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IN TRODUCTION 
On Friday, October 19, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon took 
a risky step to de-fang the Watergate investigation that had become 
a "viper in the bosom" of his Presidency.1 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals had just directed him to tum over tape-recordings subpoe­
naed by Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox; these tape­
recordings might prove or disprove White House involvement in 
the Watergate cover-up. Rather than challenge this ruling, the 
President conceived a new plan. The White House would prepare 
summaries of the nine tape-recordings in question, which would be 
verified by Senator John Stennis, a seventy-two-year-old Democrat 
from Mississippi, working alone with the assistance of a single 
White House lawyer. Cox would be entitled to the verified tran­
scripts, but nothing else. It was a generous offer, in the President's 
mind; there would be no further negotiations. 
The following day, October 20th, Cox held a dramatic press con­
ference, spelling out for the American public why he could not 
1. RICHARD NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 929 (1978). 
December 1998] The Independent Counsel 603 
agree to the Stennis proposal. President Nixon turned off his televi­
sion set and summoned Attorney General Elliot Richardson to the 
Oval Office: Cox had to be fired - immediately. Richardson re­
fused the Presidential directive and resigned. Deputy Attorney 
General William Ruckelshaus attempted to resign and was "fired" 
by the President. Finally, Solicitor General Robert Bork carried 
out the President's order, terminating Cox. "In the shock of that 
moment," one commentator later recounted, "the American public 
got a taste of what it would be like to live in a country where their 
ruler is above the law."2 A firestorm of public protest erupted that 
led to the appointment of a new special prosecutor - Leon 
Jaworski - and the slow unraveling of the Nixon presidency.3 
Nine days after the infamous "Saturday Night Massacre," 
Congress began hearings to consider legislation that would create a 
statutory special prosecutor. The purpose: allow the Watergate in­
vestigation to resume and prevent future crises such as Nixon's fir­
ing of Cox.4 A lineup of distinguished witnesses filed through the 
House and Senate to testify during those stormy days of October 
and November. Archibald Cox himself was one of the chief spokes­
men in favor of a statutorily-created special prosecutor. Before 
packing up his boxes and driving with his wife to their secluded 
farmhouse in Maine, the ousted Watergate Special Prosecutor told 
a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee that an investi­
gation by an outside, neutral prosecutor was almost essential if the 
2. Simon Lazarus & Jane E. Larson, The Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel 
Statute, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 187, 187 (1987). Lazarus participated in drafting, and lobbying 
in favor of, the final independent counsel statute as a White House advisor to President 
Jimmy Carter. Id. 
3. For a more detailed examination of these events, see KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD 
Cox: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 318-58 (1997). The White House lawyer who was intended 
to assist Senator Stennis in verifying the tapes was J. Fred Buzhardt, a friend of Stennis. Id. 
at 332. 
4. See Katy J. Harriger, Damned If She Does and Damned If She Doesn't: The Attorney 
General and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEo. L.J. 2097, 2101-02 (1998). Cox had 
been appointed Special Prosecutor by Attorney General Elliot Richardson, as part of a pack­
age by which the Senate insisted upon the selection of a neutral prosecutor for the Watergate 
case, before it approved the President's choice (Richardson) to replace Attorney General 
Richard Kleindienst, who had resigned due to allegations of impropriety in handling the 
Watergate prosecution. Cox was governed by a hastily-made charter that was drafted by 
Richardson's office and refined by Cox and Richardson even before Cox accepted the posi­
tion. See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 232-51. The charter was formalized pursuant to a regu­
lation adopted by the Attorney General. See 38 Fed. Reg. 14,688 (1973). For a copy of Cox's 
charter, designated "Duties and Responsibilities of the Special Prosecutor," see also Hear­
ings on H.J. Res. 784 and H.R. 10937 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 110 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Hearings Before the Sub­
comm. on Criminal Justice], and WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT app. I, 
at 250-51 (1975) [hereinafter WATERGATE REPORT]. 
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country was to survive1future crises like Watergate.5 As Cox reiter­
ated in a second round of congressional testimony: "The pressures, 
the tensions of divided loyalty are too much for any man, and as 
honorable and conscientious as any individual might be, the public 
could never feel entirely easy about the vigor and thoroughness 
with which the investigation was pursued. Some outside person is 
absolutely essential: "6 
Even as he testified, however, Cox was keenly aware that the 
concept of a special prosecutor divorced from the executive branch 
raised serious constitutional concerns, particularly relating to sepa­
ration of powers. But he felt strongly that an office could be crafted 
to surmount these constitutional obstacles. "[I]t is a doubt which I 
have satisfied myself that I would be willing to run,'' he told the 
Representatives, "if I were in the position of the members of the 
committee. "7 
Five years later, in 1978, the Ethics in Government Act was 
adopted by Congress after much haggling.8 It was signed into law 
on October 26, 1978, by an ebullient President Jimmy Carter.9 
Recent events in Washington have spawned an increasingly pub­
lic debate as to the effectiveness, constitutionality, and sanity of 
that nobly conceived Watergate-era statute. With the expansions in 
1998 of the Whitewater investigation by independent counsel 
Kenneth Starr, moving into the Monica Lewinsky affair10 and other 
matters only remotely connected to his original charter, the public 
questions about the independent counsel law have become intense 
and vocal. Twenty years after its adoption, the statute teeters on 
the verge of collapse .. 
Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr - a distin­
guished lawyer, former Solicitor General, and former federal ap­
peals court judge - has tested the independent counsel law as no 
other prior special prosecutor, and has revealed serious design de-
5. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 295. 
6. Removing Politics From the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th 
Cong. 200 (1974) [hereinafter Removing Politics From the Administration of Justice]. 
7. 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 307. 
8. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 1824, 
1867-73 (independent counsel provisions are codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-99 
(1994)). 
9. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Remarks on Signing S. 555 Into Law, II Pun. 
PAPERS 1854-55 (Oct. 26, 1978). 
10. See Francis X. Clines & Jeff Gerth, Subpoenas Sent as Clinton Denies Reports of an 
Affair with Aide at White House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1998, at Al; Jodi A. Enda & Angie 
Cannon, New Sex, Coverup Scandal Engulfs Clinton, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 22, 1998, at Al. 
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fects in the statute. At the time he was appointed in 1994, Starr's 
jurisdictional charter was a narrow one authorizing him to investi­
gate an Arkansas land deal involving Bill and Hillary Clinton that 
took place in the 1980s.11 From that launch pad he has gone on to 
investigate the suicide of Clinton friend and deputy White House 
Counsel Vince Foster (1994);12 irregularities in firings within the 
White House Travel Office (1996);13 alleged false statements to the 
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight by White 
House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum;14 the improper request for FBI 
background files on prominent Republicans by White House offi­
cials (1996);15 and alleged perjury and subornation of perjury by 
President Clinton, in denying a sexual affair with White House in­
tern Monica Lewinsky, during his civil deposition in the Paula Jones 
case (1998).16 
In the course of the Lewinsky investigation, and his subsequent 
referral of impeachment material to Congress, Starr has further 
tested the limits of the statute's boundaries by making prosecutorial 
11. See In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Assn., No. 94-1, 1994 WL 913274 (D.C. Cir. 
Aug. 5, 1994) (order appointing Kenneth W. Starr as Independent Counsel). · 
12. See Starr's Galaxy of Investigations, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1998, at 52. Robert Fiske had 
originally expanded his investigation into the Vmce Foster suicide, but uncovered no impro­
priety. See Peter Baker, One Death Altered Path of Presidency: Five Years Later, Clinton 
White House Still Facing Aftermath of Foster Suicide, WASH. PosT, July 20, 1998, at Al. 
Kenneth Starr later revisited the Foster matter and issued a report that found no wrongdoing 
but left many mysteries. See In re Madison Guaranty, 1994 WL 913274 (Oct. 10, 1997), (re­
port on the Death of Vmcent Foster, Jr., by the Office of the Independent Counsel). For a 
lively discussion of the Foster matter, and some of its puzzles, see Richard Brookhiser, Body 
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, § 7, at 13 (reviewing CmuSTOPHE R RUDDY, THE 
STRANGE DEATH OF VINCENT FOSTER: AN lNvEsTIGATION (1997)). 
13. The court's order expanding Starr's jurisdiction into the Travel Office matter can be 
found in In re Madison Guaranty, 1994 WL 913274 (Mar. 22, 1996) (order expanding author­
ity of the Independent Counsel to the matter of William David Watkins). 
14. The court's order expanding Starr's investigation into the Nussbaum matter can be 
found in In re Madison Guaranty, 1994 WL 913274 (Oct. 26, 1997) (order expanding author­
ity of the Independent Counsel to the matter of Bernard Nussbaum). 
15. The court's order expanding Starr's jurisdiction into the FBI files matter can be found 
in In re Madison Guaranty, 1994 WL 913274 (June 21, 1996) (order expanding authority of 
the Independent Counsel to the matter of Anthony Marceca). 
16. The court's order expanding jurisdiction in the Monica Lewinsky matter can be found 
in In re Madison Guaranty, No. 94-1, 1998 WL 472444 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998) (order ex­
panding authority of the Independent Counsel to the matter of Monica Lewinsky). Starr also 
received permission, pursuant to the Attorney General's referral powers under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 594(e) (1994), to explore whether former Deputy Attorney General (and Clinton friend) 
Webster Hubbell violated federal law in connection with his billing and expense practices 
while a member of the Rose Law Firm, of which Hillary Clinton was also a partner. See In re 
Madison Guar. Sav. and Loan Assn., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34673, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept 1, 
1994) (order expanding authority of the Independent Counsel to the matter of Webster L. 
Hubbell). For a discussion of how these spin-offs of the Whitewater case may affect future 
Presidents, see Deborah Zabarenko, Will Case Isolate Presidents? PTIT. PosT-GAZETTE, Aug. 
11, 1998, at A5. 
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decisions that (whether one agrees or disagrees with them) can cer­
tainly be categorized as aggressive. He has subpoenaed Monica 
Lewinsky's mother to testify about her daughter's sex life;17 sub­
poenaed Secret Service agents to testify about the President's 
whereabouts in the Oval Office;18 subpoenaed White House law­
yers to reveal their conversations with President Clinton concerning 
the Lewinsky case;19 and subpoenaed the President to testify before 
the grand jury, all of which culminated in impeachment proceedings 
in Congress.20 The expansive power that Starr has sought to vest in 
the independent counsel (at times with the apparent blessing of the 
attorney general and the judiciary), has prompted commentators -
Democrats, Republicans, and agnostics alike - to question 
whether the independent counsel statute has outlived its 
usefulness.21 
This Article seeks· to diagnose the troubles plaguing the in­
dependent counsel law, particularly in light of the recent blizzard of 
activity during the tenure of Whitewater Independent Counsel 
Kenneth Starr. The "sunset" provision of the statute establishes a 
deadline of June 30, 1999, by which Congress must face the difficult 
task of determining if and under what terms the statute should be 
reauthorized. This Article will offer specific proposals, arguing that 
the law is worth saving - but in a dramatically overhauled form 
designed to return the statute to its original purpose. 
17. See Naftali Bendavid , Lewinsky's Mother Testifies: Starr's Subpoena Stirs Up Ethical 
and Legal Debates, Cm. TRIB. , Feb. 11 ,  1998 , at 1 .  
18. See Peter Baker & Bill Miller, 3 Secret Service Agents Testify, WASH. PosT, July 18, 
1998 , at Al. The U.S. Court of Appeals ultimately upheld this power, and the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari on t he issue. See In re Sealed Case , 148 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998) , 
cert. denied sub nom. Rubin v. United States, No. 98-93 , 1998 WL 407152 (Nov. 9, 1998) . 
19. See Stephen Labaton, Secret Session Led to Ruling on Privilege, N. Y. T1MES, May 28, 
1998 , at A24; Ruth Marcus , Court Rejects Privilege Claim: White House Loses Appeal on 
Shielding Attorney-Client Talks, WASH. PoST, July 28, 1998 , at Al; Roger Simon , Clinton's 
Lawyers Must Testify, Rehnquist Rules, C m. TRIB. , Aug. 5 ,  1998 , at 1; Excerpts from Rules in 
Compelling Testimony of 3 in the Lewinsky Case, N.Y: TJMEs , May 28, 1998, at A24. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the power of Starr to compel testimon y from from deputy 
White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on the issue . 
See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d. 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) , cert. denied sub nom. Office of President v. 
Office of Independent Counsel , No. 98-316, 1998 WL 541012 (Nov. 9 ,  1998) . 
20. See Susan Schmidt & Ruth Marcus, President Has Been Served Subpoena: Testimony 
Sought For This Week, Legal Source Says, WASH. PoST, Jul y 26, 1998 , at Al. The White 
House worked out a deal b y  which the subpoena was withdrawn , and President Clinton re­
luctantly agreed to give his testimony b y  closed circuit television , to avoid the "indignity" of a 
personal appearance. See Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt , Clinton Agrees to Testify for Grand 
Jury, WASH. PosT, July 30, 1998, at Al; Scott Throw, A Secret Proceeding With No Secrets, 
N. Y. T1MES, Aug. 2 ,  1998 , § 4 ,  at 15. 
21. See infra note 160 and accompan ying text. 
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In Part I of the Article, I review the genealogy of the special 
prosecutor law, starting from the time of its conception in Congress 
during the Watergate crisis. Focusing upon legislative history that is 
often overlooked by scholars because much of it relates to early 
proposals that were rejected during the five-year gestation period 
of the statute, I will demonstrate that the global vision of Congress 
was quite different from the scheme which has actually developed 
under the statute. Indeed, I conclude that the independent counsel 
law has evolved into precisely the sort of "Frankenstein monster" 
that congressional leaders and commentators feared. In part due to 
the conflicting signals sent by the Supreme Court in its 1988 deci­
sion of Morrison v. Olson, 22 and in part due to the failure of the 
statutory language to match its original purpose, the law has bedev­
iled the American system of government. What began as a cautious 
piece of legislation, designed to deal primarily with extreme crises, 
has transformed itself into a runaway statute creating the 
equivalent of a permanent special prosecutor. 
In Part II of the Article, I briefly review the constitutional de­
bates that consumed the first twenty years of ,the statute's existence. 
That scholarship has largely validated the Supreme Court's decision 
in Morrison v. Olson, upholding the constitutionality of the special 
prosecutor statute. Rather than rehashing the conceptual questions 
of the past, however, I will assuriie that the general framework is 
constitutional and instead suggest that Congress should move for­
ward toward a frank examination of the tedious details of the stat­
ute, addressing its obvious gaps and patent failures. 
In Part III, I advocate over a dozen specific reforms that are 
essential if the independent counsel law is to be brought back on 
track. Tue proposed reforms fall broadly into three categories: re­
forming the process by which independent counsels are appointed; 
reforming the role of the independent counsel; and reforming the 
role of the special court. 
With respect to the appointment process, it will be argued that 
the statutory triggering device must be set much higher, so that it is 
"sprung" only rarely; the category of individuals covered by the 
statute must be dramatically reduced; and the attorney general 
must be given much more discretion to decide whether to appoint 
special prosecutors in the lion's share of cases. 
With respect to reforming the role of the independent counsel, it 
is of paramount importance that his jurisdictional limits be firmly 
22. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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established, with a strong presumption against expansion of those 
limits. As well, the independent counsel should be required to 
work full-time; should be carefully monitored to determine when 
his investigation is "substantially complete"; and should be relieved 
of the burdensome (and costly) task of producing a voluminous fi­
nal report. 
With respect to the special court, it should be given much more 
explicit duties, and authority to carry out those duties. Among 
other changes, it should be explicitly authorized to consult with the 
attorney general in selecting an independent counsel (and in deter­
mining when his or her work is "substantially complete"), and 
should possess the power to replace an independent counsel under 
certain circumstances. 
This Article concludes that the independent counsel statute is 
worth salvaging, but only if Congress pushes beyond those cosmetic 
changes adopted during previous reauthorizations. Only dramatic 
and radical reforms, bringing the special prosecutor law back to its 
post-Watergate origins, will save it from complete destruction at 
this period in American history. 
!. HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE 
The modern independent counsel law is a direct byproduct of 
the Saturday Night Massacre and the collapse of public confidence 
in government officials that followed. Although the early legisla­
tive history of the statute is often overlooked - because Congress 
did not enact the law until 1978 - an enormous amount can be 
gleaned from the initial hearings at which the concept of a statutory 
independent counsel was developed.23 
Immediately after Cox's firing in the fall of 1973, thirty-five dif­
ferent bills were introduced in the House and Senate with at least 
165 sponsors.24 Most of the focus was upon quick legislation that 
would authorize the appointment of a new Watergate Special 
Prosecutor to replace Cox, and ensure that this new appointee was 
23. Two books do an excellent job of examining the early congressional debates and hear­
ings surrounding the independent counsel law. See TERRY EASTLAND, Enucs, PoLmcs 
AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL: EXECUTIVE POWER, EXECUTIVE VICE 1789-1989, at 31-65 
{1989); KATY J. lIAruuGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN 
AMERICAN PoLmcs 40-72 {1992). 
24. See HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 43. During the remainder of the 93d Congress 
alone, at least 57 bills providing for special prosecutors were introduced. See Constance 
O'Keefe & Peter Safirstein, Note, Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers, and the Saturday 
Night Massacre: An Examination of the Practical, Constitutional, and Political Tensions in the 
Special Prosecutor Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 113, 118 
n.29 {1982) (citing CONG. INDEX {CCH) 222 {1974)). 
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protected from another "massacre" by the executive branch.25 Yet 
congressional leaders also had an eye on long-term corrective meas­
ures. Their broader goal was to institutionalize the position of spe­
cial prosecutor in order to deal with future crises in unborn 
administrations. 
A. An Urgent Push for Legislation 
One of the first and most significant bills, S. 2611, was intro­
duced in October 1973 by Senator Birch Bayh, Jr. (D. Ind.), a 
prominent member of the Judiciary Committee. The Bayh bill, a 
bipartisan legislative effort joined by fifty-five other Senators, pro­
posed the creation of a temporary (rather than a permanent) spe­
cial prosecutor, appointed by the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia.26 Although there was a flurry of other proposals -
including a bill sponsored by Senator Taft that would have allowed 
the appointment of a special prosecutor by the attorney general in 
consultation with the Senate27 - the germ of the original concept 
offered by Senator Bayh was the one that ultimately prevailed five 
years later. 
The cast of legal scholars and political leaders who supplied tes­
timony for and against the proposed legislation was quite remarka­
ble. Besides Cox himself, Senators Adlai E. Stevenson III (D. ID.) 
and Robert Taft, Jr. (R. Ohio), Acting Attorney General Robert H. 
Bork, Harvard Law Professor Paul Freund, Chicago Law Professor 
Philip B. Kurland, former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, and 
a spectrum of other luminaries paraded through the Capital to offer 
guidance.28 
Professor Freund, a preeminent constitutional scholar, sought to 
allay the immediate concerns of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
25. See HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 42-43. 
26. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 98-100. The 
general concept embodied in t he Bayh bill was debated extensively in t he Senate. See also 
Special Prosecutor Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. (1973) 
[hereinafter Special Prosecutor Hearings]. S. 2611 was first introduced b y  Senator Bayh on 
October 26, 1973, and is reported in S. REP. No. 93-596 (1973). In t he House, H.R. 11401 
took a similar approach. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 35-36. Although t he original ver­
sion of t he Bayh bill provided for t he District Court (i.e. Judge Si rica) to appoint the special 
prosecutor directly, later amendments to S. 2611 provided t hat t he district court , sitting en 
bane, would designate a panel of three of its members to appoint the special prosecutor. See 
S. REP. No. 93-596. This approach t hus mirrored t hat embodied in House Bill 11401. See 
EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 35. 
27. Senator Taft's bill, S. 2642, was introduced on November 2, 1973. See S .  REP. No. 93-
596, (1973). For a discussion of this and other early bills, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 35-
36; O 'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at 118 n.29. 
28. See Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at III-IV. 
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that any plan divorcing the special prosecutor from the executive 
branch would be :flatly unconstitutional. Freund mollified the Sena­
tors by reporting that forty-nine deans of American law schools and 
the American Bar Association had endorsed the Bayh bill or simi­
lar legislation. "I think that if you are really interested in the inde­
pendence of the prosecutor," Freund told the Senators, "you have 
to forgo executive control."29 Professor Kurland of the University 
of Chicago Law School submitted written comments supporting the 
law,30 as did Harvard Law Professors Philip B. Heymann and 
Stephen Breyer, both of whom had worked on Cox's Watergate 
Special Prosecution force.31 
Archibald Cox spent the bulk of his Senate testimony setting 
forth the facts relating to his termination.32 A week later in the 
House, however, Cox was more focused on the special prosecutor 
proposal. He strongly urged the passage of such legislation, in part 
because it would solve the problem of "divided loyalty or conflict of 
interest" that had been so evident in the Justice Department during 
Watergate.33 Cox also felt - although he understood the constitu­
tional complexities of the issue - that Congress would be wise to 
vest the power of appointing special prosecutors in the U.S. District 
Court. The judiciary, he felt, assured the "greatest independence" 
from political pressure. It also offered the greatest "appearance" of 
that virtue. 34 
At the same time, the concerns of those who opposed this legis­
lation were taken quite seriously. Dean Roger C. Cramton of 
Cornell Law School voiced a worry that would haunt the legislation 
until its passage five years later: the special prosecutor law would 
29. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 368. The "Statement by Law School 
Deans" endorsing such legislation is reprinted in Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26 , 
at 551. 
30. See Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 319. 
31. See Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26 , at 556-60. 
32. For a brief exchange in the Senate hearings in which Cox spoke about proposed legis­
lation, and suggested that a special prosecutor under the supervision of the courts was proba­
bly constitutional, see Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26 , at 29-31. 
33. 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4 , at 295 (remarks 
of Archibald Cox). 
34. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4 ,  at 304 . In 
the event that Congress feared the constitutional uncertainties of placing this power in the 
judiciary, Cox suggested that an acceptable compromise might be to provide for the appoint­
ment of the special prosecutor by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
However, the District Court would remain in charge of appointments if Congress was in 
recess, to avoid manipulation of the process by the executive branch. See 1973 Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4 ,  at 304. 
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allow Congress and the courts to usurp the function of the execu­
tive branch. Cramton explained: 
The prosecution of crime is an essential element of the executive 
function in the American scheme of government. Although the Con­
stitution shares and diffuses powers among the three branches in a 
manner that departs from the purity urged by Montesquieu, the fun­
damental scheme calls for the legislature to write the laws, an execu­
tive to enforce them, and a judiciary to interpret them in individual 
cases.35 
Federal District Judge John Sirica, the Watergate icon who had 
resuscitated the original Justice Department prosecution of that 
case and had displayed great courage in directing President Nixon 
to turn over the tapes to Cox, wrote a letter. to the Judiciary Com­
mittee admitting that he was leery of any statute that shifted the 
responsibility to appoint and supervise the special prosecutor onto 
the shoulders of the judiciary.36 District Judge Gerhard Gesell, in 
an opinion handed down shortly thereafter declaring that the dis­
missal of Special Prosecutor Cox had been invalid, joined Judge 
Sirica in warning against the intermingling of executive and judicial 
functions. Gesell cited the memory of Judge Learned Hand, cau­
tioning: "Prosecution and judgment are two quite separate func­
tions in the administration of justice; they must not merge. "37 
Perhaps the most ardent critic of the proposed new legislation 
was the man who had fired Archibald Cox at the direction of Presi­
dent Nixon. Acting Attorney General Robert Bork, in Senate testi­
mony, focused on the separation of powers issue and hammered 
away at it. "The Executive alone," Bork contended, "has the duty 
and the power to enforce the laws by prosecutions brought before 
the courts."38 If Congress was permitted to take away that duty 
from the executive branch, 
I do not see why Congress could not simply abolish the Antitrust Di­
vision or the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice and hand 
their law enforcement functions over to itself, to the courts, or to the 
35. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 352. 
36. See Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 556. 
37. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C. 1973) (quoting United States v. 
Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir. 1945)). Judge Gesell (like Judge Sirica) was responding 
to suggestions that the judiciary should shoulder the task of appointing a new special prose­
cutor to replace Cox and finish the Watergate case. He wrote these words in ruling that 
Robert Bork's firing of Cox was illegal, in the context of a civil suit brought by citizen activist 
Ralph Nader. Cox himself never put much stock in Gesell's ruling, and took no steps to have 
himself reinstated. See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 558 n.135. 
38. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 451. 
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Secretary of State. I do not see why it could not abolish the Depart­
ment of Justice and enforce the laws itself on such a theory.39 
Bork concluded bluntly: "That is simply not our system of 
government. "40 
In the House of Representatives, where simultaneous hearings 
had been launched to consider parallel legislation,41 Bork was even 
more insistent. He feared that the creation of statutorily-built spe­
cial prosecutors would encourage witch hunts of the sort made infa­
mous by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s,42 with "ugly legal 
and political results." The idea of a permanent special prosecutor 
- which was being floated in some House and Senate proposals -
was even more alarming to Bork. In a phrase that would be much­
quoted in later years, Bork warned: "[W]hat you are doing is build­
ing an office whose sole function is to attack the executive branch 
throughout its tenure. It is an institutionalized wolf hanging on the 
flank of the elk, which does not seem to me to be the way to run a 
government. "43 
One House Judiciary Committee member, Republican 
Lawrence J. Hogan of Maryland, summed it up in equally dark 
terms: "Now, my question is, do you think that maybe we are creat­
ing a Frankenstein monster, creating someone that does not have to 
answer to anyone, to have unfettered power . . .  ?"44 
All of those debating the issue, both for and against the pro­
posed legislation, understood that the legal questions facing Con­
gress were grave ones. 
39. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 452. 
40. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 451. 
41. Although the House hearings jumbled together debate on at least ten different bills, 
the focus was on a joint House-Senate resolution (H.RJ. Res. 784) and a House bill (H.R. 
11401) that- like the Bayh bill in the Senate - sought to create a temporary special prose­
cutor supervised by the courts. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, 
supra note 4, at 98 (remarks of Senator Bayh). Technically, H.R.J. Res. 784 was designed to 
preserve the machinery of the existing Watergate Special Prosecution Force in the wake of 
Cox's firing. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 28. 
H.R. 11401 was a broader bill that would have allowed the courts to create future special 
prosecutors. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 
487. 
42. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 263 
(remarks of Hon. Robert Bork). McCarthy, a Republican from WJSconsin, led controversial 
Senate hearings aimed at proving that Communists had infiltrated positions of trust in the 
U.S. government. The McCarthy hearings were later discredited as driven by political para· 
noia. See generally, RoBERT GRIFFITII, THE PoLrTics OF FEAR: JosEPH R. McCARTHY AND 
THE SENATE (1970). 
43. 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 263. 
44. 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 188. 
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B. The Constitutional Quandaries 
Three constitutional issues dominated the debate during those 
early hearings on the special prosecutor law. These were the same 
three issues that would occupy Congress and scholars for the next 
two decades. 
1. The Appointments Clause 
First, there was a question whether Congress had the power to 
place authority to select a special prosecutor in the judicial branch, 
without violating the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2 
of the Constitution.45 The 1839 decision of Ex parte Hennen stated 
that "the appointing power . . .  was no doubt intended to be exer­
cised by the department of the government to which the officer to 
be appointed most appropriately belonged,"46 which permitted the 
inference that the appointment of a special prosecutor could be del­
egated only to the executive branch. Yet, a later decision seemed to 
abandon this rigid interpretation.47 The Court in Ex parte Siebold 
had stated that although certain election supervisors were executive 
creatures, Congress could authorize the judiciary to appoint them.48 
Even though it might be "usual and proper to vest the appointment 
of inferior officers in that department . . . to which the duties of 
such officers appertain," the Court concluded, there was "no abso­
lute requirement to this effect in the Constitution."49 This decision 
provided a credible basis for the argument that the judiciary could 
appoint special prosecutors. Yet the precedent remained murky.50 
45. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides that the President, with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, shall have the power to "appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law 
• . . .  " The section goes on to provide, however, that "the Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2. Thus, early 
cases distinguished between "principal officers" (who could be.appointed only by the Presi­
dent) and "inferior officers" (whom Congress had some discretion to appoint themselves or 
delegate power to others to do so). See, e.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 
(1878). 
46. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257-58 (1839) (upholding the ability of federal district courts to 
appoint their own clerks). 
47. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). 
48. See Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397-98. 
49. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397. 
50. The Court in Siebold concluded that the question in each case turned on whether the 
exercise of appointment power by the judiciary (or any other branch) created an "incon­
gruity," because it was inconsistent with the powers of another branch. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 
398. For a discussion of the Appointment Clause debate in Congress, see EASTLAND, supra 
note 23, at 36-38. Cf. O'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at 128-35; Robert G. Solloway, 
Note, The Institutionalized Wolf: An Analysis of the Unconstitutionality of the Independent 
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2. The Removal Controversy 
The second perplexing question was whether the removal provi­
sion of the legislation - that would locate power to remove the 
special prosecutor in the judiciary - encroached upon the Presi­
dent's domain. The Constitution nowhere explicitly stated whether 
Congress, the President, or both possessed the power to remove 
federal officers once they were appointed. When it came to certain 
subordinate employees who clearly served at the will of the Presi­
dent, an early case suggested that the President was vested with 
power to "remove an officer when in his discretion he regards it for 
the public good. "51 When it came to a hodgepodge of other federal 
officials, however, the precedent was blurred. Myers v. United 
States suggested that the Chief Executive's removal power was 
broad.52 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, decided a decade 
later, abandoned that stance and suggested that the President could 
be prevented statutorily from removing certain officials in the exec­
utive branch, so long as they were not "purely executive officers."53 
United States v. Wiener reinforced Humphrey's "functional" 
approach.54 
Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 21 IND. L. REv. 955, 969-73 
{1988). 
51. Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 343 {1897) (involving the removal of a U.S. 
Attorney by President Grover Cleveland). 
52. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Myers involved an attempt by Congress to require the Senate's 
assent before the President could remove certain postmasters. The Court took a "formalis­
tic" approach, declaring that "[t]he power of removal is incident to the power of appoint­
ment." 272 U.S. at 122. The presidential power to appoint a postmaster thus implied the 
power of removal. Chief Justice Taft (formerly President Taft) expressed in dicta a broad 
view of the President's power. According to Taft, the Chief Executive could constitutionally 
remove "executive officers and members of executive tribunals," even those who had "duties 
of a quasi-judicial character." 272 U.S. at 135. This was so because the President possessed 
an independent duty to faithfully execute the law, as he saw fit. See 272 U.S. at 135. 
53. 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935). Humphrey's Executor acknowledged that the President 
could remove "purely executive officers" without cause. 295 U.S at 631-32. But the Presi­
dent had no inherent power to remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FfC), in 
Humphrey's, because this Commissioner exercised quasi-judicial and legislative functions 
and was not a "purely executive officer." 295 U.S. at 628-32. President Roosevelt had re­
moved Humphrey from the FfC after only two years in the position, even though Congress 
had established a seven-year term for the Commissioners and stipulated that the President 
could only remove those officers for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 
The modem version of the relevant statute can be found at 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 (West 1997). 
54. See 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958). Wiener reaffirmed the Humphrey's Executor approach, 
concluding that the President could not remove a member of the War Claims Commission. 
That body was established to adjudicate claims of individuals who had suffered personal in­
jury or property losses during World War II. Despite congressional silence as to removal 
power, the Court concluded that the Commission in question was designed to remain free of 
executive interference, and the Commissioners' duties were "quasi-judicial" in nature. Re­
moval power thus did not attach to the President. See 357 U.S. at 356. For a discussion of the 
removal issue, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 38-40; Laura L. Cox, Case Note, Political 
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The latter two cases thus provided a certain amount of comfort 
for those supporting special prosecutor legislation in the wake of 
Watergate. At the same time, congressional leaders were acutely 
aware that the proposed special prosecutor would be assigned 
prosecutorial functions that looked and smelled uniquely executive. 
Thus, even the most generous removal cases - Humphrey's Execu­
tor and Wiener - provided only shaky guideposts.ss 
3. The Separation of Powers Bugaboo 
The third question that nagged the draftsmen of the special 
prosecutor law subsumed the other two. Did the proposed legisla­
tion run broadside into the doctrine of separation of powers? The 
separation of powers doctrine warned that no branch of govern­
ment should aggrandize itself by usurping. the powers directly or 
implicitly assigned to another branch.s6 Dean Cramton of Cornell 
Law School neatly summed up the principle during one House 
hearing: "Each of the three branches of Government has a central 
core of functions upon which the other branches may not unduly 
encroach," Cramton explained. "[T]he basic tasks of one branch 
cannot be removed from it and placed in either another branch or 
an independent agency."s7 Because the Constitution mandated 
that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe­
cuted,"S8 did it not follow that one of the "core functions" of the 
executive branch was criminal prosecution? If that was the case, 
did it not further follow that any effort to encroach upon this "core 
Accountability and the Independent Counsel· A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing? 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 
1471, 1483-85 (1989). 
55. For a more complete discussion of the constitutional removal question, see Cox, supra 
note 54, at 1483-85; O'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at 135-39; Solloway, supra note 50, 
at 973-76. 
56. The doctrine of separation of powers dates back at least as far as the writings of John 
Locke. See Malcolm P. Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Pow­
ers," 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 385, 387-88 (1935). James Madison was one of the earliest proponents 
of the doctrine in America. Writing in The Federalist No. 47, Madison explained that the 
doctrine was essential because "there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive 
powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 
325 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Following the theory of Montesquieu, 
Madison maintained that absolute separation among the three branches was not required; 
rather, some overlap was both necessary and desirable. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra, at 
327-31. 
57. 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 339 (testi­
mony of Dean Roger C. Cramton). 
58. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3. 
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function" of the executive branch by passing it off to an unelected 
special prosecutor was constitutionally impermissible?59 
The appointment, removal, and separation of powers issues thus 
divided experts from the start, leading to lengthy (and unsatisfying) 
hearings as Congress struggled to fit a square peg into an oblong 
hole.60 
A brief reprieve was granted to Congress on November 19, 
1973, just one month after Cox's firing, when Leon Jaworski was 
appointed as successor Watergate prosecutor.61 Jaworski's appoint­
ment removed pressure on congressional leaders to find an instant 
solution to the special prosecutor quandary. The following day, 
November 20th, the Senate brought its hearings to a close, ending 
the opening volley of debate. 
Yet that first round of hearings in 1973, at which the concept of 
a statutory independent counsel was invented and roughly defined, 
shed important light on Congress's original vision of that office. It 
revealed that the statutory special prosecutor was designed, most 
immediately, to prevent the recurrence of a naked exercise of exec­
utive power that had manifested itself in the Saturday Night Massa­
cre of Watergate. Second, it was designed to build into the 
American system of government a failsafe mechanism that would 
protect future generations from constitutional meltdowns by al­
lowing the judiciary (rather than the attorney general) to appoint 
and monitor this neutral prosecutor. At the same time, Congress 
understood that the law had to carefully circumscribe the roles of 
the president, the attorney general, and the courts, if it was to be 
effective and constitutional. The initial goal of the statute was to 
59. For a fuller discussion of the separation of powers issue, see EASTLAND, supra note 
23, at 40-41; Cox, supra note 54, at 1478-83; Solloway, supra note 50, at 963-68. 
60. A nice discussion of these issues as they were intertwined with the early special prose­
cutor law hearings can be found in EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 35-41. Some examples of the 
discussions of the appointment, removal, and separation of powers issues in the early con­
gressional debates can be found in 1 Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: 
Hearings on S. 495 Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, 94th Cong. 240-43 (1975) 
[hereinafter Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations] (remarks of Erwin 
Griswold); 2 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra (remarks of 
Michael L. Uhlmann); Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 28-32 (remarks of 
Archibald Cox); Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 26, at 479-86 (dissenting views of 
Representative Mcclory et al.). 
61. This was accomplished pursuant to a carefully worded order of Acting Attorney Gen­
eral Bork that required consent of a Senate Committee before Jaworski could be terminated. 
See Atty. Gen. Order No. 551-73, 38 Fed. Reg. 30,738 (1973); GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 380-
81, 547 & n.25. Technically, Jaworski was named by the White House to replace Cox on 
November 1st. See Remarks of Acting Attorney General Robert H. Bork Announcing His 
Appointment of Leon Jaworski, 9 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1303 (Nov. 1, 1973). Bork's 
formal order re-establishing the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, however, was not is­
sued until several weeks later. See HARruGER, supra note 23, at 43, 228 & nn.18-19. 
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maintain a delicate balance among the three branches of govern­
ment, while grafting onto it a fourth sprig that would support 
weight only during brief, unusual moments of crisis. 
C. A New Start: Permanent Special Prosecutors and 
Other Proposals 
In August 1974, President Richard M. Nixon left the White 
House on a drab green helicopter, and the torment of Watergate 
was brought to a close. Congress resumed debate over special pros­
ecution legislation in the calmer environs of the Ford administra­
tion. Senator Sam Ervin's Watergate Committee issued a final 
report in June 1974, recommending the creation of a permanent Of­
fice of Public Attorney, whose occupant would serve the function of 
a special prosecutor whenever conflicts in the executive branch 
arose.62 By 1975, Ervin's idea found embodiment in a new piece of 
legislation - S. 495 - that proposed the creation of a permanent 
special prosecutor lodged in the Office of Public Attorney, under 
the control of three retired judges from the U.S. Court of 
Appeals.63 
The debates over S. 495 are routinely overlooked by scholars, 
because the concept of a permanent special prosecutor never took 
root. But it is unfortunate that this legislative history has been for­
gotten. Not only are the debates involving S. 495 fascinating and 
lively, but they provide invaluable clues concerning the nature of 
the legislation that Congress was attempting to build during the 
five-year gestation period of the independent counsel law. The 
hearings relating to S. 495 that absorbed the 94th and 95th Con­
gresses are critical because they make explicit what had been im­
plicit when the special prosecutor law was first conceived in 1973: 
that the finished legislation was meant to deal with rare, major cri­
ses like Watergate and the Teapot Dome scandal of the 1920s, 
rather than garden variety scandals that routinely dogged high level 
officials in any administration. 
S. 495, the Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975, 
was introduced by Senator Abraham Ribicoff at the start of the 
94th Congress on January 30, 1975. The initial version of this legis-
62. See SAM ERVIN, FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT CoMMITTEE ON PRESIDEN­
TIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 93-981, at 80-81 (1974) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT 
OF THE SENATE SELECT CoMMITTEE]. Senator Ervin also chaired a subcommittee of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee that Spring, which considered proposals to establish a perma­
nent "special" or "public" prosecutor. See Removing Politics from Administration of Justice, 
supra note 6. 
63. A copy of S. 495 can be found at S. REP .  No. 94-823, at 159 (1976). 
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lation proposed creating an Office of Public Attorney that would 
operate independently of the Department of Justice and the Presi­
dent. It would investigate and prosecute abuses in the executive 
branch and relating to federal elections, with appointment to be 
made by the special judicial panel for a five-year renewable term.64 
The logic behind S. 495 was similar to that underlying the string 
of special prosecutor bills that had preceded it. Washington lawyer 
Lloyd N. Cutler, who had worked with Senator Ervin on an early 
draft of the bill (and would later ·serve as White House Counsel to 
Presidents Carter and Clinton), explained the purpose of S. 495 in 
fundamental terms: "The Attorney General and his principal as­
sistants in the Department of Justice are not simply prosecuting of­
ficers but also appointees of the President and members of an 
elected administration team that usually hopes for reelection. They 
have an obvious conflict of interest when they investigate whether 
crimes have been committed in their own election campaigns or 
thereafter by high officers of the executive branch. "65 
Not only would the appointment of a permanent Public Prose­
cutor - charged with examining alleged improprieties in the execu­
tive branch on a regular basis - allow a neutral outsider to remain 
"on call" to investigate allegations of corruption, but the mere pres­
ence of such a "watchdog" would presumably discourage abuses of 
the law in the first place. 66 
The response to S. 495 was swift, loud, and intensely negative. 
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., who had been a key legislative fig­
ure throughout Watergate, declared that the bill would "establish a 
virtually inviolate fourth branch of Government, and would sub-
64. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 2-3. See 
also S. REP. No. 94-823, at 93-99 (1976). 
65. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 207-08. 
There was a great deal of concern expressed in the hearings about conflicts of interest involv­
ing the Attorney General. One source of particular concern related to the practice of some 
modem Presidents to appoint their campaign managers and political advisors as Attorneys 
General, heightening the chance of partisan political influence upon those individuals. See 
Jack Maskell, Legislative History and Purposes of Enactment of the Independent Counsel 
(Special Prosecutor) Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, at 3-6 (Mar. 4, 1987), 
microformed on Major Studies and Issue Briefs of the Congressional Research Service, 1987-
88 Supplement, Reel 30784 (Univ. Publications of Am.). 
66. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 90 
(remarks of Sam Dash). Professor Dash, former Chief Counsel to the Senate Watergate 
Committee who helped draft an earlier version of the bill, did not view the purpose of the 
statute as creating a permanent special prosecutor, per se. "You do not have a public attor­
ney running wild beginning any prosecution he wants and interfering with the Attorney Gen­
eral. Most often he acts as an ombudsman making inquiries. Only rarely, in a crisis, does he 
become a special prosecutor." Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra 
note 60, at 89. 
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stantially diminish the accountability of law-enforcement officials to 
the President, the Congress, and the American people."67 Veteran 
presidential advisor Clark M. Clifford opposed the measure as 
overkill. "My experience in Washington for the past 30 years," 
Clifford told the assembled Senators, "convinces me that corruption 
in federal government is rare; it is an aberration and an exception. 
Excessive zeal or possibly boredom by the Public Attorney, or a 
desire to avoid being tagged as a 'do-nothing'' could lead to petty 
prosecutions and harassment of persons in the Executive Branch 
• • • •  "68 
Philip A. Lacovara, a Republican who had worked with 
Archibald Cox and Leon Jaworski on the Watergate Special Prose­
cution Force (and argued United States v. Nixon in the Supreme 
Court) warned that such legislation would undercut the role en­
trusted to the Attorney General since 1789. "Even though I con­
sider the work of the Special Prosecutor's Office to be a major 
contribution to vindication of the rule of law and indeed to public 
confidence in government," stated Lacovara, "it does not follow 
that such a function should be institutionalized permanently."69 
Lacovara also feared that the jurisdiction of the proposed Public 
Attorney was too "open-ended." It would allow a permanent pros­
ecutor "to inquire into every instance of alleged mismanagement or 
petty bungling by every minor bureaucrat in the Executive 
Branch."70 
Former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, a Watergate hero 
who recently had been appointed Ambassador to Great Britain, 
told the Senate Committee in· a letter from London that the ap­
pointment of a special prosecutor was (and should remain) a rare 
occurrence in American history. S. 495 was a dangerous piece of 
legislation because it would transform such appointments into a 
preoccupation: "I feel strongly that this [establishment of a perma­
nent Special Prosecutor's office] is neither necessary nor desirable," 
Richardson wrote. He continued: 
67. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 21. The 
Watergate Special Prosecution Force mirrored Senator Baker's concerns, noting that a "spe­
cial organization" rarely remains "special" for more than several years before turning into a 
rigid bureaucratic body. See WATERGATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 138. "Such rigidity is 
especially likely, and especially harmful, in an agency that is as unaccountable as a permanent 
special prosecutor would be." WATERGATE REPORT, SUPRA note 4, at 139. 
68. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 204. 
69. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 262. 
70. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 270-71. 
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It implies that the kin,ds of problems which twice in our history (Tea­
pot Dome and Watergate) have called for the creation of a Special 
Prosecutor's office are chronic and continuing. To put it the other 
way around, it assumes that the regularly constituted law enforcement 
authorities are neither sufficiently competent nor trustworthy to be 
capable of dealing with the more-or-less routine problems of corrup­
tion and abuse of power that have to be dealt with from year to year. 
I do not believe that this assumption is warranted.71 
The American Bar Association (A.B.A.) likewise panned the 
idea of a permanent special prosecutor as undesirable and unwise. 
In a report issued for the benefit of Congress, the A.B.A. declared 
S. 495 to be legislative overkill. In most cases, the A.B.A. insisted, 
the Attorney General could appoint a special U.S. Attorney or As­
sistant Attorney General to handle a case in which a potential con­
flict existed - and build a "Chinese Wall" around this government 
lawyer - rather than going to the extraordinary lengths of ap­
pointing a special prosecutor. Only in "exceptional circumstances," 
the A.B.A. report suggested, was it desirable that a special prosecu­
tor from outside the Department of Justice should be recruited.72 
Senator Howard Baker concluded the assault on the proposed 
"permanent special prosecutor" bill by quoting an ominous passage 
from History of the Republic of the United States, authored in 1859: 
"Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of confu­
sion . . .  to gratify momentary passions, by letting into government 
principles and precedents which afterwards prove fatal to 
themselves. "73 
Hit by this barrage of opposition, supporters of S. 495 sought to 
amend the bill to delete the permanent Public Attorney provision 
and provide for an elaborate temporary special prosecutor provi­
sion, similar to that proposed by Archibald Cox (among others) 
during earlier hearings.74 This new version of the bill relied upon a 
71. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 284-85. 
72. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 418. The 
AB.A. report appears in Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 
60, at 342-430, and is entitled Removing Political Influence From Federal Law Enforcement 
Agencies. The A.B.A. position found support in the WATERGATE REPORT, supra note 4, 
published by the Cox-Jaworski prosecutors in October 1975. The Watergate Report took the 
unusual step of declaring the idea of a permanent special prosecutor unacceptable: 
Central to the question is the fact that such a public officer would be largely immune 
from the accountability that prosecutors and other public officials constantly face. Lack 
of accountability of an official on a permanent basis carries a potential for abuse of 
power that far exceeds any enforcement gains that might ensue. 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 437. 
73. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt Operations, supra note 60, at 84 n.75 
(quoting JoHN c. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (1859)). 
74. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 46, 50. Cox and former Attorney General Ramsey 
Clark had offered this proposal. Id. at 50. 
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mechanism by which a special prosecutor could be appointed by a 
special judicial panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals, after a prelimi­
nary investigation conducted by the Attorney General, if sufficient 
evidence existed of high-level misconduct.75 
Although Senate opponents may have been mollified by the 
newly overhauled S. 495, the White House was not. President Ford 
sent a stiffly-worded communication to the Senate on July 19, 1976, 
raising multiple constitutional concerns about the revised legisla­
tion. Not only did this proposed statute resurrect worrisome sepa­
ration of powers issues, the White House transmission stated, but 
the whole notion of a temporary special prosecutor sprouting up 
outside the Department of Justice unleashed a host of practical 
problems. President Ford's official communication stated: "The 
Department of Justice estimates that if S. 495 were now law, ap­
proximately half a dozen special prosecutors would have to be ap­
pointed, and close to 50 other matters possibly requiring 
appointment would be under advisement by a special court." This 
"extraordinary result," concluded the President, was bad for the 
American legal system and bad for the country.76 
In its place, the White House transmission proposed yet another 
version of S. 495 that would make the special prosecutor (once 
again) a permanent creature. Three important changes, however, 
were introduced to make it a net gain for the executive branch. 
Under the new White House plari., the special prosecutor would be 
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Sen­
ate, for a three year term. This would allow the President to con­
trol, to a large extent, the appointment process. Even more 
importantly, the special prosecutor would remain within the Justice 
Department, meaning that the Attorney General would retain su­
pervisory and removal power over this official. Finally, the White 
House proposal would make the independent counsel law applica­
ble to allegations of criminal wrongdoing in all three branches of 
government, including Congress and the judiciary. This would en­
sure that the executive branch was not singled out for adverse treat-
75. See id. at 50-51; MASKELL, supra note 65, at 7. This version of S. 495 included a 
mechanism by which the Attorney General was required to petition a three-judge division of 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for the appointment of a special prosecu­
tor under certain circumstances. See generally S. REP. No. 94-823 (1976). 
76. See Watergate Reforms: Communication from the President of the United States, 
Transmitting Proposed Substitute Language to Correct Constitutional and Practical Problems 
Contained in S. 495, H.R. Doc. No. 94-550, at 5 (1976) [hereinafter Watergate Reforms]. 
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ment. What was good for the goose was good for the legislative 
gander.77 
In response to an intense lobbying blitz by Attorney General 
Edward Levi (who ardently defended President Ford's plan), and in 
order to make peace with the White House in anticipation of diffi­
cult congressional elections in the Fall, the Senate switched alle­
giance to the President's revised version of S. 495, and approved it 
by a vote of 91 to 5.78 
But in the House, the retooled version of S. 495 drew harsh criti­
cism from those who feared the notion of a permanent special pros­
ecutor in any form. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, objected: "I think the circumstances that are 
contemplated [for appointment of a special prosecutor] are unusual 
circumstances, which I think arise because of unusual events, and 
therefore would require us to act in an extraordinary manner. I do 
not believe that setting up the Office of Permanent Special Prosecu­
tor would meet that kind of an exigency."79 
Archibald Cox, having returned to his faculty position at 
Harvard Law School, flew back to Washington to testify against the 
Ford administration proposal. He worried that it would create too 
many special prosecutors too easily. Cox told a House Subcommit­
tee that a permanent special prosecutor, even one given the bless­
ing of the Senate, reflected too little trust in the Justice 
Department. "In the end," insisted Cox, "we have to rely upon the 
integrity of men, particularly on the integrity of the Attorney Gen­
eral and of the lawyers in the Department of Justice; and I am con­
vinced that on the whole and over the years they have proved fully 
worthy of that trust." It was a bad idea, he told the Representatives 
in conclusion, to attempt to "substitute laws for character."80 
Cox reminded the House Subcommittee that the original point 
of the legislation was as follows: 
there may be a few extraordinary situations like the Teapot Dome 
scandal, or like the Watergate affair, in which it is not fair to ask any 
Attorney General to be responsible for the investigation and prosecu­
tion because so much is at stake; and while many of them no doubt 
77. The White House proposal is set forth in Ford's transmission to the Senate. See 
Watergate Reforms, supra note 76. 
78. See Provision for Special Prosecutor: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Jus­
tice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1-3 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice]; EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 52-54. For a discus­
sion of the political concerns hovering over Congress before the 1976 elections, see 
lIARruGER, supra note 23, at 50-59. 
79. 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 153-54. 
80. 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 155. 
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would act with complete honor and integrity, questions would be 
raised about full public confidence. As I understand it, the original 
conception was that this would be truly a very narrow class of excep­
tional cases. 81 
In lieu of S. 495, Cox proposed the creation of a temporary special 
prosecutor who would be appointed by a panel of U.S. Court of 
Appeals judges, but only in a very narrow category of cases. In 
other cases, the attorney general would have discretion to apply for 
a special prosecutor, but no legal duty to do so.82 
Cox's proposed law (which looked much like the special prose­
cutor law that was ultimately adopted in 1978), was designed in 
such a way that it would rarely be triggered.83 Cox and others 
feared that if the permanent model was adopted, Congress's quest 
to cure abuses in the executive branch would lead to overuse. 84 In 
some cases it might lead to abuse by over-ambitious special prose­
cutors. As John Doar, former special counsel to the House Judici­
ary Committee, expressed it: 
With the whole criminal code at his disposal, the permanent special 
prosecutor could embark on a self-defined crusade for all sorts of rea­
sons including making a name for himself. The idea that any federal 
official, appointed not elected, should have the uncontrolled power to 
thumb through the entire federal criminal code as a basis for investi­
gating a targeted group of public officials is anathema to me.85 
The cautious position of Cox and others who shared his view 
won the day. President Ford's proposal calling for a permanent 
special prosecutor within the executive branch died in the House, 
where Representatives were skittish about the upcoming Fall elec­
tion. 86 Democrats quickly regained control of the White House and 
increased their majority in Congress.87 Buoyed by this success (and 
with Republicans shell-shocked from their significant losses in the 
election as a backlash to Watergate), Senators Abraham A. Ribicoff 
(D. Conn.), Charles H. Percy (R. ID.), and twenty-four co-sponsors 
introduced S. 555 on February 2, 1977.88 
81. 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 155-56. 
82. See 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 157-58. 
83. See 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 155-56, 
158-59. 
84. See 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 155-59. 
85. 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 172. 
86. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 55; HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 66. 
87. HARRINGER, supra note 23, at 59. 
88. See O'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at 119 n.29. 
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D. Legislation Is Born: S. 555 
S. 555 was the infant version of what became mature legislation 
the following year. As Senator Ribicoff explained the bill, it estab­
lished a mechanism for creating a temporary special prosecutor, "to 
deal with the extraordinary case involving criminal misconduct of 
high-level Government of:ficials."89 It closely resembled the second 
version of S. 495 that had been poised for approval before President 
Ford's compromise intervened. In line with recommendations by a 
special committee of the A.B.A., the bill provided that the special 
prosecutor would be appointed by a panel of U.S. Court of Appeals 
judges upon application of the attorney general.90 S. 555 faced the 
same recurring constitutional issues (appointment, removal, and 
separation of powers) that had confronted each prior bill. Yet the 
opposition was weakening. Senator Baker offered an amendment 
attempting to move the special prosecutor back to the Department 
of Justice.91 Senator Ribicoff rehashed four years of congressional 
debates and swiftly dismissed Senator Baker's challenge.92 The 
amendment failed and on June 27, 1977, S. 555 soared through the 
Senate by a vote of 74 to 5.93 
After a full year of delays due to unrelated ethics provisions that 
were bogged down in the House, the House and Senate hammered 
out a deal by which the Senate version of S. 555 was incorporated 
into a joint piece of legislation.94 On October 7, 1978, the related 
conference report was adopted by the Senate.95 On October 12th, 
by an overwhelming margin of 370 to 23, the Ethics in Government 
Act of 1978 was enacted by the House, containing (in Title VI of 
the legislation) the Senate's version of the special prosecutor provi-
89. 123 CoNG. REc. 20,956 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Ribicofi) (emphasis added). 
90. See 123 CONG. REc. 20,970 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Scott); HARRIGER, supra note 23, 
at 59-60. For a detailed discussion of the A.B.A. recommendations concerning a temporary 
special prosecutor, see MASKELL, supra note 65, at 9-12. 
91. See 123 CoNG. REc. 20,996 (1977). Senator Baker's amendment would have created 
a Division of Government Crimes in the Justice Department, under the supervision of an 
Assistant Attorney General for Government Crimes, to be appointed by the President with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. 
92. See 123 CoNG. REc. 20,997 (1977). 
93. See 123 CoNG. REc. 21,007 {1977). See also New Senate Watergate Bill Allows Special 
Prosecutor, Sets Financial Disclosure, 35 CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1235 (predicting easy passage 
of bill). 
94. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1756, at 65, 77-78 {1978). For a discussion of these events, 
including the delays in the House, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 57; HARRIGER, supra 
note 23, at 60-62. For a look at the separate House and Senate bills, see H.R. 9705, 95th 
Cong. {1978), analyzed in H.R. REP. No. 95-1307, at 6-12 {1978); S. 555, 95th Cong. (1978), 
analyzed in S. REP. No. 95-170, at 51-160 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4265-66. 
95. See 124 CoNG. REc. 34,526 (1978) (Senate vote on conference report); 124 CoNo. 
REc. 36,469 {1978) (House vote on conference report). 
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sions.96 Five years to the month after Cox's firing in the Saturday 
Night Massacre, the modem special prosecutor law was born, a 
product of extensive bipartisan hearings and debate. 
President Jimmy Carter, a consistent supporter of the legisla­
tion, commented that the law provided essential authority to inves­
tigate crimes at the highest level of an administration. "I'm 
hopeful, of course, that this authority will rarely be needed," stated 
Carter at a bill-signing ceremony in the Cabinet Room of the White 
House, "but I believe it is necessary in response to the lessons that 
we have learned to the embarrassment of our country in the past."97 
The special prosecutor statute, as :finally enacted, embodied 
much of the consensus reached during its five-year incubation pe­
riod in Congress.98 The law established a temporary, rather than a 
permanent office. It created a special prosecutor removed from the 
executive branch and loosely appended to the judicial branch, with 
only limited involvement by the attorney general. As originally 
adopted, the statute neatly compartmentalized duties. The attorney 
general was required to conduct a limited "preliminary investiga­
tion" upon receiving "specific information" that the President, 
Vice-President, cabinet members, or other high-level executive offi­
cials designated in the statute had violated a federal criminal law 
(the statute was not triggered by "petty offenses").99 The Attorney 
General then had ninety days to complete the "preliminary investi­
gation."100 If the Attorney General determined that the matter 
warranted "further investigation" (or if the ninety-day period 
elapsed without a determination that the matter was "so unsubstan­
tiated as not to warrant further investigation"), the Attorney Gen­
eral was required to apply to a special three-judge court for the 
appointment of a special prosecutor.101 This Special Division of the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was appointed by the Chief 
Justice of the United States, and consisted of one judge from the 
D.C. Circuit, and two appellate judges from two different cir-
96. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-75 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-99 (1994)); HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 61-62. For a de­
tailed chronology of the history of the Ethics in Government Act through 1977, see S. REP. 
No. 95-170, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4265-66. 
97. Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Remarks on Signing S. 555 Into Law, II PUB. 
PAPERS 1854-55 (Oct. 26, 1978). 
98. For a section-by-section analysis of the statute as originally adopted, see 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4267, 4267-97. 
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1994). 
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a) (1994). 
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(l). 
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cuits.102 The special panel was then charged with appointing "an 
appropriate independent counsel;" defining the scope of his or her 
jurisdiction; and generally monitoring the activities of the special 
prosecutor (including making decisions about expanding jurisdic­
tion) from that point forward.103 The special prosecutor could be 
removed by the attorney general only for physical or mental inca­
pacity, or "extraordinary impropriety" (a term borrowed from 
Cox's Watergate charter).104 The three-judge panel, however, exer­
cised ultimate authority over the case, and could terminate the of­
fice of a special prosecutor at any time by determining that the 
prosecutor had "substantially completed" his or her work such that 
it was "appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such 
investigations and prosecutions."105 
E. The Lessons of Legislative History 
It is possible to make several global observations about the spe­
cial prosecutor law as adopted by Congress, based upon the exten­
sive legislative history that constitutes its genealogy. First, the 
statute's overarching purpose was to drag certain investigations of 
the President and other high-level executive officials out of the 
muck of partisan politics in order to restore public confidence in 
government. Watergate had virtually destroyed public trust in gov­
ernment - particularly in the presidency, but it tainted all three 
branches. The number of citizens who felt government could not 
be fully trusted to do what was right had risen by a dramatic 
twenty-two percent between 1972 and 1978.106 Reversing this lack 
of trust, by adopting legislation that addressed the appearance of 
conflict as much as actual conflict, was a goal that transcended all 
others in crafting the special prosecutor legislation.107 
The second lesson that can be distilled from the statute's pro­
tracted history is that (at least in theory) it was built to address "big 
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1994). 
103. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b), (c) (1994). 
104. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994); GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 237. 
105. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b )(2). For a fuller discussion of the mechanics of the statute as origi­
nally drafted, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 58-65; O'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at 
119-26. 
106. See HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 44. 
107. Senator Joseph Eiden, Jr. (D. Del.) would later write: "There are certain extraordi­
nary moments of crisis when the people's faith in the integrity and independence of their 
elected officials is caused to waiver . . . . To restore the utmost public confidence in the 
investigation of criminal wrongdoing by high-ranking government officials, the appointment 
of a special prosecutor then becomes necessary." Joseph R. Eiden, Jr., Shared Power Under 
the Constitution: The Independent Counsel, 65 N.C. L. REv. 881, 886 (1987). 
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problems." It was primarily designed to deal with rare, major crises 
in the executive branch - like Watergate in the 1970s and the 
Teapot Dome scandal in the 1920s - rather than the ongoing 
stream of picayune matters that inevitably dog high-level executive 
officials during any administration. Congress's unequivocal rejec­
tion of a permanent special prosecutor provision, in the latter part 
of 1976, strongly supports this interpretation of the legislative his­
tory. The special prosecutor law was never meant to ordain a per­
manent inquisitor (or inquisitors), sniffing into alleged scandal on a 
regular basis while setting up a fixed post-office box. The tempo­
rary prosecutor, set into motion by a triggering mechanism that was 
(at least in theory) fairly difficult to trip, was expected to come alive 
only under extraordinary circumstances involving maj or 
con:flicts.108 
Evidence of Congress's general intent on this score is quite tan­
gible. The hearings and debates are littered with references to 
Watergate and Teapot Dome as. models.109 
Although the facts of the Teapot Dome scandal are generally 
buried in hasty footnotes in modem discussions of the independent 
counsel law,110 they provide powerful insight into the meaning of 
108. As Peter Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, stated during 
debates: "I think the circumstances that are contemplated are unusual circumstances, which 
I think arise because of unusual events, and therefore would require us to act in an extraordi­
nary manner." 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 
153-54. 
109. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 
155-56 (remarks of Archibald Cox). Cox also made reference to Teapot Dome and Water­
gate in his Senate testimony. In 1974, he told a Senate Subcommittee: 
Teapot Dome, Watergate, and all its associated wrongdoings have taught us the sad les­
son that crime and the interference with the administration of justice can reach toward 
the top of the executive branch. Where there is reason to believe that this may have 
happened, investigation and prosecution cannot be left under the Attorney General or 
Assistant Attorney General or others in the Department of Justice appointed by the 
President and necessarily answerable to him. 
Removing Politics From the Administration of Justice, supra note 6, at 200; MAsKELL, supra 
note 65, at 5. Former Attorney General Elliot Richardson likewise used these two major 
scandals as guideposts in commenting on the proposed legislation. See Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 284-85. Even Senator Ervin's select 
committee referred to Watergate and Teapot Dome in advocating the creation of a perma­
nent special prosecutor. The Committee wrote: "In each of the Nation's two major scandals 
during the past half century, Teapot Dome and Watergate, the appointment of a special pros­
ecutor was essential to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system and public confi­
dence in the rule of Jaw. In both situations, the office was created after serious abuses had 
occurred." FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT CoMMITrEE, supra note 62, at 96. The 
Senate Government Operations Committee that reported favorably on S. 495 in the 94th 
Congress discussed the Watergate affair and the Teapot Dome scandal, in explaining the 
need for a statutorily created temporary special prosecutor. See S. REP. No. 94-823, at 2-6 
(1976). Fmally, the legislative history at the time the Ethics in Government Act was adopted 
in 1978 also refers back to these scandals. See 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4218, 4218-19. 
110. See, e.g., O'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 24, at 115-16 n.16. 
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the statute and perceived parallels between that scandal and Water­
gate as impetuses for the legislation. The Teapot Dome crisis 
erupted shortly after the death of President Warren G. Harding in 
1923. It involved the corrupt leasing of government-owned naval 
oil reserves in Teapot Dome, Wyoming, by Harding's Secretary of 
the Interior, Albert B. Fall. The leases were made to oil tycoons 
Harry F. Sinclair (of Mammoth Oil Company) and Edward L. 
Dohany (of Pan-American Petroleum), in return for personal 
"loans" to Fall totaling approximately $400,000.111 With President 
Harding's Attorney General, Harry M. Daugherty, under suspicion 
for his own improprieties in office, the Justice Department was 
viewed as incapable of conducting an impartial investigation of the 
charges.112 President Calvin Coolidge therefore appointed two spe­
cial prosecutors (one Democrat and one Republican) to look into 
the allegations at the request of the Senate, follo,ving Congress's 
own internal investigation.113 The two special prosecutors nomi­
nated by the President and confirmed by the Senate were Senator 
Atlee Pomerene (of Ohio) and attorney (later Supreme Court Jus­
tice) Owen Roberts of Philadelphia. Their investigation culminated 
in the conviction of former Secretary of the Interior Fall on bribery 
charges in 1929.114 Fall was fined $100,000 and sentenced to a year 
in prison.115 
Watergate and Teapot Dome thus shared much in common, his­
torically. Both involved allegations of criminal activity by high­
ranking executive officials while holding federal office. Both in-
111. See ROBERT K. MURRAY, THE HARDING ERA: WARREN G. HARDING AND His 
ADMINISTRATION 461-73 (1969); FRANCIS RUSSELL, THE SHADOW OF BLOOMING GROVE! 
WARREN G. HARDING AND His TIMES 488-532 (1968). Teapot Dome was named for a dis­
tinctive rock resembling a teapot that sat on the controversial oil-lands. 
112. See MURRAY, supra note 111, at 473-85. Daugherty's alleged improprieties, 
although not directly related to Teapot Dome, raised serious questions as to whether he 
could conduct that investigation in a neutral fashion. Id. at 474-82. In tum, these raised 
questions about the entire Harding administration. Id. at 482. Daugherty had been Har­
ding's mentor from Ohio political days. 
113. See SJ. Res. 54, 68th Cong., 43 Stat. 5 (1924) (resolution requesting special prosecu­
tors); S. Res. 282, 67th Cong., 62 CoNG. REc. 6097 (1922) (congressional investigation). 
114. See Fall v. United States, 49 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1931); United States v. Fall, 10 F.2d 
648 (D.C. Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 757 (1930). Fall was the only cabinet officer ever 
convicted of a crime committed while in office. See Stephen A. Wolf, In the Pursuit of Power 
Without Accountability: How the Independent Counsel Statute is Designed and Used to Un­
dermine the Energy and Independence of the Presidency, 35 S.D. L. REv. 1, 13 n.22 (1989). 
115. See RussELL, supra note 111, at 488. At the early stages of the Teapot Dome scan­
dal, Attorney General Daugherty had resigned in disgrace in 1924 (after the House at­
tempted to impeach him). He was indicted twice and barely escaped conviction for 
attempting to defraud the government. (His alleged improprieties were only marginally re­
lated to Teapot Dome). Daugherty's account can be found in HARRY M. DAUGHERTY, THE 
INSIDE STORY OF THE HARDING TRAGEDY (1932). 
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valved a tainted Justice Department that could not be trusted to 
conduct a neutral investigation. At the time of the Teapot Dome 
debacle, Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty was himself en­
gulfed in scandal, and could not be relied upon to investigate execu­
tive branch officials to whom he might owe allegiance.116 In 
Watergate, two of President Nixon's Attorneys Generals - John 
Mitchell and Richard Kleindienst - had been forced to resign 
under the cloud of suspicion. The head of the Justice Department's 
Criminal Division, Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, 
was also tainted and had become "a conduit for a constant flow of 
information from the grand jury and the prosecutors first to [John] 
Dean and then to the President."117 A neutral investigation by the 
Justice Department, by the time a special prosecutor was brought 
in, was considered an impossibility. 
Thus, Congress was particularly alert to situations in which the 
attorney general and/or the Department of Justice might be part of 
the problem. As Chief Justice Taft once stated, the attorney gen­
eral was "the hand of the President" in enforcing the laws of the 
United States.118 Although the legislative draftsmen were also con­
cerned with the appearance of impropriety, to the extent this fueled 
the public perception of mistrust in government, the most urgent 
candidates for the appointment of special prosecutors were those 
cases in which evidence existed that the Justice Department was 
tainted. Although there had been other special prosecutors in 
American history - such as those appointed to investigate the 
"Whiskey Ring" during the Grant administration,119 and the "spe­
cial assistant" named during the Truman administration to investi­
gate allegations of a tax fix and other improprieties by high-ranking 
executive of:ficials120 - Watergate and Teapot Dome remained the 
prototypes. 
116. See supra note 112. 
117. FINAL REPORT OF nm SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 62, at 80; see also 
GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 256-60, 368-71; MASKELL, supra note 65, at 1-3. 
118. See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922). 
119. The "Whiskey Ring" was the name given to a network of Midwest distillers who 
bribed revenue officers and pocketed liquor taxes; some of the funds allegedly made their 
way into Grant's reelection campaign fund through his close friend and secretary, Orville E. 
Babcock. The Whiskey Ring investigation was mentioned in Senate Report 823, see S. REP. 
No. 94-823, at 2-6 (1976), in reviewing past special prosecutors in American history. For a 
more detailed account of the Whiskey Ring investigation, see 7 JAMES FoRD RHODES, His­
TORY OF TilE UNITED STATES 182-89 (1906). 
120. See S. REP. No. 94-823, at 2-6 (1976). During the Truman administration, Attorney 
General J. Howard McGrath appointed a "special assistant" to investigate alleged improprie­
ties in granting government loans and engaging in "tax fixes," by high level executive officials 
(including President Truman's Appointment Secretary and high-ranking Justice Department 
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A final lesson that can be gleaned from the legislative history is 
that Congress intended that the scope of the special prosecutor's 
job would be narrowly circumscribed. True, the special prosecu­
tor's authority would be broad in the sense that he or she would 
have the same power as the attorney general to investigate and 
prosecute an alleged crime, once the parameters of his or her juris­
diction were established.121 At the same time, the jurisdictional 
limits would be carefully mapped out by the three-judge panel. 
One of the few duties specifically assigned to the special court, in 
the otherwise obscure statutory language, was the obligation of de­
fining the precise boundaries of the special prosecutor's jurisdiction 
in a written statement or charter.122 Both proponents and oppo­
nents of the law understood that if such a statute gave the special 
prosecutor too much power to roam - beyond carefully delineated 
jurisdictional borders - the statute would be patently unconstitu­
tional. Congress's final piece of legislation, which created a tempo­
rary (rather than permanent) special prosecutor and issued that 
prosecutor a passport identifying his or her precise jurisdiction, was 
meant to avoid that dangerous precipice.123 
For reasons that remain obscure, however, the statute as finally 
drafted and implemented has not matched the original noble design 
of Congress. In the twenty years since the law's enactment, the of­
fice of independent counsel has managed to become everything that 
the framers of the law initially intended that it should not become. 
While at least many of the key draftsmen envisioned a special pros­
ecutor cropping up rarely - perhaps every generation or two -
the statute has collapsed into a horribly overused (and costly) law, 
with investigations triggered almost effortlessly by either political 
lawyers). When Special Assistant Newbold Morris sought McGrath's files, McGrath fired 
him. Truman then fired McGrath for interfering in the investigation. Several convictions 
were ultimately obtained by the special assistant during the Eisenhower administration. See 
Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 921 (1958). This 
episode is discussed in Wolf, supra note 114, at 13. 
121. Archibald Cox advocated this sort of broad authority during the course of his House 
testimony. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 300· 
04, 317. 
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1994). As Charles Ruff, one of the Watergate Special Prose· 
cutors who succeeded Cox and Jaworski, stated: "One of the advantages of the temporary 
Special Prosecutor mechanism that has been proposed is that there would be limited jurisdic­
tion in that temporary Special Prosecutor . . . .  " 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 116. 
123. The American Bar Association strongly pushed the requirement of a clearly deline­
ated statement of jurisdiction, since this "would serve as a restricting influence on any tempo­
rary special prosecutor who might othenvise have notions of expanding an investigation 
beyond its proper limits." 2 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra 
note 60, at 164-65. 
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party pushing easily manipulated buttons. While the statute was 
built to confine the special prosecutor's jurisdiction to a narrow 
piece of turf, and thus minimize separation of powers worries, the 
law has devolved in such a way that an independent counsel can 
virtually write his or her own jurisdictional ticket. 
Precisely how this disconnect has occurred remains one of the 
great puzzles of the legislation. The early House and Senate history 
reveals a relatively clear picture of what Congress thought it was 
attempting to accomplish in assembling a special prosecutor law af­
ter Watergate. Yet the original goal is almost unrecognizable in the 
modem statute, as applied. 
Congressional intent, of course, is an evanescent concept. It can 
be argued with force that Congress intended the independent coun­
sel statute to mean whatever the words of the statute say. As 
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote: "We do not inquire what the 
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."124 Pursu­
ant to this view of the statute's history, prior debates and oral blus­
terings are irrelevant.125 If one examines the words of the statute 
itself and limits the inquiry to that document alone, the extremely 
broad sweep of the independent counsel law that has evolved today 
is warranted (if not mandated) by the statutory text. An opposing 
view of congressional intent, however, would place much more 
weight upon the paper trail left during debates, congressional hear­
ings, and other evidence of legislative history. The words of the 
independent counsel statute would be properly shaped and inter­
preted with reference to those legislative proceedings that led up to 
the law's codification - most of which suggest a more cautious 
piece of legislation.126 
124. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, Theory of Legal Interpretation, in COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS 203, 207 (1920). Holmes also wrote, however, that "the general purpose is a more 
important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down." 
United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905). 
125. Judge Kenneth Starr, while on the federal bench, espoused such a narrow view of 
the value of legislative history. See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legisla­
tive History, 1987 DUKE LJ. 371. See also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 
(1917) (Day, J.) (stating that when statutory language is plain, legislative history cannot be 
examined); Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commn., 777 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
(1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 59, 65-66 (1988). For a statement of the related principle in the law 
of contracts, see JoHN EDWARD MuRRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §§ 105-07 (2d rev. 
ed. 1974). 
126. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (Brewer, 
J.) (stating the "spirit" of a statute, evidenced in part by its legislative history, controls over 
seemingly clear statutory language); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent 
and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the 
632 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:601 
Given the protracted and public nature of the debates over the 
special prosecutor law, the latter notion of congressional intent is 
particularly apropos in this case. It is fair to say, in retrospect, that 
the global intent of Congress became lost in the words of the stat­
ute. Perhaps due to the pro-good-government, put-Watergate­
behind-us fervor of the Carter years (when the Congressional plan 
was finally reduced to text), and an over-ambitious desire by the 
legislature to avoid appearances of conflict even where no actual 
conflicts of interest existed, Congress overshot its mark. The devil 
has now emerged from the details, and wreaked havoc upon the 
statute. Nowhere in the congressional history does one find a core 
of legislative support for a law that looks like the one that presently 
exists. Indeed, it is fair to state (based upon the legislative history 
recounted above) that if a statute had been drafted in the 1970s 
resembling the independent counsel law as currently implemented, 
it would have been viewed as more shocking and abhorrent than 
any other proposal on the table, including the permanent special 
prosecutor provisions of S. 495 that were so overwhelmingly 
rej ected.127 
Fortunately, the "textualists versus purposivists" debate that has 
found new life in recent years - particularly due to the lively and 
controversial writings of Justice Scalia128 - can be largely avoided 
when it comes to the current controversy over the independent 
counsel law. Those who fasten tightly onto the statutory text gener­
ally do so primarily out of separation of powers concerns - the 
judiciary should not usurp the function of the legislature, by re­
writing statutes.129 In the instant case, however, it is not necessary 
to argue that courts should "reform" and re-interpret the independ­
ent counsel law. Rather, the simpler (and less controversial path) is 
for Congress itself to repair the statute. 
Congress is free to determine for itself within the next year what 
the statute was meant to accomplish; the House and Senate are em­
powered to adjust the statutory language accordingly. If the statute 
is to be salvaged before the "sunset provision" ticks to a close in 
Reading of Statutes, 41 CoLUM. L. REv. 527 {1947); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's 
Observations, 1987 DuKE LJ. 380. 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 64-86. 
128. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW (Amy Gutman ed., 1997) {advancing a strong argument in favor of "textualism"); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal? 96 MICH. L. REv. 1509, 1513 
{1998) {listing critics of the "new textualism"). 
129. See ANTONIN ScALIA, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in SCALIA, supra note 
128, at 9-14. 
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1999, Congress must squarely face the disconnect between the 
words of the statute and its original purpose, and bring the law back 
to its sensible moorings. 
II. THE FIRST TWENTY YEAR S: E STABLI SHING THE LAW' S 
CONSTITUTI ONALITY 
This Article will not rehash the debate concerning the legisla­
tion's constitutionality. That subject consumed commentators for 
the first decade of the statute's life, leading to the landmark clash 
between the executive and legislative branches in Morrison v. Ol­
son.130 Morrison was a hard fought tug-of-war, with the Senate and 
House of Representatives filing amicus briefs in the Supreme Court 
staunchly defending the independent counsel statute, and the 
Reagan Department of Justice (led by Solicitor General Charles 
Fried) filing an amicus brief arguing that the statute was patently 
unconstitutional.131 The Justice Department's position was 
summed up best in an old provision from the Massachusetts Consti­
tution, that presumably demonstrated the Founders' desire to 
achieve a strict separation among the three branches of govern­
ment. That 1780 provision read: 
In the Government of this Commonwealth, the Legislative De­
partment shall never exercise the Executive and the Judicial Powers, 
or either of them; the Executive shall never exercise the Legislative 
and Judicial Powers or either of them; the Judicial shall never exercise 
the Legislative and Executive Powers, or either of them: To the end, 
it may be a Government of Laws and not of Men.132 
130. 487 U.S. 6 54 (1988). Morrison involved a ch allenge to th e i ndependent cou nsel pro­
vi sions of th e Ethics i n  Government Act filed by Theodore B .  Olson, Carol E .  D inkins, and 
Edward C. Sch mults. These three for mer Ju stice D epartment lawyer s  were u nder i nvestiga­
ti on for providi ng false testi mony and withholding evidence from th e Hou se Ju dici ar y Com­
mittee, in connection with a congressional i nvestigation into efforts by th e E nvironmental 
Protection Agency and th e Ju stice D epartment to enforce th e so- called " Super fu nd Law." 
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 665-6 8. After a divided panel of th e U.S. Court of Appeals for th e 
District of Columbi a Circuit held th at Title VI of th e Ethics Act was u nconsti tu tional, see In 
re Sealed Case, 838 F .2 d  476 (D .C. Cir .  1988), I ndependent Cou nsel Alexi a  Morrison took an 
appeal to th e Su preme Court. For a copy of th e br iefs filed by th e parties in th e Cour t of 
Appeals, see E ditor's Note, The Constitutional Validity of the Ethics in Government Act: 
Morri son v. Olson, 16 HoFSTRA L. REv. 65 (1987). 
131. A slew of other i nterested parties su bmitted amicus br iefs for and against th e stat­
ute. These i ncluded th e citizen watch dog grou p  Common Cau se (then chaired by Archibald 
Cox), who filed an amicus brief defending th e constitutionality of th e Ethics Act provisions. 
132.  MAss. CoNsT. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX. Fr ied would later cite thi s  paragraph in 
lamenting th e Court' s ruling in Morrison. See Charles Fried & Pau l  M. B ator, D ebate: After 
the Independent Counsel Decision: Is Separation of Powers Dead? 26 AM. CRIM .  L. REv. 
166 7, 1669 (1989). Ju stice Scali a also qu oted th is Massachu sett s provi sion in his vi gorou s 
di ssent. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 6 97 (Scali a, J., di ssenting). 
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This purist view of separation of powers, however, did not pre­
vail. On the last day of its October 1987 term, the Supreme Court 
upheld the independent counsel statute in a strong seven-to-one de­
cision authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist.133 The 
Court's lengthy opinion in Morrison v. Olson considered and dis­
missed as uncompelling the three constitutional concerns that had 
haunted the statute since its inception. It also rejected sweeping 
assertions that the special three-judge panel, as part of the judicial 
branch, was constitutionally unfit to play a role under the independ­
ent counsel statute.134 First, the Morrison Court concluded that 
there was no Appointments Clause problem under Article II, Sec­
tion 2, because the independent counsel was an "inferior officer" 
and the judiciary had historically shared a certain amount of power 
to appoint such officers with the president.135 Second, the Court 
declared that limiting the ability of the attorney general to termi­
nate an independent counsel - for "good cause" only - did not 
impermissibly impinge upon the executive branch's removal power. 
Cases like Humphrey's Executor136 and Wiener v. United States137 
supported the proposition that as long as vesting the removal power 
in another branch did not impede the president in carrying out his 
constitutional duties as chief executive, such a removal provision 
was legitimate.138 Third, the Court swept aside the overarching sep-
133. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660. Justice Kennedy did not take part in the considera­
tion or decision of the Morrison case. 
134. In this regard, the Morrison Court considered and rejected an argument that the Act 
violated the "cases and controversies" provision of Article III. The Court concluded that the 
judiciary possessed ample power to perform the duties Congress delegated to the special 
court under the .statute (including the appointment of the special prosecutor), even though 
they were not strictly judicial in nature. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677-85. For a further 
discussion of these issues, see notes 344-56 and accompanying text. 
135. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-77. The Court has interpreted the Appointments 
Clause to mean that: "Principal officers are selected by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Inferior officers Congress may allow to be appointed by the President 
alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 
{1976) {per curiam). For a detailed discussion of the Appointments Clause issue in Morrison, 
see Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REv. 105, 111 (1988); 
Kenneth R. Feinburg, The Separation of Powers Issue in the Independent Counsel Debate, 25 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 171, 175-82 {1987); Eric R. Glitzenstein & Alan B. Morrison, The 
Supreme Court's Decision in Morrison v. Olson: A Common Sense Application of the Consti­
tution to a Practical Problem, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 359, 362-66 {1989); Lazarus & Larson, supra 
note 2, at 191-92; Cox, supra note 54, at 1486-88; Solloway, supra note 50, at 969-73; Alexan­
der I. Tachmes, Note, Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978: A 
Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine or an Essential Check on Executive Power? 42 
U. MIAMI L. REv. 735, 743-54 {1988). 
136. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
137. 357 U.S. 349 {1958). 
138. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-93. In essence, the Court in Morrison was distancing 
itself from the "formalistic" approach of Myers v. United States - which favored strict sepa· 
ration of powers and focused on whether the official was performing a "purely executive" 
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aration of powers concern, concluding that neither Congress nor 
the judiciary was guilty of improperly encroaching upon executive 
terrain under the statute, in view of the limited overlap among the 
branches of government authorized by the legislation.139 
Morrison represented an "unqualified victory" for supporters of 
the Watergate-era special prosecutor law.140 Justice Scalia spoke as 
the lone voice of dissent, berating the majority for shattering the 
constitutional balance embodied in the American legal system. 
"Frequently," Scalia wrote, "an issue of this sort will come before 
the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing: the potential of the 
asserted principle to effect important change in the equilibrium of 
power is not immediately evident, and must be discerned by a care­
ful and perceptive analysis." Scalia concluded with a pessimistic 
observation: "But this wolf comes as a wolf."141 
In the decade since Morrison v. Olson, a vast mountain of legal 
literature was produced, most of which focused upon the constitu­
tional questions. The statute and the Court's opinion in Morrison 
function that belonged to the President - and embracing a less rigid "functional" approach 
that had its seed in Humphrey's Executor and Wiener, tolerating much more overlap among 
the branches of government so long as Congress was not invading the "core function" of the 
executive branch. For an in-depth examination of the formalist versus functional issue, see 
Peter B. Davidson, Note, Chipping Away at the President's Control Over His Administration: 
An Analysis of Morrison v. Olson and Beyond, 6 J.L. & PoL. 205 (1989); William L. 
Weingard III, Comment, Morrison v. Olson: Renewed Acceptance for a Functional Approach 
to Separation of Powers, 16 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 603 (1989). For a more complete discus­
sion of the removal issue, see Cox, supra note 54, at 1483-85; Michael L. McCoy, Note, The 
Office of Independent Counsel - A  Constitutional Overview, 28 WASHBURN L.J. 150, 167-71 
(1988); Solloway, supra note 50, at 973-78. 
139. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693-96. For a fuller discussion of the separation of powers 
issue, see William C. Banks, When They Get Close to the Truth: Challenging the Special 
Prosecutors, 38 SYRACUSE L. REv. 623, 628-36 (1987); Feinburg, supra note 135, at 171-73; 
Glitzenstein & Morrison, supra note 135, at 369-82; Cox, supra note 54, at 1478-83; Solloway, 
supra note 50, at 963-68. 
140. See David O. Stewart & Scott Nelson, Separation of Powers, Cont., A.B.A. J. Sept. 1, 
1988, at 40, 44. 
141. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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were criticized,142 lauded,143 commented upon,144 and analyzed at 
such length that few rocks were left unturned. Most of the scholar­
ship churned out pre- and post-Morrison tended to validate the 
Supreme Court's path of logic. Scholars confirmed that Congress, 
since the founding of the nation, had delegated a wide range of 
tasks to the judiciary which intersect with those of the executive 
branch, including the appointment of "inferior" executive of­
ficers.145 Scholars also demonstrated that the prosecution of fed-
142. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 135; Donald A. Daugherty, Recent Case, The Separation 
of Powers and Abuses in Prosecutorial Discretion, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953 {1988); 
Thomas S. Martin & David E. Zerhusen, Independent Counsel - Checks and Balances, 58 
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 536 (1990); Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts From the Administration of 
Justice: Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 
79 GEO. L.J. 1 {1990); Independent Counsel Symposium 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 167 app. A at 
279 {1987); Kevin R. Morrissey, Co=ent, Separation of Powers and the Individual: Morri· 
son v. Olson, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 965 {1989). 
143. See, e.g., Biden, supra note 107; Harold H. Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Con· 
stitution, 24 WILLAMETIE L. REv. 539 (1988); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Morrison v. Olson: A 
Modest Assessment, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 255 {1989); Feinburg, supra note 135; Glitzenstein & 
Morrison, supra note 135; Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforce· 
ment: Some Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 275 {1989); Richard J. Pierce, 
Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, The Structure of Government, Sup. CT. REv. 1, 1 
{1988); Donald J. Simon, A Constitutional Rationale for the Independent Counsel Law, 25 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 229 {1987); Frank Tuerkeimer, Prosecution of Criminal Cases: Where 
Executive and Judicial Power Meet, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 251 {1987). 
144. See, e.g., Steven Breyer, Foreword to Independent Counsel Symposium, 25 AM. 
CRIM. L. REv. 167 {1987); Fried & Bator, supra note 132; Glitzenstein & Morrison, supra 
note 135; Lazarus & Larson, supra note 2; Alan B. Moore, Recent Development, Separation 
of Powers and the Independent Counsel Act - Morrison v. Olson, 12 HARV. J.L. & Pun. 
POLY. 259 {1989); Irvin B. Nathan & David P. Gersch, Strengthening the Independent Counsel 
Law Requires Judicial Review of the Attorney General's Decisions, 25 AM. CruM. L. REv. 199 
{1987); Stewart & Nelson, supra note 140; Carolyn M. Corry, Note, On the Constitutionality 
of the Independent Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act: Do They Comport 
with the Separation of Powers?, 26 Duo. L. REv. 715 {1988); Davidson, supra note 138; Alton 
L. Lightney, Note, Constitutional Law: The Independent Counsel and the Supreme Court's 
Separation of Powers Jurisprudence, 40 FLA. L. REv. 563 {1988); McCoy, supra note 138; 
Solloway, supra note 50; Edward Susolik, Note, Separation of Power and Liberty: The Ap· 
pointments Clause, Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1515 (1990); 
Weingard, supra note 138. 
145. See James A. Cohen, Self Love and the Judicial Power to Appoint a Special Prosecu· 
tor, 16 HoFSTRA L. REv. 23 {1987); Lazarus & Larson, supra note 2, at 191-94. A number of 
states have similarly permitted the judicial branch to appoint special prosecutors. See People 
ex rel Lindsley v. District Court, 66 P. 896 {Colo. 1901); State ex rel. Kelly v. Alcorn, 6 Conn. 
Supp. 210 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1938); Pelaez v. State, 144 So. 364 (Fla. 1932); Mach v. State, 135 
S.E.2d 467 (Ga. 1964); State v. Bell, 370 P.2d 508 (Idaho 1962); People v. Sears, 273 N.E.2d 
380 (Ill. 1971); Hendricks v. State, 196 N.E.2d 66 (Ind. 1964); White v. Polk County, 17 Iowa 
413 (1864); Attorney General v. Flynn, 120 N.E.2d 296 {Mass. 1954); In re Investigation of 
Recount, 258 N.W. 776 (Mich. 1935); State v. Jones, 268 S.W. 83 (Mo. 1924); Lizar v. State, 
166 P.2d 119 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946); State v. Bute, 234 N.W. 605 {S.D. 1931); State v. 
Gonzales, 26 Tex. 197 {1862). See also Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Validity, Under State Law, 
of Appointment of Independent Special Prosecutor to Handle Political or Controversial Prose· 
cutions or Investigations of Persons Other Than Regular Prosecutor, 84 A.L.R. 3o 29 {1978). 
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eral crimes were neither exclusively reserved to the executive 
branch,146 nor a "core function" of that branch.147 
Yet little scholarly synergy went into examining the mechanics 
of the law, or the important question: "[H]as it worked properly, as 
a policy matter?"148 As a result, twenty years later, a host of 
bumps, warts, and now malignant tumors have revealed themselves 
growing across the statute's surface. 
This Article will avoid reiterating debate over the constitutional 
questions that surrounded the special prosecutor law after it was 
adopted in the 1970s. Five years' worth of congressional hearings 
and a plethora of scholarship have covered that ground, and it need 
not be revisited.149 Nor will this Article quarrel with the Supreme 
Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson, upholding the specific 
method employed by Congress to implement its special prosecutor 
apparatus.150 The lion's share of legal scholarship since Morrison 
has tended to support the position that it is constitutionally sound 
to allow a three-judge panel to appoint and oversee the independ­
ent counsel.151 It will therefore be assumed that the general frame-
146. One of the finest articles on this subject is Krent, supra note 143. See also Cohen, 
supra note 145; Feinburg, supra note 135; Lazarus & Larson, supra note 2; Peter M. Shane, 
Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 596, 603-06 {1989). For a recent case holding that federal courts could ap­
point private counsel to prosecute criminal contempt charges, see Young v. United States ex 
rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787 (1987). Such cases frequently arose in the patent/counterfeit 
trademark area, where the court had little power to enforce its contempt orders without 
appointing a special prosecutor to do so. See Cohen, supra note 145, at 23-24. 
147. The best pieces of scholarship on this subject are Krent, supra note 143 and 
Stephanie AJ. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson 
and the Framers' Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069 {1990). See also Dudley, supra note 143. But see 
Solloway, supra note 50, at 964-68 (suggesting that prosecution is a core function of the 
executive). 
148. One of the most impressive articles devoted to sorting out how to cure the statute's 
defects is Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: 'Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. 
CRIM. L. REv. 463 (1996). See also Judge Griffin B. Bell et al., A Roundtable Discussion on 
the Independent Counsel Statute, 49 MERCER L. REv. 457 {1998); Benjamin R. Civiletti, Post­
Watergate Legislation in Retrospect: The Alfred P. Murrah Lecture on the Administration of 
Justice, 34 Sw. LJ. 1043 (1981). 
149. See supra notes 142-44. 
150. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. But see Carter, supra note 135, at 
136-41 (criticizing decision in Morrison as misguided); Independent Counsel Symposium, 
supra note 142, app. A at 279 (statement by former Attorney General Griffin Bell to House 
Judiciary Committee, calling legislation unconstitutional and unwise). 
151. See, e.g., Glitzenstein & Morrison, supra note 135; Keith Werhan, Toward an Eclectic 
Approach to Separation of Powers: Morrison v. Olson Examined, 16 HAsTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 
393 {1989); Morrissey, supra note 142. For an engaging debate between two prominent con­
stitutional scholars on the separation of powers question presented in Morrison, see Fried & 
Bator, supra note 132. More recently, Professor Akhil Amar has sharply questioned the 
constitutionality of the independent counsel law. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional 
Nightmare, WASH. PoST, Sept. 20, 1998, at Cl. Amar's lively discussion with Professor Lau­
rence Tribe about the constitutionality of the statute, in light of its recent application in the 
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work of the statute is constitutional. Despite the creative 
arguments by Professor Akhil Amar that the independent counsel 
law is patently invalid under the separation of powers doctrine, and 
his contention that the present Court has signaled its readiness to 
junk the statute,152 it is doubtful that this position - although elo­
quently presented - will win the day. There is scant indication 
that the Court would abandon its position in Morrison, even consid­
ering subsequent changes in the composition of the Court.153 
The more important question that now faces Congress, legal 
scholars, and the American public is this: Can the language of the 
independent counsel statute be reformed and rehabilitated, such 
that its provisions (as applied in the real world that intersects with 
politics) conform to its original theoretical design? Can Congress 
rewrite the legislation, such that its tedious details match the cau­
tious model that Congress seemed to envision when it went to the 
drafting table in the 1970s? 
This Article will advance the proposition that the independent 
counsel statute can be salvaged - but only through aggressive sur­
gery. Those cosmetic reforms that have been undertaken by Con­
gress in the past154 will not be sufficient to save the statute now, in 
the face of mounting public (and legislative) opinion that grows in­
creasingly hostile toward its failures. Serious reforms that rebuild 
the statute's defective components are necessary if it is to become 
Lewinsky investigation, can be found in Akhil Reed Amar & Laurence Tribe, The Independ­
ent Counsel, SLATE (Sept. 10, Sept. 15, Sept. 29, Oct. 1, Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.slate.com/ 
code/DDD/DDD.asp?file=IC&i:Msg=l>. A masterful argument by Amar with respect to 
the unconstitutionality of the independent counsel law appears in Akhil Reed Amar, ln­
tertextualism, 112 HARv. L. RE.v. (forthcoming Jan. 1999). However, this author remains 
unpersuaded. 
152. Amar, supra note 151; Amar & Tribe, supra note 151. Professor Amar hinges his 
prediction upon the recent decision of Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), in which 
the Court (per Justice Scalia) discussed the concept of "inferior" and "principal" officers 
under the Appointment Clause of Article II, Section 2, in some detail. See also Nick Braven, 
Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New Appointment Clause Jurisprudence, 
98 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 1103 (1998). Yet, Edmond dealt with the unique subject of military law, 
and specifically avoided casting any stones at the Morrison decision. See 520 U.S. at 661-62. 
Thus, Professor Amar's conclusion that Edmond effectively repudiates the Court's decision 
in Morrison seems to be a stretch (however valiant). Professor Tribe, in his September 15th 
reply to Amar in the Internet publication Slate, above, apparently agrees. Amar & 1libe, 
supra note 151. 
153. Justice Ginsburg, as a federal appeals judge, favored the position that the independ­
ent counsel law was constitutional. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, as a First Circuit judge and former Harvard Law 
professor, participated in a Symposium for the American Criminal Law Review that was gen­
erally supportive of the independent counsel law, although Breyer himself remained neutral 
in his co=ents. See Breyer, supra note 144. 
154. See infra note 156-58 and accompanying text. 
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the viable failsafe mechanism it was intended to be, rather than a 
dysfunctional drag upon the American justice system. 
III. REFORMING THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW 
On June 30, 1999, the sunset provision contained in the in­
dependent counsel statute will tick to a close. Unless Congress 
reauthorizes the legislation, it "shall cease to be effective."155 This 
represents the fourth - and most controversial - occasion on 
which the statute will face reauthorization. The law was amended 
and renewed by Congress in 1982 and 1987 without a significant 
struggle.156 In 1992, the statute was allowed to lapse for two years 
when Senate Republicans blocked it, angry and weary from the 
Iran-Contra investigation.157 Congress then renewed the law in 
1994158 after President Bill Clinton moved into the White House. 
Clinton himself lauded the independent counsel statute at that time, 
calling it " a  force for Government integrity and p ublic 
confidence. "159 
That enthusiasm has now waned, however, within the White 
House and beyond. Particularly since the recent uproar over the 
expansion of Kenneth Starr's Whitewater investigation into the 
Monica Lewinsky matter, there has been a deluge of commentary 
calling for the gutting and scrapping of the independent counsel 
law, from both Democrats and Republicans.160 Whitewater Associ-
155. 28 u.s.c. § 599 {1994). 
156. See Ethics in Government Act, Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 
2039; Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293. 
For a discussion of the 1982 reauthorization and related amendments, see Thomas J. Satery, 
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and Subsequent Reforms: The Effect of Political and 
Practical Influences on the Creation of Public Policy, 13 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 243, 251-59 
{1990). For a discussion of the 1987 reauthorization and amendments, see Stanley I. Kutler, 
In the Shadow of Watergate: Legal, Political, and Cultural Implications, 18 Nov A L. REv. 
1743, 1751-54 (1994); Satery, supra, at 260-67. 
157. See James P. Fleissner, The Future of the Independent Counsel Statute: Confronting 
the Dilemma of Allocating the Power of Prosecutorial Discretion, 49 MERCER L. REv. 427, 
440 (1998); Kutler, supra note 156, at 1754. 
158. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 
Stat. 732. 
159. President's Statement on Signing the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act, I 
PuB. PAPERS 1169 (June 30, 1994). President Clinton later had a change of heart about the 
statute, after being hounded by the Whitewater scandal. Following the 1996 election, he 
reportedly told his opponent, Senator Bob Dole, who had opposed reauthorization of the 
independent counsel law: "You were right and I was wrong on the independent counsel." 
BoB WOODWARD, THE CH01cE: How CLINTON WoN 444 (1997). 
160. See Paul T. Cappuccio, Scalia Was Right About the Independent Counsel Law, WALL 
ST. J., June 29, 1998, at A19 (stating that the "statute has utterly failed to achieve its overrid­
ing goal" and should be scrapped); Gerard E. Lynch, The Problem Isn't in the Starrs But in a 
Misguided Law, WASH. PoST, Feb. 22, 1998, at C3; Julia Malone, Some Rethinking Support of 
1978 Counsel Statute, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 12, 1998, at AlO, available in 
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ate Counsel Brett M. Kavanaugh would scrap the present system in 
favor of a new statute that allows the President to nominate the 
independent counsel, and the Senate to approve the selection, with 
significant discretion granted to the President in deciding when to 
appoint a special prosecutor.161 1\vo-time White House counsel 
Lloyd Cutler would similarly provide for the selection of an in­
dependent counsel from a pre-established panel nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate; or in the alternative, he 
would create an Office of Public Prosecutor charged with prosecut­
ing alleged ethical crimes committed by all public officials, as in 
Britain or Northern Ireland.162 Inspector General Michael R. 
Bromwich and Professor Kathleen Clark would replace or supple­
ment the independent counsel law with an "Inspector General" for 
the White House, assigned to keep a watchful eye for ethical viola­
tions in order to prevent abuses from occurring.163 Former Justice 
Department official Terry Eastland would abandon the present stat­
ute entirely, and allow the dual mechanism of congressional investi­
gations and the impeachment process to take care of any problems 
of executive malfeasance.164 
The call for complete abandonment of the statute - an under­
standable reaction when legislation reveals such ugly design defects 
- is an expedient yet unsatisfying solution. Virtually every former 
special prosecutor, although acknowledging serious flaws in the law, 
has endorsed its preservation in conjunction with major reforms.165 
Few pieces of legislation in this century have been fashioned after 
so much soul-searching, deliberation, and congressional resolve. 
The original special prosecutor legislation was created after five 
years of legislative debate. The constitutional issues relating to the 
ALLNEWS, 1998 WL 3627743; Jeremy Rabkin, Rule by Unaccountability: Critics of the In· 
dependent Counsel Don't Go Far Enough, AM. SPECTATOR, July 1998, at 52; David E. 
Rovella, Ken Starr: A Hard Man to Fire, NATL. L.J., Feb. 16, 1998, at Al; James Toedtman, 
Independent Counsel Law - Democrats Eating Humble Pie Now, SEATTLE TIMES, July 24, 
1998, at A2. 
161. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 Gao. L.J. 
2133, 2135-36 (1998). 
162. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 477-78; Fleissner, supra note 157, at 449. 
163. See Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General 
Model, 86 Gao. L.J. 2027 (1998); Kathleen Clark, Toward More Ethical Government: An 
Inspector General for the White House, 49 MERCER L. Rav. 553 (1998). The Inspector Gen· 
eral Act of 1978 is codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-12 (1994). 
164. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 134; see also Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference of 
the Fourth Circuit: The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should it be 
Fixed?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 1515, 1590 (1997) [hereinafter Sixty-Seventh Judicial Con· 
ference] (remarks of Terry Eastland). 
165. See Kenneth Jost, Independent Counsel Disconnect: Some Critics Suggest Limiting 
Lengths and Targets of Investigations, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 30, 30. 
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general structure of the statute were hashed out for another decade, 
culminating in Morrison v. Olson. The statute was reauthorized 
three times by Congress, each time with detailed amendments. 
Although Congress may not have succeeded in reducing to text, 
gracefully, those core provisions that had seemingly driven the stat­
ute's creation after Watergate, the framework remains a viable one. 
Rather than throwing out two decades' worth of legislative work 
inspired by a legitimate perception that some form of special prose­
cutor law was necessary, Congress should tackle the more daunting 
but productive task of reforming the statute. If members of the 
House and Senate take a hard look at the lessons .to be learned 
from the current Whitewater imbroglio, they may succeed in fight­
ing off the political pox that has debilitated the statute in recent 
years. Over a dozen specific reforms are essential if the law is to be 
returned to its original, sensible purpose. These can be roughly or­
ganized into three categories: Reforms relating to the appointment 
of special prosecutors; reforms relating to the functions of special 
prosecutors; and reforms relating to the role of the special court. 
A. Reform the Method and Frequency of Appointing 
Independent Counsels 
Since the statute's adoption in 1978, there have been twenty 
separate independent counsel investigations (eighteen public and 
two under seal) with the number growing with each administra­
tion.166 Some independent counsels have branched off into multi-
166. The twenty independent counsel investigations, and their subjects, are as follows. 
Carter Administration: Investigation of White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan for co­
caine use (Independent Counsel: Arthur H. Christy) (no charges filed); Campaign Manager 
Tllllothy Kraft for cocaine use (Independent Counsel: Gerald J. Gallinghouse) (no charges). 
Reagan Administration: Labor Secretary Raymond Donovan for larceny and fraud (In­
dependent Counsel: Leon Silverman) (no charges); White House counsel Edwin Meese for 
financial improprieties (Independent Counsel: Jacob A. Stein) (no charges); Assistant Attor­
ney General Theodore B. Olson for lying in congressional testimony (Independent Counsel: 
Alexia Morrison) (no charges); White House Aide Michael K. Deaver for lying about lobby­
ing foreign clients (Independent Counsel: Whitney North Seymour, Jr.) (convicted of per­
jury); Various Reagan Administration officials for illegally selling arms to Iran and diverting 
funds to Nicaraguan Contras (Independent Counsel: Lawrence E. Walsh) {multiple indict­
ments, convictions, and guilty pleas, some nullified by presidential pardon); Attorney Gen­
eral Edwin Meese and White House Aide Franklyn Nofziger for contracting scandal 
involving Wedtech Corp. (Independent Counsel: James C. McKay) (one acquittal, one con­
viction overturned on appeal); Assistant Attorney General W. Lawrence Wallace for finance­
related abuses (Independent Counsels: James R. Harper; Carl Rauh) (no charges); White 
House aide James Cicconi for improper loan (under seal) (Independent Counsel: Dan 
Webb) (no charges); Housing and Urban Development Secretary Samuel Pierce for fraud 
and mismanagement (Independent Counsels: Arlin Adams; Larry D. Thompson) (multiple 
convictions and guilty pleas, one acquittal) (final report not yet filed). Bush Administration: 
Under seal (name of subject and independent counsel under seal) (no charges); Bush Admin­
istration officials for illegal search of Bill Clinton's passport file during campaign (Independ-
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ple investigations.167 As of late 1998, six different independent 
counsels are in existence, operating simultaneously.168 As discussed 
above, this proliferation of special prosecutors - unattached to the 
executive branch - was not what Congress seemed to envision 
when it conceived the law during the Watergate era. The concept 
of a permanent special prosecutor's office, built to root out scandal 
in the executive branch on an ongoing basis, was flatly rejected. It 
was viewed as dangerous, constitutionally infirm, and abhorrent to 
the tripartite system of American government. Yet with a half 
dozen independent counsels being bred and sustained at any given 
time, under the statute as drafted, it has produced the "institution­
alized wolf hanging on the flank of an elk" that Acting Attorney 
General Robert Bork warned against at Congressional hearings as 
early as 1973.169 
The runaway nature of the statute is not attributable to a single 
independent counsel or a single political party. Both Democrats 
and Republicans have discovered how to push the buttons and tilt 
the machine, in the years following Watergate. They have discov­
ered that careers can be made and political opponents eviscerated 
ent Counsels: Joseph E. DiGenova; Michael Zeldin) (no c harges). Clinton Administration: 
Bill and Hillar y Clinton regarding W hitewater land deal {Independent Counsels : Robert 
Fiske; Kenneth W. Starr) (multiple indictments, guilty pleas, acquittals, and convictions) 
(pending); Secretary of Agriculture Mi ke Esp y for accepting improper gifts (Independent 
Counsel: Donald C. Smaltz) (multiple convictions, guilty pleas, and acquittals) (acquitted); 
HUD Secretary Henry G. Cisneros for l ying to FBI about size of payments to mistress (In­
dependent Counsel: David M. Barrett) (pending); Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown 
for personal financial irregularities {Independent Counsel: Daniel S. Pearson) {case termi­
nated and transferred to Justice Department upon Brown's death); AmeriCorps head and 
former campai gn chief of staff Eli Segal for conflict of interest allegations (Independent 
Counsel: Curtis von Kann) (no charges); Secretar y of Interior Bruce Babbitt for allegedl y 
testifying falsely to Congress regarding rejection of Wisconsin Indian casino license (In­
dependent Counsel: Carol Elder Bruce) (pending); Labor Secretary Alexis M. Herman for 
allegedly receiving kic kbacks to steer contributions to the Democratic party as director of 
W hite House Office of Public Liaison {Independent Counsel: Ralp h I. Lancaster, Jr.) (pend­
ing). See Jack Maskell, The Independent Counsel Law, FED. LAw., July 1998, at 28, 31; Don­
ald E. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel, a View from Inside, 86 Gso. L.J. 2307, 2323-24 
(1998); Susan Page, Independent Counsel Law: Parties Switch Sides, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 
1997, at 4A; Roberto Suro, Labor Secretary Under Investigation: Reno Seeks Independent 
Counsel, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 12, 1998, at Al; Counsel Appointed for Babbitt In­
quiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1998, at A14; Independent Counsel Investigations, WASH. PosT, 
Apr. 13, 1997, at A12; Investigator Chosen in Labor Secretary's Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 
1998, at A18. 
167. Besides the multiple investigations of Kenneth Starr, discussed supra at notes 12-16 
and accompanying text, Independent Counsel Donald C. Smalz has broadened his investiga­
tion of Mi ke Esp y through a "referral" b y  t he special court. See In re Esp y, 80 F.3d 501 (D.C. 
Cir 1996). See discussion infra note 268. 
168. The pending investigations are t hose involving Samuel Pierce (Reagan administra­
tion); and Bill and Hillary Clinton, Henry Cisneros, Bruce Babbitt, and Alexis Herman (Clin­
ton adminis tration). See supra note 166. 
169. 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 263 . 
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through a good scandal.17° As this undignified game of political 
pinball has been perfected, there has come with it an abandonment 
of the original notion that the special prosecutor law would be re­
served for rare and special crises. The number of independent 
counsels will only continue to multiply, in future years, if significant 
changes are not made. Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox re­
cently commented that only two investigations triggered by the stat­
ute since its enactment have matched his conception of the law at 
the time he testified in its favor.171 This over-use and trivialization 
of the independent counsel law is the single greatest flaw that has 
emerged since 1978. 
Most of the allegations that have set the gears of the independ­
ent counsel statute whirring thus far - such as allegations of co­
caine use by President Carter's White House Chief of Staff 
Hamilton Jordan, and assertions that President Clinton's HUD Sec­
retary Henry Cisneros lied in an FBI background check about the 
size of payments to a mistress - are a far cry from the sort of na­
tional crises and executive branch conflicts that provided the initial 
impetus for the law. Watergate and Teapot Dome both involved 
special prosecutors who were appointed to defuse national crises 
when the normal chain-of-command in the Justice Department had 
collapsed. We have learned from two decades' worth of experience, 
unhappily, that when a special prosecutor law can be triggered at 
the earliest stages of alleged wrongdoing with a faint puff of smoke, 
it will be triggered constantly. 
There are three adjustments that must be made to the independ-' 
ent counsel statute, if it is to be reserved for the sort of rare and 
extreme cases for which it was originally built. 
170. See Ken Gormley, When prosecutors aren't so special, BoSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 1997, 
at Cl. For an excellent discussion of the harmful politicizing of the statute, see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEo. L.J. 2267 (1998). 
171. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1579-80 (remarks of 
Archibald Cox). The two matters were the first investigation of Attorney General Edwin 
Meese by special prosecutor Jacob Stein that involved serious allegations against the Attor­
ney General himself, and the Iran-Contra affair of the Reagan administration. The latter 
raised weighty questions whether the President, Vice President, Attorney General, and other 
high-level executive officials had abused their offices in conspiring to sell arms to Iran in 
violation of the federal Arms Control Export law; diverting those funds to freedom-fighting 
Contras (rebels) in Nicaragua after Congress had forbidden such action; and conspiring to 
cover up this activity. See LAWRENCE E. WAI.sH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CoNSPIR­
ACY AND CoVER-UP (1997); Bell et al., supra note 148, at 466-67 (containing Lawrence 
Walsh's own defense of his investigation); Sandra D. Jordan, Classified Information and Con­
flicts in Independent Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing the Scales of Justice After Iran-Contra, 
91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1651, 1667 n.82 (1991); Christopher Drew & Christopher J. McNulty, 7-
Year Tale of Intrigue Concludes: Iran-Contra Inquiry Faults Reagan, Bush, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 
19, 1994, at Al. 
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The first crucial (yet simple) adjustment that must be made to 
the statute is retooling the triggering device contained in Section 
592 of the statute. At present, Section 592(c) requires that - after 
conducting a preliminary investigation - the Attorney General 
must apply to the special three-judge panel for the appointment of 
an independent counsel if she determines that there are "reason­
able grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted."172 
Regrettably, this standard is so loose that virtually any half-credible 
allegation against an individual covered by the statute will amount 
to "reasonable grounds" to move to the next stage, forcing the At­
torney General to seek appointment even in cases that present only 
marginal evidence of criminal wrongdoing. As Lloyd Cutler has 
criticized, the threshold is "about one micro millimeter high."173 
The result, as Theodore Olson's lawyers have accurately described, 
is that a target is forced to prove the "negative" to the Attorney 
General, i.e. "that no reasonable grounds to investigate exist."174 
This has been a principal villain in causing the statute to malfunc­
tion, since (1) it strays far from the "crisis" model originally envi­
sioned by Congress, and (2) it triggers the statute even when there 
is only a remote chance that some conflict within the Justice De­
partment might prevent the Attorney General from handling the 
case as a routine matter. In short, the present statute has sanc­
tioned the use of "howitzers to combat mice" and spawned a large 
number of investigations in which criminal wrongdoing is not ulti­
mately found.11s 
How should the statutory language be reformed? Lloyd Cutler 
has proposed, in place of the present language, a new threshold that 
requires the Attorney General to find "reasonable grounds for be­
lieving that a significant federal crime may have been commit-
172. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(l)(A) (1994). 
173. Bell et al., supra note 148, at 470. 
174. Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 544. 
175. Stephen Labaton, Rethinking a Law: Time and Targets Alter Capitol Views on the 
Independent Counsel Statute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1997, at AlO. Out of the 19 independent 
counsel investigations to date, indictments have been handed down in only seven of those 
investigations. See Maskell, supra note 166, at 39. Even after cases go to trial, juries are not 
necessarily impressed. In the recent trial of former Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy, by 
independent counsel Donal D. Smaltz, the federal jury acquitted Espy of all thirty criminal 
counts. Espy's acquittal came after a four-year, $17 million investigation related to charges 
that he had accepted gifts, including sports tickets and other favors, from companies with 
whom he had dealt as Agriculture Secretary. See Neil A. Lewis, Espy is Acquitted on Gifts 
Received While in Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al. 
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ted."176 The "reasonable grounds" language is still weak, however; 
it does little to strain out cases that are based more upon rumor and 
speculation than hard evidence. The American Bar Association's 
White Collar Crime Committee of the Criminal Justice Section has 
recommended a fl.at "probable cause" requirement,177 that would 
mandate probable cause of criminal wrongdoing, before the Attor­
ney General was required to apply for appointment of a special 
prosecutor. But this has its problems, as well. Since probable cause 
is the standard that historically governs grand juries, adopting a 
probable cause standard for the preliminary investigation phase 
would jumble together the roles of the Attorney General and the 
grand jury, creating confusion.178 It might also cause the Justice 
Department to keep the appointment of an independent counsel in 
abeyance until a grand jury was ready to be empaneled, injecting 
the Attorney General into the process longer than she needs to be 
involved. The ideal standard thus should be a new one, unique to 
the independent counsel law, that helps to reserve the triggering 
mechanism for extraordinarily serious matters. 
Thus, Section 592(c) should be amended to require the Attor­
ney General to appoint an independent counsel when there exist 
"substantial grounds to believe that a felony has been committed 
and further investigation is warranted."179 Not only does this lan­
guage ratchet the threshold upwards, but it provides a nice balance 
between weak, premature allegations (which should not trigger the 
statute) and weighty, well-developed allegations (which should 
cause an independent counsel to be appointed). It also grants the 
Attorney General much-needed discretion to determine which 
types of crimes are serious enough to warrant further investigation 
176. Bell et al., supra note 148, at 470. 
177. See Jost, supra note 165, at 30. Probable cause, in the context of an arrest, exists 
when an officer has within her knowledge reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances 
sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent person to believe the suspect has committed, or is 
committing a crime. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). 
178. For criticism of the probable cause standard in this context, see Martin & Zerhusen, 
supra note 142, at 544. See also Bell et al., supra note 148, at 471-72. A well-known case that 
supports the proposition that grand juries are governed by a probable cause standard is 
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) ("The role of the grand jury is re­
stricted to a finding as to whether or not there is probable cause to believe that an offense has 
been committed.") See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) ("The grand 
jury's responsibilities continue to include both the determination whether there is probable 
cause to believe a crime has been committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded 
criminal prosecutions."). 
179. The "substantial grounds" language is similar to the "substantial evidence" test that 
is frequently used in agency law. See, e.g., Gouveia v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 
980 F.2d 814, 818 (1st Cir. 1992); Silwany-Rodriquez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 
975 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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and prosecution, taking into account established Justice Depart­
ment policies.180 The inability to make this sort of common-sense 
judgment has been a perennial thorn in the side of those imple­
menting the statute, leading to the forced appointment of special 
prosecutors in cases that would ordinarily lead to a slap on the wrist 
for any Justice Department lawyer who attempted to bring such a 
case in the door.181 Once the triggering mechanism is adjusted in 
this fashion, the statute will operate in a much more restrained (and 
sensible) fashion. 
2. Allow the Attorney General to Exercise More Power in 
Conducting the Preliminary Investigation 
The second change necessary to reform the runaway independ­
ent counsel statute involves allowing the Attorney General to exer­
cise much more authority in conducting the preliminary 
investigation. As presently drafted, Section 592 unnecessarily con­
stricts the power of the Attorney General. Once she receives infor­
mation that an individual covered by the statute may have 
committed a crime, her ability to conduct a preliminary investiga­
tion is dramatically limited. Unlike a typical investigation carried 
out by the Justice Department, the independent counsel statute 
does not permit her "to convene grand juries, plea bargain, grant 
immunity, or issue subpoenas."182 The theory behind restricting the 
Attorney General's power during the ninety-day preliminary inves­
tigation stage is that the Justice Department - because it is poten­
tially enmeshed in a conflict of interest - should not be permitted 
to take action that might "spoil" the case for future independent 
prosecutors.183 Yet this restriction has made it virtually impossible 
for the Attorney General to perform her statutory task in a respon-
180. For a similar argument that the Attorney General must be vested with more discre­
tion when it comes to triggering the statute, see Harriger, supra note 4, at 2115-16. Former 
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti also would limit the statute to federal felonies, eliminat· 
ing all misdemeanors. See Civiletti, supra note 148, at 1054. 
181. Cf Civilette, supra note 148, at 1044-45. One example of a case that most likely 
would not have been brought pursuant to ordinary Department of Justice policy was the case 
against Henry Cisneros, involving "a false statement under oath where the only falsity is in 
the size of the payment that is acknowledged by the possible defendant." See Bell et al., 
supra note 148, at 472. 
182. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(2)(A) (1994). 
183. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 470. As Lawrence Walsh explained: 
If you are going to investigate and prosecute someone, you do not want somebody else 
getting in there first and getting the documents and giving everybody time to think up 
what their defense is going to be and tell other people what it is going to be so they can 
acco=odate it. 
Id. 
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sible fashion, and has contributed to the unrestricted flood of cases 
that have been spawned by the statute. As President Bush's Attor­
ney General, William P. Barr, described the Justice Department's 
unenviable position: "[Y]our hands are tied during the investiga­
tion phase . . . . "184 
The problem, of course, is that the hurdles are already set too 
low. Section 591 of the statute directs the Attorney General to ini­
tiate a preliminary investigation if she receives "information suffi­
cient to constitute grounds to investigate" whether a person 
covered by the statute may have committed a crime.185 At the first 
puff of smoke, she must take action to determine if there may be a 
conflagration. She is permitted to consider, under Section 59l(d), 
only the "specificity" of the information and the "credibility" of the 
source.186 As law enforcement officials are acutely aware, it is diffi­
cult to knock out any allegation on the basis of credibility and speci­
ficity, except in extreme cases.187 The statute, by design, inevitably 
propels even weak allegations toward a preliminary investiga­
tion.188 The problem is only compounded by the fact that the stat­
ute prohibits the Attorney General from using her ordinary 
investigative tools - the subpoena power, the empaneling of grand 
juries, the use of immunity - in completing her preliminary investi­
gation.189 This phase thus becomes a shallow legal exercise, with 
the vast majority of cases unleashing a special prosecutor, like it or 
not.19o As former Attorney General Barr explained the problem: 
184. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1529-30 (remarks of William P. 
Barr). 
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 59l{a) {1994). 
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 59l{d){l){A), (B). 
187. As one co=entator joked, it might be necessary for the informant to display 
mental instability by asserting that "the CIA requires them to wear a colander on their head 
to avoid getting [ga=a] rays, or something like that," before his or her credibility could be 
questioned. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1529 (remarks of 
William P. Barr). 
188. For a disturbing description of how the statute "compelled" the dubious Olson in­
vestigation, despite the fact that the vast majority of prosecutors would have declined to 
prosecute it, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 132-33. For a similar discussion of how the 
weak statute allowed the media to propel forward the Bruce Babbitt inquiry, see Robert 
Worth, How The New York Tlllles, The Washington Post, and the Independent Counsel Law 
Screwed Bruce Babbitt, WASH. MoNTIILY, Apr. 1, 1998, at 14. For an excellent look at inves­
tigations that take up an enormous amount of time by the Justice Department, but do not 
trigger a formal preliminary investigation, see Wolf, supra note 114, at 26-27. 
189. See 28 U.S.C. § 592{a){2){A) {1994). 
190. One recent exception where Attorney General Reno refused to request the appoint­
ment of an independent counsel related to her decision not to ask the special court to name a 
special prosecutor to investigate whether Vice President Al Gore lied to Justice Department 
officials during their inquiry into fund raising phone calls Gore placed from the White House 
during the 1996 campaign. See Robert Suro, Probe of Gore on Lying Ruled Out: Reno Re­
jects One Investigation Involving Fund-Raising, WASH. PosT, Nov, 25, 1998, at Al. Under 
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"It is very hard to conceive of a case where you can make that call 
where you haven't subpoenaed documents and you haven't brought 
witnesses before the grand jury, [and] you haven't compelled cer­
tain people to speak to you . . . . "191 
Admittedly, there is a danger in allowing the Attorney General 
to delve too far into the merits of a case, when the investigation 
may soon be bumped to an independent counsel. If, for instance, 
the Justice Department grants immunity to an individual during the 
preliminary investigation stage, this can later thwart the ability of 
an independent counsel to prosecute that individual.192 In extreme 
cases, it might allow an Attorney General to block intentionally the 
prosecution of high-level executive officials, by handing out immu­
nity and preventing further criminal action. Yet such unlikely pos­
sibilities should not j ustify emasculating the preliminary 
investigation at the Justice Department level. 
At a minimum, the statute must be amended to permit the At­
torney General to subpoena witnesses and gather reliable evidence 
during the ninety-day investigation period, as in any other criminal 
case. This will ensure that she can make an informed decision 
whether the appointment of an independent counsel is justified and 
sensible.193 At the same time, the convening of a grand jury by the 
Attorney General is something that should remain discouraged (or 
prohibited) under the statute.194 First, it represents a major intru­
sion into the merits of the criminal matter, leaving the independent 
counsel - if appointed - with a partially-baked proceeding not of 
his or her creation. Second, as a practical matter, ninety days is an 
the weak statutory standard, this matter most likely could have prompted the appointment of 
a special prosecutor. However, given the controversial nature of the Lewinsky investigation, 
the Attorney General most likely has decided to guard against the appointment of new spe· 
cial prosecutors, except where absolutely necessary, thus rebelling against the statute. 
191. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1530 (remarks of William P. 
Barr); see also Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 544 (suggesting the difficulty in estab· 
lishing lack of reasonable grounds absent the Attorney General's investigative tools). A sim­
ilar point was made by former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler. See Bell et al., supra note 
148, at 469. 
192. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 470-71. 
193. Even Lawrence Walsh, who has expressed concern about allowing the Attorney 
General to wade too far into a case before the independent counsel is appointed, agrees that 
the subpoena power is essential. See id.; Lawrence E. Walsh, The Need for Renewal of the 
Independent Counsel Act, 86 GEo. LJ. 2379, 2385 (1998). 
194. It is true that a grand jury was convened in the Whitewater case, by Attorney Gen· 
eral Janet Reno, before the independent counsel statute was triggered. But this was an unu­
sual case. The first Whitewater independent counsel, Robert Fiske, was appointed by the 
Attorney General in 1994, during a period in which the statute had lapsed. See O'Sullivan, 
supra note 148, at 471-72. Thus the original grand jury was attached to a more traditional 
investigation under the control of the Justice Department. 
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exceedingly short amount of time in which to convene and com­
plete a major grand jury investigation. It makes good sense to with­
hold (or at least strongly discourage) the use of grand juries by 
Attorneys General during the preliminary investigation stage.195 
However, it is neither productive nor sensible to ban the use of sub­
poenas by the Attorney General. The current version of Section 
592, which strips the Attorney General of this rudimentary investi­
gative tool, only exacerbates the problems that flow from a weak 
triggering mechanism. The inability to gather evidence and reliable 
information prevents any meaningful screening of serious cases 
from the mundane - which is supposed to be the Attorney Gen­
eral's principal function during the initial process. 
Finally, a related problem is that the Attorney General must re­
fer each case for further investigation unless there exists "clear and 
convincing evidence" that the subject lacked the requisite state of 
mind.196 As a result, the key question normally assessed by a prose­
cutor in a criminal matter before exercising his or her discretion to 
prosecute - i.e. whether the conduct was inadvertent or negligent 
rather than knowing and intentional - cannot be considered by the 
Attorney GeneraJ.197 This provision should be deleted entirely, 
since it further hamstrings the Attorney General and prevents her 
from conducting a meaningful preliminary investigation to separate 
serious cases from minor, politically mischievous matters. 
3. Limit the Categories of Persons Covered by the Statute 
The third essential reform, that garners almost universal support 
among former special prosecutors and commentators, is the limiting 
of the list of individuals covered by the statute.198 Presently, Sec­
tion 59l(b) sweeps within its ambit not only the President and Vice­
President, but a laundry list of other executive officials. It covers 
seventeen cabinet officials;199 any individual working in the Execu-
195. Many administrative agencies (including the Internal Revenue Senrice, the Securi­
ties Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and others) possess subpoena 
power to interrogate witnesses, compel production of documents, and gather information in 
an investigation, even though they cannot convene a grand jury. See Donald R.C. Pongrace, 
Comment, Requirement of Notice of Third-Party Subpoenas Issued In SEC Investigations: A 
New Limitation On the Administrative Subpoena Power, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 701, 708-19 
(1984). 
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1994). 
197. See O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 480; Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 
164, at 1531-33 (remarks of Jamie Gorelick and William Barr). 
198. See infra note 207. 
199. The statute encompasses "any individual serving in a position listed in section 5312 
of title 5." This provision, in turn, sets forth 17 different cabinet officers, namely: Secretary 
of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the 
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tive Office who is compensated above a certain level;200 any Assis­
tant Attorney General and any Justice Department employee who 
is compensated above a certain level;201 the Director of Central In­
telligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue;202 certain individuals who held 
the above positions during the incumbency of the current Presi­
dent;203 and the chairman, treasurer, and other high-ranking mem­
bers of the committee seeking the election or reelection of the 
President.204 In all, nearly 240 persons are covered, most of whom 
hold "considerably subordinate positions" in the executive 
hierarchy.205 
Not only is this list of "covered individuals" absurdly broad, but 
it cheapens the independent counsel statute by forcing its applica­
tion in cases that are far from kindling for incendiary national cri­
ses. Professor Julie O'Sullivan, who worked as Associate Counsel 
on the Whitewater investigation under both Robert Fiske and 
Kenneth Starr, has criticized the statute for its overbreadth, stating 
that it "guard[s] against 'appearance' problems in lower profile 
cases where no such problems truly exist."206 A parade of former 
special prosecutors including Archibald Cox, Lawrence Walsh, Ja­
cob Stein, Joseph DiGenova, Robert Fiske, and others have con­
cluded that the reach of coverage is far too broad, although no 
precise consensus exists as to how sharply to limit the language.207 
Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of 
Transportation, United States Trade Representative, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Edu­
cation, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and 
Commissioner of Social Security of the Social Security Administration. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 591(b)(2) (1994); 5 u.s.c. § 5312 (1994). 
200. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(3). The level of compensation is that set forth in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 5313 (1994) for certain sub-cabinet officials. 
201. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(4). The level of compensation is that set forth for various 
administrative heads and other officials enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 5314 (1994). 
202. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(5). 
203. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(6), (7). 
204. See 28 U.S.C. § 59l(b)(6). 
205. Civiletti, supra note 148, at 1054. 
206. O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 464. Specifically, Professor O'Sullivan referred to the 
Theodore Olson and Tunothy Kraft investigations as low-profile matters unsuited for a spe· 
cial prosecutor. Id. 
207. Some commentators suggest limiting the field to the President and cabinet officers. 
See, e.g., Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 541. An ABA subcommittee has also made 
that recommendation. See id. Archibald Cox would limit the statute to covering the Presi­
dent, Vice-President, and "maybe the three most important Cabinet officers." See Bell et al., 
supra note 148, at 473. Jacob Stein, the first independent counsel assigned to investigate 
Attorney General Edwin Meese during the Reagan Administration, would limit coverage to 
the "highest people in the government." See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 
164, at 1549 (remarks of Jacob Stein). Lawrence Walsh, the Iran-Contra independent coun-
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The statute should be amended to reduce the list of covered in­
dividuals to an essential core, at least when it comes to the 
mandatory application of its provisions. The original impetus for 
the special prosecutor law - eliminating actual and apparent con­
flicts to restore public faith in the system of government - points 
toward the President,2°8 Vice-President, and the Attorney General 
as essential candidates for coverage. Since the law was designed to 
ensure that individuals at the top of the executive pyramid could 
not, and would not, investigate themselves, the statute would be 
hollow if it did not subsume these three key members of the execu­
tive branch. Likewise, the highest officials on the committees to 
elect and reelect the President, who have been covered by the stat­
ute since its adoption in 1978 because they act as alter egos for the 
President with respect to fund-raising - an activity that inherently 
creates potential for criminal abuse under the American electoral 
system - must also remain listed under the mandatory provision. 
With respect to the laundry list of other cabinet officers, sub­
cabinet officers, and administrative heads presently covered by Sec­
tion 591 of the statute, however, these should be moved into a new 
"optional" category. When it comes to allegations of criminal activ­
ity involving such lower-level officials, the Attorney General should 
be permitted to set the statute into motion by initiating a prelimi­
nary investigation pursuant to its provisions - on her own initiative 
or at the request of Congress - but she should not be bound to do 
sel, would restrict the statute to the same categories as Cox. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 
473-74. Joseph DiGenova, the independent counsel appointed to investigate the Bush Ad­
ministration's search of Bill Clinton's passport file, would limit the statute's reach to the 
President, Vice-President, Attorney General, and top Justice Department officials. See Jost, 
supra note 165, at 30. Robert Fiske, the first Whitewater independent counsel, would limit 
the coverage to the President, Vice-President, Attorney General, and perhaps the Deputy 
Attorney General and head of the F.B.I. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 
164, at 1533, 1564 (remarks of Robert Fiske). Leon Silverman, however, who led the investi­
gation of President Reagan's first labor secretary, Raymond Donovan, would continue fairly 
broad coverage under the statute, allowing it to encompass all cabinet officers and White 
House staff members. Silverman has stated "[t]he attorney general ought not be put in the 
position of pursuing an investigation against a political friend." Jost, supra note 165, at 30. 
208. Significant issues arise, however, when the President is the subject of an independent 
counsel investigation. Because there exists a serious question whether a sitting President can 
be indicted and/or prosecuted while in office, issues arise as to the proper function of an 
independent counsel when the primary target of an investigation is the President. Related 
issues also arise concerning whether Congress can permit the independent counsel to take 
over the role of the legislature in gathering evidence for the purposes of impeachment pro­
ceedings (as opposed to gathering evidence for an actual criminal prosecution). For the au­
thor's detailed views on these fascinating but distinct subjects, see Ken Gormley, 
Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: A Dysfunctional Union, 51 STAN. L. REv. _ 
(1999). 
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so.209 The Attorney General should also remain free to conduct her 
own investigation, unconstrained by the statute. The Attorney 
General should possess complete discretion to determine whether 
the existence of a conflict, or the potential thereof, warrants the 
triggering of the extraordinary machinery of the independent coun­
sel law in such cases. The Attorney General's determination on this 
score should be final and nonreviewable. 
The reach of the statute should be narrowed further by amend­
ing Section 591 to limit it to crimes committed while in federal of­
fice, or in seeking that office. Currently, the statute sweeps with a 
broad brush, mandating a preliminary investigation whenever the 
Attorney General receives a whiff of evidence that a covered indi­
vidual "may have violated any Federal criminal law" (other than 
certain petty offenses enumerated in the statute).210 This standard 
is unbounded in terms of time; it also requires no link whatsoever 
to misbehavior in public office, which was the sine qua non of the 
statute when it was conceived during Watergate. As Jacob Stein, 
independent counsel in the first investigation involving Attorney 
General Edwin Meese (and later lawyer for Monica Lewinsky), 
summed it up: "The nature of the inquiry should be limited to 
things done in office, misuse of the office. "211 
The above three modifications would alter dramatically the 
number of cases swept within the mandatory provisions of the stat­
ute, and help return the legislation to a sensible path. The statute 
would be reserved, by definition, for rare crises involving the top 
members of the executive branch. Since the public has "come to 
distrust" the office of independent counsel itself,212 due to overuse 
209. Section 591(c) of the independent counsel statute already creates a sort of "op­
tional" category, under which the Attorney General may trigger the machinery of the in­
dependent counsel if she believes that a particular investigation "may result in a personal, 
financial, or political conflict of interest." 28 U.S.C. § 59l(c)(l). Thus, there is already a 
mechanism in place by which the Attorney General may trigger the statute with respect to 
any lower-level executive official, if she believes that such a course is appropriate. See also 28 
U.S.C. § 592(g)(l) (1994), which allows members of the Judiciary Committee of the House or 
Senate to request appointment of an independent counsel. 
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(a). The petty offenses are those listed as Class B or C misde· 
meanors in the federal criminal code. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (1994). 
211. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1549 (remarks of Jacob Stein). 
Not only would this approach "limit the type of crime" that was covered by the statute, but it 
would also - as a practical matter - limit "how far back you went." Bell et al., supra note 
148, at 474 (comments of Archibald Cox). Lawrence Walsh concurs that the statute should 
be limited to crimes committed while in office, and those involving significant misuse of that 
office. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1563-64 (remarks of 
Lawrence Walsh); Walsh, supra note 193, at 2384. 
212. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1594 (remarks of Archibald 
Cox); see also S. REP. No. 103-101, at 11 (1993) (remarks of former Attorney General 
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of the statute during its controversial twenty.:.year lifetime, reducing 
the field of coverage to essential cases would enhance its central 
purpose of rehabilitating public trust in American government. 
4. Leave Other Investigations to Ad Hoc Appointments of 
Special Prosecutors 
Assuming that the above reforms to the independent counsel 
statute are implemented by Congress, the question will still linger: 
What happens to the rest of the investigations concerning allega­
tions of wrongdoing by high-level executive officials? Based upon 
the narrowed list of covered individuals, proposed above, most of 
the recent independent counsel inquiries would never have come 
into existence. Investigations into alleged illegal gratuities received 
by Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy;213 allegations that HUD 
Secretary Henry Cisneros lied to FBI during a background check 
about the size of his payments to a mistress;214 the investigation into 
the personal finances of deceased Commerce Secretary Ronald 
Brown;215 claims of perjury involving Secretary of the Interior 
Bruce Babbitt in connection with his Congressional testimony con­
cerning an Indian casino license;216 the investigation of Secretary of 
Labor Alexis Herman relating to alleged kickbacks for steering 
contributions to the Democratic party217 - all of these investiga­
tions would fall outside the purview of the "reformed" independent 
counsel statute.218 Moreover, since the statute would be limited to 
alleged crimes committed while occupying or seeking federal office, 
the Whitewater investigation219 that has spawned so much contro-
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach) (stating that the law "has served to destroy rather than preserve 
public confidence in the integrity of government"). 
213. See David Johnston, Agriculture Chief Faces New Inquiry on Business Gifts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1994, at Al. 
214. See David Johnston, Concluding that Cisneros Lied, Reno Urges a Special Prosecu­
tor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at Al. 
215. See The Ron Brown Problem, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1995, at A30. 
216. See Counsel Appointed for Babbitt Inquiry, supra note 166, at A14. For a fascinating 
discussion of how the Babbitt inquiry was driven by the media, see Worth, supra note 188. 
217. See Investigator Chosen in Labor Secretary's Case, supra note 166, at A18. 
218. But see Reno's Decision Activates a Sixth Investigation of Clinton's White House, 
MINN. STAR TRIB., Feb. 12, 1998, at A19 (describing the recent investigation relating to 
Clinton campaign chief of staff Eli Segal (who later served as director of AmeriCorps)). This 
case still might have fallen within the statute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(8) relating to 
campaign officials. For more information concerning these investigations during the Clinton 
Administration, see supra note 166. 
219. This matter involved alleged improprieties in an Arkansas land deal relating to Bill 
and Hillary Clinton in the 1980s, long before Clinton was elected President. For a good 
discussion of the original Whitewater matter, see, for example, JAMES B. STEWART, BLOOD 
SPORT. THE PRESIDENT AND ms ADVERSARIES (1996); Michael Isikoff & Howard Schnei-
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versy during the Clinton administration would never have been ini­
tiated, at least under the mandatory provisions of the statute. 
Additionally, Kenneth Starr's Whitewater add-ons involving the 
Vince Foster suicide, the White House Travel Office firings, and 
"Filegate" (involving the improper request for key Republicans' 
FBI background files by White House administrators) would not 
have triggered the statute.220 Indeed, of the twenty-plus independ­
ent counsel investigations initiated under the statute since its incep­
tion in 1973,221 only four - the two investigations of Attorney 
General Edwin Meese; the Iran-Contra matter (because it involved 
allegations that encompassed the President, Vice-President, Attor­
ney General, and others); and the investigation involving Clinton 
campaign chief of staff Eli Segal (because it presumably involved 
irregularities by a top campaign official acting as a surrogate for the 
President) - would have triggered the mandatory provisions of the 
statute.222 
What would have happened to the rest of the twenty investiga­
tions and cases like them? They would have remained governed by 
the state and federal criminal justice systems that have successfully 
handled such matters for the past two hundred years. Much of the 
problem relating to the modern epidemic of special prosecutors 
flows from the fact that the nation, traumatized by Watergate, has 
forsworn its trust in the Attorney General and other government 
lawyers. Ever since 1789,223 the Attorney General has supervised 
difficult cases, many of them involving corrupt public officials in-
der, Clintons' Former Real Estate Firm Probed, WASH. PosT, Nov. 2, 1993, at Al; Michael 
Isikoff & Howard Schneider, The Unfolding of Whitewater, WASH. PoST, Jan. 21, 1994, at 
A20. 
220. For a review of the "add-ons" appended to Kenneth Starr's Whitewater investiga­
tion, see Adam Cohen, ls the Prosecutor Running a Starr Chamber?, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 
58; Ken Gormley, Starr Should Give Case to the House, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3, 1998, at ASS; 
Starr's Galaxy of Investigations, supra note 12, at 52. 
221. Although there have been 20 independent counsels appointed, several of them 
(most prominently Kenneth Starr) have branched out into multiple investigations. See supra 
notes 12-16, 167, and accompanying text. 
222. The Monica Lewinsky investigation, because it is appended to the Whitewater 
probe, presumably would not have been authorized either. However, to the extent the 
Lewinsky case involves alleged criminal wrongdoing by the President - perjury in a civil 
deposition and suborning perjury - it still could have {independently) triggered the 
mandatory appointment of an independent counsel under the proposed amendments to the 
statute set forth above. Of course this also depends on whether a sitting President can be the 
direct target of an independent counsel investigation, which in turn depends on whether a 
sitting President can be indicted or prosecuted. See supra note 208. 
223. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 261 
(remarks of Philip A. Lacovara). The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the office of the Attor­
ney General, but the Department of Justice was not established until 1870. See Biden, supra 
note 107, at 883-84. 
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eluding those in the executive branch.224 The presumption in recent 
years has been that any allegation that involves even a hint of po­
tential conflict - because it relates to an actor within the executive 
branch - must be removed from the Justice Department and 
farmed out to an outside prosecutor. The reverse presumption, 
however, should apply. As former Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson testified eloquently in the Senate in 1975, to do other­
wise assumes that "the regularly constituted law enforcement aµ­
thorities are neither sufficiently competent nor trustworthy to be 
capable of dealing with the more-or-less routine problems of cor­
ruption and abuse of power that have to be dealt with from year to 
year. I do not believe that this assumption is warranted.�'225 
The point of retooling the present law is not to allow guilty pub­
lic officials to go free or unpunished. Rather, it is to prevent the 
triggering of the extraordinary mechanism of the mdependent 
counsel law - with its potentially limitless resources - except in 
special cases. 226 Every purported scandal that touches an official in 
the executive branch is not special enough. It is detrimental to as­
sume that competent, professional, aggressive career prosecutors in 
the Justice Department and U.S. Attorneys' offices are not capable 
of investigating and prosecuting charges simply because White 
House aides or cabinet officers are the targets. "Indeed, if ambition 
plays a role," Professor Julie O'Sullivan has astutely pointed out, "it 
probably would be better served by indicting a big name official 
than by exonerating him."227 As Clinton administration Deputy 
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick recently noted: "I don't think 
that there is any reason why Attorney General Reno couldn't inves-
224. During the Garfield Administration, the Justice Department investigated the "Star 
Route Frauds," which involved alleged fraud in contracting for mail delivery, and implicated 
the secretary of the Republican National Committee {who had also been Garfield's campaign 
manager). In the Kennedy Administration, the Justice Department investigated conflict-of­
interest charges against President Kennedy's Secretary of Navy. President Nixon's Attorney 
General investigated allegations of extortion and bribery against Vice-President Spiro T. 
Agnew, that led to Agnew's resignation. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 8. 
225. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 284-85. 
Archibald Cox similarly testified that it was not "desirable to start off with the presumption 
that our Attorneys General cannot be trusted. Tue presumption should be the other way, 
and they should be held responsible when they were proved incompetent or unfaithful." See 
Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice, supra note 6, at 211 (remarks of 
Archibald Cox); see also Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 541 (arguing that the Depart­
ment of Justice generally should be permitted to use its normal investigative process unless 
there is an actual conflict of interest); O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 475 (suggesting that 
Justice Department lawyers "are privy to a store of institutional knowledge and experience" 
that makes them particularly suited for even the most sensitive investigations). 
226. See Gormley, supra note 170, at C7. 
227. O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 477. 
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tigate [HUD Secretary] Henry Cisneros."228 Although the Attor­
ney General (ironically) and the special court may have contributed 
to the under-reliance on Justice Department lawyers, in recent 
years, this skewed outlook must be repaired.229 
Several backups will exist to ensure that serious cases requiring 
the injection of a neutral prosecutor do not fall through the cracks, 
intentionally or unintentionally. First, as discussed above, the stat­
ute would include an "optional" category (encompassing those cab­
inet officers, sub-cabinet officers, agency heads, and other 
individuals currently subsumed under Section· 591 of the legisla­
tion). The Attorney General would thus have the ability to conduct 
a preliminary investigation relating to these high-level executive of­
ficials, and refer the matter to the special three-judge panel for ap­
pointment of an independent counsel, if she believed that the threat 
of conflict warranted it. For example, in a serious case where a 
close friend or advisor to the president in the White House were 
implicated, the Attorney General might voluntarily elect to trigger 
the statute, in order to distance herself from any appearance of 
political influence, even if the statute did not mandate that she do 
so. 
Second, in the event that the Attorney General suffered from an 
actual conflict of interest because of her personal or financial asso­
ciation with a member of the executive branch under investigation 
(including another member of the Justice Department), the statute 
still would mandate her automatic recusal under Section 591(e).230 
Thus, the overt case of a conflict of interest would be amply 
covered. 
Third, the Attorney General would still retain the ability to ap­
point ad hoc special prosecutors under his or her own supervision, 
without going through the costly machinery of the independent 
counsel statute, as an alternative in select cases. The appointment 
of ad hoc prosecutors by the executive branch was the normal prac­
tice prior to the Watergate crisis.231 Even after Watergate, Attor-
228. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1533 (remarks of Jamie 
Gorelick). For a suggestion that the independent counsel statute has adversely affected the 
morale of Justice Department lawyers, see Feinburg, supra note 135, at 184. 
229. See Alison Frankel, Blame the Law, Not the Lawyer, AM. LAW., Mar. 1998, at 58 
(describing Attorney General Reno's hasty use of the statute); Ken Gormley, Starr's Three 
Silent Chaperons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1998, at A25 (criticizing the court's passive role under 
the statute). 
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(e) (1994) (providing for mandatory recusal of the Attorney 
General in specified cases). 
231. President Grant appointed a special counsel to help prosecute the "Whiskey Ring," 
in which his personal secretary was allegedly involved. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 8. 
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neys General in several instances appointed their own ad hoc 
special prosecutors where the danger of conflict warranted it. Pres­
ident Carter's Attorney General, Griffin Bell, appointed a former 
U.S. Attorney from New York to investigate charges that the Presi­
dent's brother, Billy Carter, was funneling money from the Bank of 
Georgia through the Carter peanut warehouse to the presidential 
campaign. At the conclusion of the investigation, the special prose­
cutor "accounted for every peanut and every nickel" and filed an 
expeditious report.232 President Bush's Attorney General William 
Barr exercised his inherent authority to appoint neutral investiga­
tors to handle three politically sensitive matters, dealing with the 
"Inslaw Octopus Scandal," "Iraqgate," and a controversy involving 
alleged abuse of the House of Representatives Bank. In each case, 
Attorney General Barr hired prominent retired judges to investi­
gate the allegations, and "I did that on my own nickel, not under 
the statute."233 More recently, the original special prosecutor in the 
Whitewater case - Robert Fiske - was appointed by Attorney 
General Janet Reno pursuant to her own inherent powers during a 
lull in which the independent counsel law had lapsed.234 Thus, the 
ad hoc method of appointing special prosecutors that has been fol­
lowed by the Justice Department for much of this century has 
President Theodore Roosevelt's Attorney General appointed a special prosecutor to investi­
gate a land fraud ring, allegedly involving the Commissioner of the General Land Office. See 
id. President Roosevelt himself named a special prosecutor to investigate alleged corruption 
by Post Office officials. See id. President Coolidge appointed (and the Senate confirmed) 
two special prosecutors in the Teapot Dome scandal. See id. President Truman appointed a 
commission to investigate tax-fixing in his administration. See HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 
15-16. Attorney General Robert Kennedy appointed Leon Jaworski as special counsel to 
handle the prosecution of Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi for contempt, relating to his 
defiance of federal civil rights laws, where the danger existed that the public might perceive 
the Kennedy Administration as too soft on Barnett. See 1976 Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Criminal Justice, supra note 78, at 175 (remarks of John Dear). For a discussion of the 
appointment of such ad hoc special prosecutors, generally, see EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 
7-16; HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 13-39; Kavanaugh, supra note 161, at 2143; Smaltz, supra 
note 166, at 2311-20. 
232. See Fleissner, supra note 157, at 464-65; see also S. REP. No. 97-496, at 5 {1982), 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3541 (noting success of this investigation). The special 
prosecutor appointed by Attorney General Bell was Paul Curran. 
233. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1533 (remarks of William P. 
Barr). In the "Inslaw" scandal, Barr appointed Senior U.S. District Judge Nicholas Bua of 
Illinois. In the "lraqgate" matter, he appointed retired Judge Frederick Lacey of the U.S. 
District Court for New Jersey. In the House bank controversy, Barr appointed former U.S. 
Court of Appeals Judge Malcolm Wtlkey of the D.C. Circuit to investigate the matter. For a 
discussion of the "Inslaw" scandal, see Mary Fricker & Stephen Pizzo, Outlaws at Justice, S.F. 
CHRON., June 14, 1992, § 7, at 11. The "Iraqgate" scandal is reviewed in Peter Mantius, 
Cover-up on BNL? The Idea is Absurd, Investigator Claims, ATLANTA JouRN. & CONST., 
Dec. 10, 1992, at AS. The House bank scandal is discussed in David Johnson, Ex-Manager of 
House Bank Accepts Plea Deal and Admits Embezzlement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1993, at A18. 
234. See O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 471-72. 
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worked effectively. For the bulk of minor investigations involving 
cabinet and sub-cabinet officials, agency heads, and Justice Depart­
ment officials below the Attorney General, this method will remain 
perfectly satisfactory. 
Additionally, Section 592(g) of the statute acts as a :final safe­
guard, since it permits the members of the Judiciary Committee of 
either the House or the Senate to request the appointment of an 
independent counsel directly.235 Working in tandem with the above 
three devices, this back-up will provide the political impetus neces­
sary to spur the Attorney General to appoint an independent coun­
sel in non-mandatory cases that may warrant the injection of a 
neutral, outside investigator. Because Congress can directly re­
quest that the Attorney General take action, and can exert political 
influence upon her to do so when extraordinary cases arise (as oc­
curred when the Senate pushed the Nixon administration to ap­
point a special prosecutor during Watergate ),236 the legislature has 
a direct safety-check against unsatisfactory decisions by the Attor­
ney General. Congress can further strengthen Section 592(g) by 
amending that provision to allow the full House or Senate to call 
for the appointment of an independent counsel - rather than limit­
ing the decision to the Judiciary Committees that may be aligned 
with a particular political party at a given time - in order to in­
crease the influence of the legislature in this important function.237 
With these minor adjustments made, there will exist little dan­
ger that important cases will slip through the cracks. Three sepa­
rate mechanisms will allow the Attorney General to appoint a 
special prosecutor, even in non-mandatory cases. Coupled with 
Congress's ability to exert political pressure (and indeed to conduct 
its own investigations )238 when it concludes that an outside prosecu­
tor is essential, the vision of a renegade Attorney General refusing 
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(g) (1994). This section provides: "The Committee on the Judici­
ary of either House of the Congress, or a majority of majority party members or a majority of 
all nonmajority party members of either such committee, may request in writing that the 
Attorney General apply for the appointment of an independent counsel." 28 U.S.C. 
§ 592(g)(1). That provision goes on to require the Attorney General to provide a written 
report to the congressional committee, within 30 days, explaining whether a preliminary in­
vestigation will be conducted and why. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(2). After the preliminary 
investigation is completed, the statute requires a report to the committee notifying it whether 
an application for an independent counsel has been made and why. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 592(g)(3). 
236. See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 241-45. 
237. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(1). 
238. For a discussion of Congress's own ability to conduct investigations, see Harriger, 
supra note 180, at 2116-17. 
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to ensure a neutral investigation for a potentially conflicted crimi­
nal case will remain a remote and unlikely possibility, at worst. 
B. Reform the Role and Regulate the Power of 
Independent Counsels 
· 
Even after Congress establishes an appropriate line of demarca­
tion between those serious (and exceptional) cases that should au­
tomatically trigger the statute, and those that should be left to the 
sound judgment of the Attorney General, much work still remains. 
The job description of the independent counsel himself - and the 
scope of his extraordinary power - require close scrutiny. First, 
the special prosecutor's jurisdictional statement, or charter, should 
serve carefully to limit the extent of his permissible work. Second� 
a string of miscellaneous reforms should be implemented to reel in 
otherwise limitless (and costly) investigations. 
1. The Independent Counsel's Jurisdictional Limits Must Be 
Strictly Controlled 
The most serious breakdown in the regulation of independent 
counsels, once appointed, has occurred in territory unfamiliar to 
most non-lawyers. The multiple expansions of Whitewater prosecu­
tor Kenneth Starr from his original charter into unrelated terrain -
culminating in the Monica Lewinsky investigation - have revealed 
a gaping hole in the statute. Although few newspaper or television 
accounts have cast it in these terms, the recent crisis involving the 
independent counsel law had far less to do with a young White 
House intern and far more to do with a single, unsexy word: 
jurisdiction.239 
One of the principal features of the legislation that saves it from 
patent unconstitutionality is its careful limitation of the special 
prosecutor's field of authority. The congressional debates are 
abundantly clear in this regard. One of the ways that Congress in­
tended to ensure that the special prosecutor could not run amok, 
and become the dreaded "Frankenstein monster" uncontrolled by 
any branch of government, was to narrowly constrain his or her 
scope of authority and nail down his or her jurisdictional limits in a 
written charter.240 Thus, one of the few duties of the special court 
that was carefully delineated in the statute was its duty to define the 
239. See Ken Gormley, Starr is Overstepping His Mandate, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1998, at 
A43. 
240. See supra discussion at notes 121-23 and related text. For another example of the 
general concern about allowing overly-broad jurisdiction in creating the special prosecutor, 
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"prosecutorial jurisdiction" of the newly ordained independent 
counsel.241 Section 593(b )(3) of the statute directs the court to de­
fine the jurisdiction in such a way as to "assure that the independ­
ent counsel has adequate authority to fully investigate and 
prosecute the subject matter with respect to which the Attorney 
General has requested the appointment. "242 It also contemplates 
that the special prosecutor will have power to explore "all matters 
related to that subject matter."243 
The sweep of the independent counsel's jurisdiction is thus 
broad in one sense - allowing him or her (in essence) to stand in 
the shoes of the Attorney General in conducting a particular in­
quiry. Yet it is narrow in another crucial sense. Unlike an ordinary 
prosecutor sitting in the Justice Department or U.S. Attorney's of­
fice, this special prosecutor is not free to investigate and prosecute 
any federal crime placed upon his or her desk. Rather, he or she is 
forever tied to the written statement of jurisdiction, formulated by 
the Attorney General and reduced to writing by the special court. 
This narrow jurisdictional lock is an essential component of the 
independent counsel law. Senator Carl Levin (D. Mich.), one of 
the Senate leaders intimately involved with the statute since its in­
ception,244 has underscored the importance of the jurisdictional 
charter. Senator Levin recently stated on the floor of the Senate: 
"[T]he most fundamental limit in the law is that an independent 
counsel can investigate only that which is within the scope of juris­
diction granted by the court that appoints him."245 Likewise, when 
the Supreme Court upheld the law in Morrison v. Olson, it specifi-
see the remarks of Henry S. Ruth, Jr., who succeeded Leon Jaworski as Watergate Special 
Prosecutor, in Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 121. 
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b){l) (1994). 
242. 28 u.s.c. § 593(b){3). 
243. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b )(3). The statute provides that jurisdiction should include the au­
thority to investigate and prosecute other federal crimes - excluding certain petty offenses 
- "that may arise out of the investigation or prosecution of the matter with respect to which 
the Attorney General's request was made, including perjury, obstruction of justice, destruc­
tion of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses." 28 U.S.C. § 593(b){3). Section 593(b)(3) 
authorizes the court - and the court alone - to make public the written statement of juris­
diction (i.e. the special prosecutor's charter). This may occur only upon the request of the 
Attorney General or after the court reaches its own determination "that disclosure of the 
identity and prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent counsel would be in the best inter­
ests of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(4). 
244. Senator Levin served as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Govern­
ment Management, which has legislative jurisdiction in the Senate over the independent 
counsel statute. See Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter 
of Public Confidence and Constitlltional Balance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 11 (1987). 
245. 144 CoNG. REc. Sll, 952, at Sll, 953 {daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. 
Levin). See also Levin & Bean, supra note 244, at 20-21 ("Authorizing the court to describe 
the scope of the counsel's inquiry is an inherent part of the appointment power since the 
December 1998] The Independent Counsel 661 
cally referred to the restricted nature of the special prosecutor's ju­
risdiction in justifying the constitutionality of the statute. As Chief 
Justice Rehnquist explained in unequivocal terms: "Unlike other 
prosecutors, [the independent counsel] has no ongoing responsibili­
ties that extend beyond the accomplishment of the mission that she 
was appointed for and authorized by the Special Division to 
undertake. "246 
It is absolutely essential that the independent counsel's jurisdic­
tion remain carefully circumscribed. First, if it were not so, he or 
she would no longer be an "inferior officer" constrained by the pa­
rameters set by the executive and judicial branches. Rather, he or 
she would have become a "principal officer," subordinate to no 
other official in determining his or her responsibilities. The statute 
would thus be facially unconstitutional (since only the President can 
appoint principal officers).247 Second, if the independent counsel 
could dictate the terms of his or her own jurisdiction, this would 
create separation of powers problems of mammoth proportions, be­
cause Congress would be creating a free-floating satellite branch of 
government unaccountable to any other, a cardinal sin under our 
tripartite constitutional system.248 Regrettably, the independent 
counsel statute has evolved in such a way that the jurisdictional 
constraints envisioned by Congress have been rendered worse than 
impotent. This has been accomplished, primarily, through the de­
fective "expansion of jurisdiction" provisions codified in Section 
593(c). It has been exacerbated, moreover, by the recent strain of 
the multiple Whitewater investigations. 
Section 593(c) of the statute allows the court, upon the request 
of the Attorney General, to "expand the prosecutorial jurisdiction" 
of an independent counsel "in lieu of the appointment of another 
court appoints the independent counsel to a temporary office whose tenure must be defined 
by the completion of a particular task."). 
246. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671-72 (1988). The Court made this point in con­
nection with its analysis under the Appointments Clause. The Court concluded that in­
dependent counsels are "inferior officers" rather than "principal officers," and thus subject to 
appointment by the judiciary (rather than exclusively by the President), in part because the 
independent counsel "is empowered by the Act to perform only certain, limited duties," and 
his or her office "is limited in jurisdiction." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72. 
247. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-72; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976). 
248. For a discussion of the dangers of creating an unaccountable fourth branch of gov­
ernment, see discussion infra note 330 and accompanying text. For a spirited argument that it 
is "empty" to contend that modem independent counsels are "unaccountable," since they are 
bound by the same policies as the Justice Department and can be removed for misconduct, 
see Samuel Dash, Independent Counsel: No More, No Less a Federal Prosecutor, 86 GEo. 
L.J. 2077, 2081-83 (1998). 
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independent counsel" under certain circumstances.249 Section 
593(c)(2)(A) of the statute provides that if an independent counsel 
receives information concerning possible criminal violations com­
mitted by persons covered by the statute - but outside of the scope 
of this particular independent counsel's jurisdiction - he or she 
may forward such information to the Attorney General and request 
permission to expand the investigation into this unrelated matter.zs0 
The Attorney General is then required to conduct a preliminary 
investigation (similar to that mandated when the independent coun­
sel is first created). However, rather than the ninety-day period 
that applies in the first instance,251 the Attorney General is given 
only thirty days to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine 
if expansion of jurisdiction is warranted.252 During that abbrevi­
ated investigation, the statute mandates that the Attorney General 
give "great weight to any recommendations of the independent coun­
sel" concerning expansion of jurisdiction.253 
Section 593(c)(2)(B) goes on to provide that if the Attorney 
General concludes that "there are no reasonable grounds to believe 
that further investigation is warranted," she must notify the special 
court and the issue is closed.254 If, on the other hand, the Attorney 
General determines that reasonable grounds do exist to believe that 
further investigation may be warranted (giving great weight to the 
recommendation of the independent counsel), the court must ex­
pand the independent counsel's jurisdiction to encompass this mat­
ter, or appoint another special prosecutor to investigate the same 
matter.255 
The net effect of these statutory provisions is to create a cham­
ber of horrors for the potential target of an investigation, almost 
guarantying (and mandating) that the expansion of jurisdiction oc­
cur once an independent counsel requests it. The statute's three­
step procedure, coupled with an aggressive independent counsel in 
a particular case, yields a recipe by which the independent counsel 
can perform a feat of prestidigitation and expand his jurisdiction 
249. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(1) (1994). 
250. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(A). 
251. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(l) (1994). 
252. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(A). 
253. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
254. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(B). 
255. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(C). It is unclear from the language of the statute whether 
the special court has the power, unilaterally, to appoint a different independent counsel to 
investigate the matter (rather than expanding the jurisdiction of the existing special prosecu­
tor), or whether this can only occur at the request of the Attorney General. 
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almost at will. The rapid expansion of Kenneth Starr's Whitewater 
probe into the unconnected Monica Lewinsky matter provides a 
useful case study of how effortlessly this statutory jump can be 
accomplished. 
As Step #1 of the statutory process, Starr - after receiving in­
formation from Linda Tripp that President Clinton may have lied in 
his affidavit in the unrelated Paula Jones civil case when he denied 
a sexual affair with Lewinsky - contacted Attorney General Reno 
and requested permission to expand his jurisdiction into this mat­
ter.256 Starr's initial request to the Attorney General was explicitly 
premised upon a potential link to the existing Whitewater investiga­
tion. Starr conveyed to the Attorney General that Clinton friend 
Vernon Jordan may have steered consulting work and other im­
proper benefits to Webster Hubbell (a primary target in the White­
water investigation) in order to buy his silence in that case. It 
similarly appeared that Jordan might be providing Lewinsky attrac­
tive job interviews, in order to buy her silence about her affair with 
President Clinton. The Whitewater independent counsel explained 
to the Attorney General that he had only thirty-six hours in which 
to confront Lewinsky and seek cooperation, since Newsweek was 
preparing to publish an article breaking open the story and alerting 
Jordan to the inquiry.257 
As Step #2 of the process, Attorney General Reno then con­
ducted a truncated "preliminary investigation�' of the matter, and 
decided one day later to authori.Ze expansion of Starr's jurisdiction 
to cover the Lewinsky case.258 The Attorney General's order noted 
the potential link to Whitewater.259 That connection, however, 
256. See Dan Baiz, Washington's Extraordinary Week: How the Events Unfolded, From 
Jones to Lewinsky, WASH. PoST, Jan. 25, 1998, at Al. One criticism of Starr, at the time these 
events took place, was that he authorized the placement of a wire on Linda Tripp to obtain 
further inculpatory statements from Monica Lewinsky before he requested expansion of ju­
risdiction from the Attorney General or received approval to expand jurisdiction into the 
Lewinsky matter by the three-judge panel. See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 239, at A43. For an 
excellent summary of the events leading to the expansion of Starr's jurisdiction into the 
Lewinsky matter, and criticism thereof, see the statement of Senator Levin in the Congres­
sional Record, supra note 245, at Sll, 954-56. 
257. These events are discussed in numerous sources. See Baiz, supra note 256; Ronald 
Brownstein & Kenneth T. Walsh, Starr Struck, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Feb. 2, 1998, 
at 14, 16-17; Nancy Gibbs, Clinton's Crisis, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 21; Gormley, supra note 
229, at A25; Michael lsikoff & Evan Thomas, Clinton and the Intern, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 
.L998, at 31, 41-43. 
258. Brownstein & Walsh, supra note 257, at 16-17; lsikoff & Thomas, supra note 257, at 
41-42. 
259. Attorney General Reno's order stated: "It would be appropriate for Independent 
Counsel Starr to handle this matter because he is currently investigating similar allegations 
involving possible efforts to influence witnesses in his own investigation. Some potential sub­
jects and witnesses in this matter overlap with those in his ongoing investigation." See Notifi-
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proved largely irrelevant - indeed, little mention was made of it 
thereafter, at least until Kenneth Starr testified in front of the 
House Judiciary Committee nearly a year later.260 Regardless of 
the lack of overlap between Whitewater and the Lewinsky matter, 
pursuant to Section 593 of the statute Attorney General Reno had 
little alternative but to honor the request to expand jurisdiction, 
once it was made by Starr.261 Because the independent counsel had 
asked that this matter be referred to him,262 the Attorney General 
was mandated to give "great weight" to that request. She therefore 
approved it. 
As Step #3, the special panel then endorsed the expansion of 
Starr's jurisdiction on that same day - January 16, 1998 - al­
lowing the Whitewater independent counsel to investigate 
"whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury, obstructed 
justice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise violated federal law . . . 
in dealing with witnesses, potential witnesses, attorneys, or others 
concerning the civil case Jones v. Clinton. "263 This result was liter­
ally inevitable. Pursuant to the statute, the special court had no 
option but to expand jurisdiction (or perhaps appoint a new in­
dependent counsel), since Section 593(c)(2)(C) mandates that the 
court "shall expand the jurisdiction of the appropriate independent 
counsel to include the matters involved or shall appoint another in­
dependent counsel to investigate such matters, " if so directed by the 
Attorney General.264 
Thus, although observers commenting upon the Lewinsky inves­
tigation have stated that Whitewater independent counsel Starr was 
cation to the Court of the Initiation of a Preliminary Investigation and Application to the 
Court for the Expansion of the Jurisdiction of the Independent Counsel [hereinafter Applica­
tion for Expansion of Jurisdiction] at 2, In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Assn., No. 
97-1, 1998 WL 472444 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998). 
260. See Ken Gormley, Court Must Do Its Duty in Starr Case, NEwsoAY, July 9, 1998, at 
A45. Kenneth Starr did discuss the putative connection between the Lewinsky matter and 
Whitewater during his House Judiciary Committee testimony in November of 1998. See In­
dependent Counsel Kenneth Starr's Prepared Testimony Before the House Judiciary Com­
mittee, 1998 WL 801023 (F.D.H.C.) (Nov. 19, 1998); see also Alison Mitchell, Rancorous 
House Panel Hears Starr's Case for Impeachment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1998, at Al. 
261. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(A) (1994). For a discussion of how Attorney General 
Reno may have contributed to the general over-use of the jurisdictional provisions, however, 
see Frankel, supra note 229. 
262. See Application for Expansion of Jurisdiction, In re Madison Guaranty, 1998 WL 
472444, at 2. 
263. In re Madison Guaranty, 1998 WL 472444, at 1 (order granting expansion of 
prosecutorial jusrisdiction, unsealed by order filed Jan. 29, 1998). 
264. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(C). The court also presumably has the power to appoint a 
different independent counsel to investigate the same matter, rather than expanding jurisdic­
tion. However, it is unclear whether the court is bound by the request of the Attorney Gen­
eral, or can make an independent judgment on the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(C). 
December 1998] The Independent Counsel 665 
only carrying out his duty to investigate the Lewinsky matter -
since it was assigned to him by the Attorney General and the 
court265 - such a characterization misses the mark. Once in­
dependent counsel Starr set the process in motion by requesting 
permission to expand his jurisdiction into the Lewinsky case, the 
statute almost guaranteed that the Attorney General and the court 
would authorize it. A serious internal flaw was thus revealed within 
the folds of the statute: it permits virtually unlimited expansion of 
jurisdiction, if an aggressive independent counsel seeks to stake out 
new territory for himself. 
Of all the defects exposed within the statute over the past 
twenty years, relating to the powers of the independent counsel, 
this is the most serious. It defeats the elaborate system of controls 
built into the special prosecutor law by Congress, and creates a sep­
aration of powers nightmare. It means that the independent coun­
sel can leap from one matter to the next, becoming a permanent 
inquisitor of a president or some other target of choice.266 It means 
that the already-minuscule threshold for triggering and conducting 
a preliminary investigation can be bypassed, since the Attorney 
General must grant great deference to the independent counsel's 
recommendation in favor of expansion. It also means that the im­
portant pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Ol­
son, that the independent counsel shall have "no ongoing 
responsibilities that extend beyond the accomplishment of the mis­
sion that she was appointed for and authorized by the Special Divi­
sion to undertake," becomes rubbish.267 
265. See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Judiciary Panel, In Party Vote, Urges Impeachment Hear­
ings; House Will Decide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1998, at Al (Rep. Howard L. Berman (D. Cal.), 
stated that "it was Mr. Clinton's Attorney General, Janet Reno, who approved Mr. Starr's 
inquiry into the Lewinsky matter."). See also Michael Hedges, Starr Says More to Come, 
PGH. PoST-GAZ., Oct. 10, 1998, at Al (Charles Bakaly, a spokesman for Starr's office, stated: 
"We are committed to discharging our duties to investigate the matters that the attorney 
general requested we investigate, and that the special division gave us jurisdiction over."). 
266. See David E. Rosenbaum, Some Experts are Faulting Counsel Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
26, 1998, at Al4. 
267. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988). Another problem with the flimsy 
jurisdictional standard is that an independent counsel can circumvent an Attorney General's 
decision to reject expansion of his or her jurisdiction, by requesting the court to rule that the 
new subject matter is implicit in the original grant of jurisdiction. Since Section 593 has 
considerable play in the joints, and allows the court to define jurisdiction to cover "all mat­
ters related to that [primary] subject matter," 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3), an independent counsel 
can use this as an end-run if the attorney general refuses to expand jurisdiction. See Morris­
sey, supra note 142, at 990-91; O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 485-88. This is precisely what 
the independent counsel in Morrison v. Olson succeeded in doing, in seeking to pursue con­
spiracy charges against two targets after other allegations evaporated. See In re Sealed Case, 
838 F.2d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Morrissey, supra note 142, at 990-91. If Congress 
amended the statute to create a presumption against expanding jurisdiction of the independ-
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Indeed, we have discovered that even where the Attorney Gen­
eral puts up a fight, and seeks to prohibit expansion of jurisdiction, 
the independent counsel can still approach the court (as Donald 
Smaltz did in the Espy case), and seek a determination that the 
matter is "related" to the subject of his original charter.26s Thus, 
expansions can be accomplished both directly and indirectly, even 
without the consent of the Attorney General. 
The only cure for this fundamental flaw in the jurisdictional ma­
chinery is to amend the statute to create a presumption against ex­
pansion into matters unrelated to the special prosecutor's original 
charter. This change is essential for several reasons. First, there is 
an inherent danger in allowing unlimited jurisdiction for a 
prosecutorial creature like the independent counsel. Unlike other 
prosecutors (even the Attorney General herself), the independent 
counsel operates outside the sphere of political and constitutional 
accountability. As the first Whitewater independent counsel, 
Robert Fiske, put it: "[T]he independent counsel doesn't have to 
seek authority from anybody to do anything. He or she can do 
whatever they feel is appropriate, without any review by any­
one. "269 Jacob Stein, the independent counsel in the first investiga­
tion of Attorney General Edwin Meese concurred: "I had more 
authority than anybody should have. I was reviewing myself."270 
Moreover, the existence of such potentially unbounded power (and 
ent counsel directly, it would simultaneously curtail the independent counsel's ability to indi­
rectly expand his authority through this "related matter" approach. 
268. For an excellent discussion of how the independent counsel accomplished his desired 
result in the Espy case, see Maskell, supra note 166, at 36-37; O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 
485-88. The "related matter" provision of the independent counsel statute is contained in 28 
U.S.C. § 593(b )(3). The Supreme Court in Morrison held that such matters must be "demon­
strably related to the factual circumstances that gave rise to the Attorney General's investiga­
tion and request for the appointment of the independent counsel in the particular case." 
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 679. The Eighth Circuit has interpreted this to mean that the "related 
matter" provision is "exceedingly broad." See United states v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1316-19 
(8th Cir. 1996). At the same time, that circuit has ruled that the determination of the Attor­
ney General as to the independent counsel's jurisdiction is final and non-reviewable. See 
Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1316-19 holding that it was exclusively within the power of the Attorney 
General to make determinations as to relatedness, and that this decision was not subject to 
judicial review). However, the special court apparently has not embraced the latter position. 
See In re Espy, 80 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting the Attorney General's determination 
that a matter was not "related"). But see In re Espy, 145 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir 1998) (agreeing 
with the Attorney General that a matter was not "related" to independent counsel's original 
jurisdiction charge.) 
269. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1546 (remarks of Robert Fiske). 
270. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1549 (remarks of Jacob Stein). 
Attorney General (later Justice) Robert Jackson once described the danger inherent in over­
broad prosecutorial power as follows: 
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person 
in America. His discretion is tremendous . . . .  
December 1998] The Independent Counsel 667 
resources) can easily skew the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
As Professor O'Sullivan - who worked on the Whitewater investi­
gation herself - observed, the intense focus on a single case com­
bined with the extraordinary power of the office poses unique 
hazards. An independent counsel's performance - and entire ca­
reer - may be "assessed on the basis of the one matter referred to 
him." This awkward fact "will certainly alter his perspective and 
may well alter his substantive decisions."271 The further the in­
dependent counsel's power is stretched, the greater the danger that 
the braking mechanism known as prosecutorial discretion will fail 
entirely. 
Third, there is a built-in inconsistency in allowing an independ­
ent counsel to spring from one matter to another, given the ultimate 
purpose of the statute. The goal is to select the most neutral person 
available - in both fact and appearance - in order to shore up 
public confidence in highly controversial cases. An existing in­
dependent counsel, by definition, arrives with the baggage of the 
extant investigation on his or her back. Given the inevitable split of 
public opinion as to whether a special prosecutor in any case -
particularly one involving the president or high administration offi­
cial - is motivated by political bias or the desire to build a career 
at the expense of a political foe, an existing independent counsel is 
almost never the best choice for a new investigation.272 
A number of specific amendments to the statute must be accom­
plished by Congress, in order to switch the presumption against ex­
panding an independent counsel's jurisdiction into unrelated turf. 
First, Section 593(c)(2)(A) should be revised to give the Attorney 
General a full ninety-day period in which to complete her prelimi­
nary investigation, when the independent counsel seeks to expand 
. . .  With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a 
fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of some ·act on the part of almost 
anyone. In such a case, it is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and 
then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and 
then searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on 
him. It is in this realm . . .  that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. 
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address Before the Second Annual Conference 
of United States Attorneys (April 1, 1940), in 24 AM. JUDICATURE SoCY. 18, 18-19 (1940). 
271. O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 490. 
272. The perception of a large segment of the American public that Kenneth Starr was 
"out to get the President" in the Whitewater investigation - even before the Lewinsky mat­
ter arose - is well documented. See Donald Kaul, Special Counsels Spend Millions Working 
as Hatchet Men for GOP, Aruz. REPUBLIC, Dec. 15, 1997, at B7; Richard Reeves, Witch 
Hunt, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27, 1997, at 29A; Angie Cannon, Independent Counsel 
Starr Losing Reputation For Impartiality, HouSToN CHRON., June 1, 1997, at A6, available in 
ALLNEWS, 1998 WL 8414316. Thus, regardless of Starr's actual bias, or lack thereof, he 
was far from the "best choice" for a controversial new investigation. 
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jurisdiction. The existing thirty-day period encourages shortcuts 
and discourages a serious investigation of the new matter. More­
over, Section 593(c)(2)(A) should be amended to strike the lan­
guage that requires the Attorney General to "give great weight to 
any recommendations of the independent counsel."273 In its place, 
language should be inserted stating that "there exists a presumption 
against expansion of jurisdiction into subjects unrelated to the origi­
nal grant of jurisdiction to the independent counsel by the Special 
Court." In malting a determination whether extension of jurisdic­
tion is appropriate, the Attorney General should be required to 
take into account the "degree of relatedness" between the two mat­
ters. The more remote the connection between the new matter and 
the independent counsel's original charter, the stronger the pre­
sumption should be against authorizing expansion. The Attorney 
General's decision not to expand jurisdiction should be deemed fi­
nal and nonreviewable. However, in the event that she recom­
mends expansion, Section 593(c)(2)(C) could be amended to allow 
the special court - the entity that established jurisdiction in the 
first place - to review the Attorney General's recommendation 
determine for itself whether an enlargement of the jurisdictional 
boundary line is prudent.274 
Once the existing presumption is switched in this fashion, facile 
expansions of jurisdiction will be curbed and one of the greatest 
deficiencies of the statute will be corrected. The legislative history 
of the statute makes clear that a critical duty of the special court 
was to guard against expansions of jurisdiction that "convert a tem­
porary special prosecutor into a permanent special prosecutor."275 
A statutorily-imposed presumption against expansion will consti­
tute a major step toward accomplishing that end. 
Besides re-asserting strict jurisdictional controls over independ­
ent counsels, Congress should fine-tune a number of other provi­
sions that govern the identity and breadth of power of special 
prosecutors. These should be aimed at correcting two other peren­
nial problems with the modem-day special prosecutor: lack of time 
limits and lack of budgetary constraints. 
273. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(A) (1994). 
274. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(B) also would have to be amended to eliminate the "reason­
able grounds" threshold for triggering the appointment of an independent counsel. A higher 
threshold should be inserted consistent with revisions to Section 592{c)(l)(A), discussed 
supra at notes 176-81 and accompanying text. 
275. See Ethics In Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4281 
{103 Stat. 1724). 
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2. Control the Duration of Investigtitions Through 
Periodic Review 
669 
One recurrent criticism of the statute, after twenty years of fine­
tuning, is that there is still no practical limitation upon the length of 
time a particular investigation may take. The Iran-Contra investi­
gation consumed seven years.276 The less noteworthy probe into 
irregularities of the Reagan administration's Department of Hous­
ing and Urban Development has taken an equal length of time, and 
is still not complete.277 The Whitewater investigation commenced 
in January 1994. Its many appendages have already kept the case 
going for nearly five years, as if animated by a life and breath of its 
own.21s 
In response to the seemingly endless time-line for a modern in­
dependent counsel inquiry, some commentators have proposed a 
statutory cap on investigations. Archibald Cox has suggested a 
one-year time limit after which an independent counsel must 
demonstrate to the court that his or her investigation should con­
tinue "for good cause shown."279 Several bills have been intro­
duced in Congress that would require, in a similar vein, that an 
independent counsel must "go back to Congress" or petition the 
court for additional funding after two years have elapsed.280 
These proposals, although based upon legitimate concerns for 
the slinky-like ability of investigations to grow, are nonetheless un­
satisfying. Iran-Contra independent counsel Lawrence Walsh, who 
oversaw one of the longest investigations in modern history, ex­
pressed legitimate concern that any such arbitrary time limit would 
place the special prosecutor in an unwinnable position: "All [the 
opposition] has to do is hold back documents, delay testimony, let 
the time run out, and talk about the expense of your office. That is 
276. See Drew & McNulty, supra note 171, at 1. See also LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE lNDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR !RAN-CONTRA MATTERS (1993). 
277. See Tom Hamburger, Latitude Given to Special Prosecutors Draws Fire; Sprawling 
Investigations Into Reagan, Clinton Cases Trigger Demands for Change, MINN. STAR TRIB., 
May 10, 1998, at 17A. 
278. See, e.g., Howard Fmeman & Karen Breslau, What Will He Say? NEWSWEEK, Aug. 
10, 1998, at 22. 
279. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 474; Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 
164, at 587 (remarks of Archibald Cox). Cox envisioned that the request for extension of 
time would be made to the court "in camera, if necessary" and could be renewed each year 
for good cause shown. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 474. Lloyd Cutler also would impose 
a one-year time limit, but would allow the Attorney General some say over whether such an 
extension was appropriate. See id. at 475-76. 
280. See Jost, supra note 165, at 30. 
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the way to undercut an independent counsel."281 Not only would 
the targets of investigations and their political allies find creative 
ways to sabotage the work of a special prosecutor by stalling until 
deadlines ticked to a close, but the nature of a criminal investiga­
tion is such that its precise duration can never be mapped out in 
advance. The Teapot Dome scandal of the 1920s took nearly six 
years to investigate, from start to finish.282 Watergate took two and 
a half years, from the time Cox was appointed in May 1973 until the 
Final Report of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force was issued 
in October 1975.283 
Rather than placing artificial time limits on the duration of an 
independent counsel's work, the simpler (and more sensible) ap­
proach would be for Congress to insert teeth into the existing provi­
sion that requires the special court to review the status of an 
independent counsel investigation every two years (and after two 
such cycles, every year).284 As will be discussed in greater detail, 
Section 596 of the statute already mandates that the court periodi­
cally assess the independent counsel's work and determine if it is 
"substantially completed" such that his or her office should be ter­
minated.285 By ensuring that periodic reviews actually take place, 
and by establishing concrete standards by which the court must 
make its assessment, Congress will strengthen the incentive for the 
independent counsel to wrap up his or her work expeditiously, and 
avoid the embarrassment of being terminated for over-staying his 
or her welcome. 
Congress also should provide the court with standards for as­
sessing whether an investigation is "substantially completed" under 
Section 595(b )(2). In rendering this important determination, the 
court should be required to consider: (1) the amount of work that 
has been completed by the independent counsel and the amount of 
remaining work that he or she can reasonably anticipate; (2) the 
amount of the remaining work of the independent counsel that re­
lates to the subject matter of his or her original jurisdictional state­
ment, and the amount of remaining work that is peripheral (the 
281. Bell et al., supra note 148, at 475. Larry Thompson, one of two independent coun­
sels investigating fraud and mismanagement in the Reagan Administration Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, raised similar concerns about placing "artificial limits" 
upon the length of an investigation. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 
1550-51 (remarks of Larry Thompson). 
282. See MURRAY, supra note 111, at 471-73. 
283. See WATERGATE REPORT, supra note 4. 
284. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1994). 
285. See discussion infra notes 368-75 and accompanying text. 
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more work that is peripheral, the more reason to conclude that the 
assignment is "substantially complete"); and (3) the amount of the 
remaining work that could be completed by the Justice Department 
without the danger of conflict or appearance thereof. 
The statute should specifically authorize the special court to 
seek input from the Attorney General, as well as from the in­
dependent counsel, in determining whether the above criteria point 
toward the near completion of the special prosecutor's assigned 
task. In this way, lingering investigations will be brought to a defin­
itive close, and artificial time limits will become unnecessary. 
3. Require That Each Independent Counsel Work Full-Time 
Another controversy that reached a crescendo in the recent 
Whitewater matter relates to the question whether a special prose­
cutor must work full-time. Kelln.eth Starr, throughout most of his 
tenure as Whitewater independent counsel, treated the appoint­
ment as a part-time position. Starr continued to earn approxi­
mately $1 million per year in private legal practice, as a lawyer for 
the prestigious Kirkland & Ellis firm in Washington, leading some 
to criticize him as a high-priced moonlighter.286 Judge David 
Sentelle, on the other hand, has suggested that a full-time job com­
mitment from potential independent counsels would "make our job 
very nearly impossible." Sentelle's concern was that "attorneys 
who have the ability, the reputation and the proven integrity for the 
job do not want to give up years of their career . . .  in order to do 
something that will be lower paying, unpopular, and may not lead 
anywhere."287 Congress itself worried about this possibility, and 
declined to build a requirement of full-time job commitment into 
the statute.288 As Judge Butzner, who formerly sat on the special 
court explained, a salary of $55.43 per hour with a maximum statu-
286. See Naftali Bendavid, Starr Takes Leave From Chicago Finn, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 1, 
1998, at 8; Tlll1othy Burger, Starr Still Stalling on 1997 Take, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 2, 1998, 
at 8; Robert Scheer, Setting Fire to Tobacco Legislation; Kenneth Starr Lives in a Glass House 
When it Comes to Conflicting Duties, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1998, at B7. Starr was also criti­
cized for representing tobacco interests in challenging anti-tobacco legislation, a high priority 
of the Clinton Administration. See Scheer, supra. Even after he expanded his Whitewater 
inquiry to encompass the Monica Lewinsky matter, Starr argued a major appeal for Meineke 
Discount Mufflers. See Burger, supra. In response to increased criticism about his outside 
legal work, Starr took a leave from his law practice in August of 1998, just as the controver­
sial Lewinsky investigation reached a crescendo. See Bendavid, supra note 286. 
287. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1540 (remarks of David B. 
Sentelle). 
288. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-452, at 26-27 (1987). 
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tory cap of $115,682 per year, would make it "very, very difficult" 
to attract someone with a first-rate law practice.2s9 
Although not all special prosecutors have worked full time,290 
many former special prosecutors and commentators have con­
cluded that a statutory amendment mandating full-time work by an 
independent counsel is essential.291 For Archibald Cox, such a re­
form would represent a "symbolic plus."292 Moreover, if the statute 
were limited to serious cases and major crises, as originally envi­
sioned by Congress, Cox found it hard to believe that "there aren't 
qualified people who aren't willing to put aside their normal lives in 
order to serve in a position of this responsibility under these cir­
cumstances. "293 As former Attorney General Griffin Bell ex­
pressed in a similar vein: "If it is important enough to have this 
procedure, then I think you ought to work at it full time."294 
A statutory amendment mandating a full-time commitment by 
each independent counsel has many things to recommend it. First, 
an Attorney General is not permitted to engage in private legal 
practice, during the term of his or her office.295 There is no reason 
to permit independent counsels, who stand in the shoes of the At­
torney General and wield extraordinary power in cases of critical 
importance, to live by different rules. Second, such a requirement 
would boost public confidence in the independent counsel's office, 
something that is desperately needed after the divisive Whitewater 
investigation.296 Third, such a requirement would help screen out 
frivolous cases. As Professor Julie O'Sullivan has noted, few attor­
neys would drop their careers and make financial sacrifices to work 
on marginal cases that were not of "sufficient public import to draw 
289. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1540 (remarks of John D. 
Butzner). After Judge Butzner made his comments, the statutory maximum for Starr's salary 
was raised to $118,000. See Chris Caldwell, The All Starr Team, GEORGE, Apr. 1998, at 126. 
The salary is that established pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5315, level IV of the Executive Schedule. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 594(b) (1994). 
290. For a review of those special prosecutors who have worked part-time, in the years 
prior to the appointment of Kenneth Starr, see Nolan, supra note 142, at 22 n.96. 
291. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 476-77; See Jost, supra note 165, at 30; Sixty-Seventh 
Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1587. 
292. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1587 (remarks of Archibald 
Cox). 
293. Id. at 1587. 
294. Bell et al., supra note 148, at 476-77. This sentiment was also expressed by Michael 
Zeldin, independent counsel in the investigation involving the Bush Administration search of 
Bill Clinton's passport records. See Jost, supra note 165, at 30. 
295. See 5 C.F.R. § 3801.106 (1998); 61 Fed. Reg. 59811-01, 1996 WL 675232 (F.R.) (Nov. 
25, 1996). 
296. A similar point was made in O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 482. 
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them from their practices."297 Just as importantly, a full-time re­
quirement for independent counsels would bring investigations to a 
close much more swiftly. Archibald Cox was paid a salary of 
$38,000 per year as Watergate Special Prosecutor, and took a leave 
from his tenured position on the Harvard Law School faculty to 
accept the post.298 Leon Jaworski, who succeeded Cox as Water­
gate Special Prosecutor, likewise left behind his lucrative Texas law 
firm practice to re-locate to Washington throughout the duration of 
his service.299 In each case, the special prosecutor had a powerful 
incentive to complete the investigation, wrap up his work, and go 
home.300 In the Whitewater case, there is ample room to wonder 
whether it would have spun off into so many addendums (including 
the Monica Lewinsky investigation) if independent counsel Starr 
had been required to work at the initial Whitewater investigation 
full-time, write a report, and return to his legal practice at Kirkland 
& Ellis.301 
When Attorney General-designate Elliott Richardson asked 
Archibald Cox to move to Washington, at age 61, and take on an ill­
de:fined and untested position in the Watergate case, seven promi­
nent lawyers and judges had already turned Richardson down.302 
Cox accepted the post, knowing it was probably a "no-win job," 
because he concluded that "[s]omebody clearly has to do it."303 
The only hope for the independent counsel statute, in the future, is 
that conscientious lawyers and jurists will continue to accept such 
positions, regardless of the relatively low pay and large time com­
mitment. 304 To gear the statute to attract lawyers who wish to keep 
one foot in their existing jobs, is to attract individuals who are not 
prepared to unqualifiedly accept the position at the outset. 
297. Id. at 482. 
298. See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 240-41. 
299. See JAMES DoYLE, NoT .ABOVE nm LAW: THE BATTLES OF WATERGATE PROSECU­
TORS Cox AND JAWORSKI 237-39 (1997). 
300. Jaworski returned to Texas as soon as tbe Watergate case was in a position for trial 
by his litigation team. See id. at 349, 374-76. 
301. For an argument that independent counsels really do not have unlimited time to 
conduct their investigations, since the special court can terminate tbem pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 596(b)(2) (1994) if it determines that tbeir work is "substantially completed," see Dash, 
supra note 248, at 2083-84. 
302. See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 233-34. 
303. GoRMLEY, supra note 3, at 240. 
304. Every federal judge and cabinet official in tbe nation presumably has to make such 
financial trade-offs in deciding whether or not to engage in public service. 
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4. Control Costs by Reducing the Number of Cases That Trigger 
the Statute 
Another public criticism leveled at the independent counsel 
statute relates to the enormous financial costs it generates.305 The 
statute provides that the Justice Department must "pay all costs re­
lating to the establishment and operation" of an independent coun­
sel office.306 As former Deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann 
has commented, the office has turned into a "juggernaut" uncon­
strained by practical pressures including budget and time con­
straints.307 The price-tag for the twenty independent counsel 
investigations launched under the statute thus far, since 1978, is 
roughly $136 million.308 The cost of Kenneth Starr's Whitewater 
investigation and its various appendages is approximately $40 mil­
lion (and counting) as of late 1998.309 On top of these direct tabs 
run up by the independent counsels, there are additional hidden 
costs. For instance, the FBI spent approximately $4.6 million in car­
rying out its work in the Iran-Contra investigation,310 on top of the 
almost $48 million expended directly by independent counsel Law­
rence Walsh.311 All of these expenses are ultimately borne by the 
taxpayer. 
No talisman exists for controlling the cost of the independent 
counsel mechanism, other than regulating the number, scope, and 
duration of investigations. The most cost-effective manner in which 
to conduct any investigation at the federal level, of course, is to 
305. See, e.g., Paul Delaney, Losing Faith in the Independent Counsel Act, BALT. SuN, 
July 5, 1998, at 17A, available in ALLNEWS, 1998 WL 4974596; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at 
Home: After Kenneth Starr, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at A19; Relax, It's Just Money, 
GEORGE, Apr. 1998, at 130. In the first four years of existence of the independent counsel 
statute, the median length of an investigation was seven months and the median cost was less 
than $200,000. In the last four years, the median length of an investigation was two and a half 
years, and the median cost was nearly four million dollars. See Kathleen Clark, Paying the 
Price for Heightened Ethics Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds and Other Ways That Government 
Officials Pay Their Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. R.E.v. 65, 127 {1997). For a detailed list of costs by 
investigation, see Kathy Kiely, $54M For Independent Counsels, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 12, 
1998, at 2, available in ALLNEWS, 1998 WL 11032723 (covering Clinton Administration); 
Investigations, by Administration, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 1997, at A4 (covering entire span of 
the statute). 
306. 28 u.s.c. § 594{d){2) {1994). 
307. See Philip B. Heymann, Four Unresolved Questions About the Responsibilities of an 
Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2120-21 (1998). 
308. See Malone, supra note 160, at AlO; Maskell, supra note 166, at 31; Page, supra note 
166, at A4;. 
309. See Relax, It's Just Money, supra note 305, at 130; Page, supra note 166, at A4; Kiely, 
supra note 305, at 2; Gormley, supra note 170, at Cl; Gormley, supra note 260. 
310. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 124. 
311. See Investigations, by Administration, supra note 305, at A4. 
December 1998] The Independent Counsel 675 
have the Justice Department handle it. The Justice Department is a 
massive operation with 115,667 employees, thousands of lawyers, 
and a budget of $18.6 billion.312 Each time an independent counsel 
is created, a mini-law firm must be set up, divorced from the De­
partment of Justice, requiring its own office space, staff, equipment, 
and overhead. All of this only duplicates the resources already in 
place at the Justice Department, and represents a horribly ineffi­
cient way of doing business at an enormous cost to the taxpayer. 
Some commentators have suggested that the Attorney General 
should establish staffing levels and budgetary constraints for the in­
dependent counsel, at the time of appointment, in order to build a 
de facto cap onto potential expenditures.313 However, this ap­
proach is impractical; an Attorney General could then use the purse 
strings to effectively suffocate an investigation that posed a threat 
to his or her administration. The better solution is to address the 
root of the problem. If Congress amends the statute such that it is 
triggered only on rare and serious occasions,314 as discussed above, 
the spiraling costs will recede (quite naturally) to an acceptable 
level. This check on the escalating costs of special prosecutors is far 
superior to artificial budgetary caps, because it will keep spending 
under control without hampering legitimate investigations. 
5. Sharply Limit Final Reports 
A final way that the independent counsel statute can be 
strengthened, while simultaneously containing costs, is sharply to 
limit the practice by which independent counsels draft voluminous 
(and expensive) reports at the conclusion of their investigations. 
Once again, the statute itself is the principal culprit. Professor 
O'Sullivan has expressed the problem by stating that the statute 
"creates incentives for [independent counsels] to investigate too 
long and report too fulsomely."315 Section 594(h)(l)(A) requires 
that each independent counsel file a report with the court, every six 
months, which "identifies and explains major expenses, and summa­
rizes all other expenses, incurred by that office" during the relevant 
period, and "estimates future expenses."316 This is a sensible re-
312. See 1997 ATTY. GEN. ANN. REP. 1, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/aglar97/ 
doj1997.pdf>. 
313. See Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 542-43 (arguing that the jndependent 
counsel should be required to seek enlargements of time and money from the court). 
314. See supra discussion at notes 172-238 and accompanying text. 
315. O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 500. 
316. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(l)(A) (1994). 
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quirement. The Court and Congress have a strong interest in moni­
toring expenditures and ensuring that the independent counsel -
who, unlike other federal entities, has no precise budget - does 
not indulge in lavish expenses. 
Section 594(h)(l)(B), however, drops a fly in the ointment. This 
section requires, before the office of the independent counsel is ter­
mi:Ilated, that such counsel "file a final report with the division of 
the court, setting forth fully and completely a description of the 
work of the independent counsel, including the disposition of all 
cases brought."317 This means that the independent counsel must 
go beyond reporting the input and output of funds. Section 
594(h)(l)(B) requires every special prosecutor, prior to leaving of­
fice, to explain the work history of his or her operation, and justify 
(in essence) all of his or her actions.31s 
This is a daunting task for independent counsels, most of whom 
are top professionals and have much at stake if the public is permit­
ted to scrutinize each move and decision made during a protracted, 
politically-charged investigation. 319 Not surprisingly, independent 
counsels have thus tended to err on the side of over-completeness, 
preparing vast reports that leave no stone unturned, and racking up 
significant time and expenses in discharging their final statutory 
duty.320 A prime example is Lawrence Walsh's Iran-Contra investi­
gation report, which consisted of three bound volumes comprised of 
nearly 1,500 pages,321 and kept his office working long after the sub­
jects of the investigation had left office.322 
Almost universally, the "final report" requirement has been 
criticized by former independent counsels and those intimately fa­
miliar with the process. It has been called a "wasteful require­
ment,"323 an expensive chore that "serve[s] to overly politicize the 
investigation,"324 and a "pain in the neck."325 Not only is this kind 
of report foreign to any other prosecutor's office in the country,32� 
317. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(l)(B). 
318. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(l)(B). 
319. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1559. 
320. See O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 484-85. 
321. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1558. 
322. See Drew & McNulty, supra note 171, at 1; Carl P. Leubsdorf, Report Says Reagan 
Fostered Iran-Contra; He Denies Creating Climate For Aides' Efforts, DALLAS MoRNINO 
NEws, Jan. 19, 1994, at lA. 
323. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1556. 
324. Id. at 1558. 
325. Id. 
326. See Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 547. 
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it also raises serious concerns about basic faimess.327 Criminal in­
vestigations are traditionally shielded from blow-by-blow accounts 
and detailed public scrutiny. Particularly where no indictment is 
lodged or no prosecution is commenced, there is a tradition of cir­
cumspection and silence, designed to safeguard the reputation and 
privacy of the individuals under investigation. In the typical case, 
professional and ethical limitations sharply limit what prosecutors 
can say and do about criminal investigations, beyond what is con­
tained in the public record.328 When it comes to the high-profile 
world of special prosecutors, however, the "final report" require­
ment casts these practices to the wind, and forces an independent 
counsel (in essence) to air the dirty laundry of his targets.329 
The most sensible solution to this problem is for Congress to 
dramatically shrink the scope of the information that must be pro­
vided at the conclusion of the independent counsel's work. Since 
the independent counsel must provide periodic reports to the court, 
at six-month intervals, accounting (in detail) for each expenditure 
pursuant to Section 594(h)(1)(A), the court will have ample chance 
to become familiar with the nature of the work being performed by 
the office. At the conclusion of the investigation, the statute should 
require nothing more than a reckoning of expenditures, personnel 
information, and a concise summary of the work performed by the 
office. If the special court wishes to obtain further information, on 
particular subjects, the statute may authorize the court to request 
additional details from the special prosecutor in order to resolve 
specific questions. Yet the presumption should be toward a lean, 
straightforward report. Grand jury information and other material 
generally shielded from public disclosure should be excluded from 
the principal report, since it will inevitably be made public. If the 
court determines that such confidential information is essential to 
complete its own review, the statute should permit the independent 
counsel to provide a sealed, supplemental report containing such 
information. Because the special court has no veto power over the 
327. See Heymann, supra note 307, at 2128-30; Kavanaugh, supra note 161, at 2155-57. 
328. See Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 547; O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 484-85. 
329. One significant injustice decried by commentators is that an individual against whom 
criminal charges are not brought can still be "publicly branded a criminal or wrongdoer" in 
the final report. See Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 546-47. This occurred, most 
notably, in the second investigation of Attorney General Edwin Meese by independent coun­
sel James McKay. See EASTLAND, supra note 23, at 123; Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, 
at 547 n.39. See also OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, REPORT OF INDEPENDENT COUN­
SEL IN RE EoWIN MEESE III 73-76, 95-99 (1988) (suggesting that evidence "probably" existed 
to convict Meese for certain offenses, although criminal charges were not brought). 
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prosecutorial decisions of the independent counsel,330 in any event, 
the court (as a general rule) need not explore the nitty-gritty of the 
independent counsel's operation. A short and pithy report (in con­
junction with the information the court receives from periodic 
budget reports) will more than suffice. 
One independent counsel charged with handling the unusually 
lengthy (and costly) investigation of the Reagan administration De­
partment of Housing and Urban Development lamented: "When I 
was a prosecutor in the Department of Justice, when I ended a case, 
I simply shut the door and turned the lights out. Now I have to 
spend millions of your money doing this report."331 If costs are to 
be controlled and investigations are to be brought to a close, the 
statute must allow independent counsels to tum their lights out -
at some point - and shut the door. 
C. Reform and Clarify the Duties of the Special Court 
One of the great failures of the independent counsel statute in 
recent years is that the body that Congress envisioned acting as a 
moderating and restraining influence on special prosecutors - the 
special three-judge panel - has all but surrendered any meaningful 
role in the process. In the debates that shaped the original statute, 
Congress settled upon the judiciary to appoint and monitor the spe­
cial prosecutor because it believed that the special three-judge 
panel could act as a wise and moderating influence in certain politi­
cally treacherous cases. Congress had several reasons for placing 
this important responsibility in the judicial branch. First, Judge 
John Sirica had been a hero in Watergate and had emerged as one 
figure whom the American people trusted in that unseemly mess.332 
Second, the 1970s was a period of great reliance (perhaps over­
reliance) upon the judiciary to resolve problems that were not being 
adequately resolved by other branches of government. The abor­
tion controversy,333 the fight for gender equality,334 the school bus-
330. See Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654, 681 (1988). 
331. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1556 (remarks of Larry D. 
Thompson). 
332. See HARRIGER, supra note 23, at 47 & 229 n.35. Sirica had won public respect be­
cause his refusal to believe that the Watergate burglars were telling the whole truth - and 
his questioning of the sufficiency of the Justice Department's prosecution in the original 
Watergate trial - led to the unraveling of the White House cover-up. See generally JoHN 
S1ruCA, To SET THE REcoRD STRAIGHT (1979). 
333. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
334. See e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973). 
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sing battle,335 and other political hot potatoes of the day were 
thrown onto the doorstep of the judiciary after Congress and the 
executive branch punted them away. At the time the original spe­
cial prosecutor legislation was fashioned, the courts appeared to be 
the safest haven to locate the appointment and oversight power, in 
order to avoid any possible corruption in the process.336 
Unfortunately, Congress envisioned one thing, but the legisla­
tion did another in practice. Congress's purpose in vesting a three­
judge panel with the power to appoint and monitor the special pros­
ecutor was to shift this duty away from the Justice Department 
(where there existed potential conflicts), and move it down Consti­
tution Avenue to the special court. After all, Watergate Special 
Prosecutor Archibald Cox had been fired by President Nixon be­
cause he was an appointee of the executive branch, directly ac­
countable to Attorney General Elliot Richardson.337 The whole 
point of the new legislation was to fight off potential conflicts and 
prevent incidents like the "Saturday Night Massacre" from recur­
ring, by moving oversight responsibility to a neutral court.338 
There is no indication that Congress intended the court to re­
main invisible. Elliot Richardson, as the Attorney General over­
seeing the Watergate case, had played a cautious but essential role 
in interfacing with, and maintaining a check over, special prosecu­
tor Cox.339 Congress certainly envisioned that a similar oversight 
function would be carried out by the special court under the statute. 
This was the only guarantee, layered into the statute, that the spe­
cial prosecutor would not become an unaccountable fourth branch 
of government.340 The "someone" to whom he or she was meant to 
be answerable was the three-judge panel, in conjunction with the 
335. See e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
336. It is noteworthy that the first major "special prosecutor" bill introduced by Senator 
Birch Bayh in Congress, in the week following Archibald Cox's firing in the Saturday Night 
Massacre, placed the power to appoint and oversee the special prosecutor in the federal 
District Court. See S. REP. No. 93-595, at 2 (1973). 
337. For an account of the legal debate over whether President Nixon had the power to 
fire Cox, see GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 323, 383, 420 & 558 n.135. 
338. For a discussion of the conflicts of interest that abounded in the Watergate investiga­
tion prior to Cox's appointment, see id. note 3, at 257-61, 282 & 368-71. 
339. The relationship between Cox and Richardson, that was essential to Cox's effective 
performance as special prosecutor, is su=arized in id. at 294-99, 318-22. Professor John 
:Barrett thoroughly discusses the importance of a healthy relationship between the Attorney 
General and independent counsels in John Q. Barrett, All Or Nothing, Or Maybe Coopera­
tion: Attorney General Power, Conduct, and Judgment in Relation to the Work of an In­
dependent Counsel, 49 MERCER L. REv. 519, 549-50 (1998). 
340. For an expression of Congress's concern that the special prosecutor legislation 
should not be permitted to create a "fourth branch of Government," see Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, supra note 60, at 23 (remarks of Sen. Baker). 
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Attorney General whose direct control was filtered through the 
special court. Unfortunately, the court has shrunk down its own 
role to almost nothing. After appointing an independent counsel 
and establishing his or her jurisdiction,341 the court has done little 
more than rubber-stamp the special prosecutor's actions.342 In­
deed, the court itself has articulated a minimalist vision of its func­
tions. Judge John D. Butzner, Jr. of the Fourth Circuit, a Reagan 
appointee and a member of the special court since 1988, directly 
addressed the question: "Once the independent counsel has been 
appointed and the order signed defining his scope, what does the 
court have to do as far as the investigation?" Judge Butzner's reply 
was: "Very little, and less than that."343 
Judge Butzner's response may accurately sum up the approach 
taken by the special court to date, but it hardly matches the model 
envisioned by Congress. Although it is dangerous to allow the At­
torney General to meddle too much in the work of the independent 
counsel, it is even more dangerous to allow the special court to 
meddle too little, such that the special prosecutor can become a 
branch of government unto itself. 1\vo factors have contributed to 
the special court's failure to fulfill its essential role under the stat­
ute. The first is the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson. 
The second is the statute itself. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Morrison v. Olson resolved 
the separation of powers conundrum, inherent in the independent 
counsel statute, by distancing the judiciary from any functions of 
the independent counsel that were even remotely prosecutorial. 
Writing for a near-unanimous Court, the Chief Justice stated: 
[Although] provisions of the Act do require the court to exercise 
some judgment and discretion, . . .  the powers granted by these provi­
sions are themselves essentially ministerial. The Act simply does not 
give the Division the power to 'supervise' the independent counsel in 
the exercise of his or her investigative or prosecutorial authority.344 
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that a number of functions 
of the special court necessarily interfaced \vith the prosecutor's 
341. 28 u.s.c. § 593 (1994). 
342. See Gormley, supra note 229, at A25; Gormley, supra note 260. 
343. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1541 (remarks of John D. 
Butzner). 
344. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 (1988) (footnote omitted). The Special 
Division itself has likewise written: "The Independent Counsel does not operate under our 
supervision and his acts . . .  do not bear our aegis." In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 
1994). 
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work.345 He also conceded that the special court's power to termi­
nate an investigation under Section 596(b) (2) was quasi­
executive.346 Yet he went on to conclude that "the functions that 
the Special Division is empowered to perform are not inherently 
'Executive'; indeed, they are directly analogous to functions that 
federal judges perform in other contexts."347 
Chief Justice Rehnquist was searching for the safest path on the 
treacherous separation of powers catwalk. An independent counsel 
significantly controlled by the judiciary would almost certainly en­
croach upon the executive branch's traditional powers to enforce 
the laws and prosecute criminals.348 Yet the Court's stern language 
in Morrison has caused the special panel to become scared of its 
own shadow. The purpose of the independent counsel statute was 
to allow the special court to oversee the special pro·secutor (in place 
of the Justice Department), but limit its involvement scrupulously. 
As part of this plan, the court's oversight functions were carefully 
separated from its traditonal judicial functions, so that it could not 
act as both judge and prosecutor. The statute's draftsmen were 
keely aware that too much involvement by the special court would 
tip the statute into the realm of unconstitutionality. Yet too little 
involvement would constitute an even worse sin, creating the "rov­
ing Frankenstein monster" that Congress assiduously sought to 
avoid exhuming.349 
345. These functions included the ability of the special court to determine whether the 
Attorney General had shown "good cause" for extending a preliminary investigation beyond 
the time limit; deciding whether to make public the various reports of the Attorney General 
and the independent counsel; and deciding whether to award attorneys fees. See Morrison, 
487 U.S. at 681 n.19. 
346. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 682. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1994) allows the special court 
to terminate the office of the independent counsel when, based upon a request from the 
Attorney General or upon its own motion, it determines that an investigation is "so substan­
tially completed that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such 
investigations and prosecutions." 
347. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681. The examples that Chief Justice Rehnquist gave included 
(a) the ability of federal judges to decide whether to allow the disclosure of matters occurring 
before a grand jury pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6( e ); (b) the ability of federal judges to 
extend a grand jury investigation pursuant to Rule 6(g); and ( c) the ability of federal judges 
to award attorneys fees in civil rights cases pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Morrison, 487 
U.S. at 681. 
348. See Tuerkeimer, supra note 143, at 251-52. 
349. For a discussion of some of the specific dangers inherent in permitting the independ­
ent counsel to become an unaccountable "fourth branch" of government, see Daugherty, 
supra note 142, at 984-90, and Feinburg, supra note 135, at 183-84. Senator Howard Baker 
also warned against creating a "virtually inviolate fourth branch of Government" that "would 
substantially diminish the accountability of law-enforcement officials to the President, the 
Congress, and the American people." See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Government 
Operations, supra note 60, at 23. 
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The wishy-washy language of the statute has not helped matters. 
The statutory language is oddly silent as to what the special court 
should do - if anything - once the investigation proceeds for­
ward. The statute fails to spell out even the most basic duties of the 
three-judge panel. In reforming the independent counsel statute, 
Congress must face and resolve this fundamental question: Is the 
special court the monitor of the special prosecutor, or is no branch 
of government the monitor? Does the court have a role after the 
independent counsel is appointed, or none at all? If the latter, the 
statute must be junked as patently unconstitutional, since no branch 
is minding the store. If the former is true (as Congress seems to 
have intended), Congress must lay out the court's powers and re­
sponsibilities in painstaking detail, or the judiciary will continue to 
bury its head in the sand. 
The Supreme Court and scholars can no longer duck this un­
comfortable fact: If the independent counsel statute is indeed con­
stitutional (as Morrison held), the independent counsel must be 
"inferior" to someone.350 That someone, like it or not, is the special 
court as much as it is the Attorney General. The special court acts 
as a filter, straining out potential bias or conflict that may exist 
within the Department of Justice in select cases. The Attorney 
General retains some role; but a number of the Justice Depart­
ment's ordinary duties are shifted to the three-judge panel. The 
court not only has the power to appoint,351 but it has the power to 
set the written jurisdictional boundaries of the independent coun­
sel;352 determine when investigations are substantially com­
pleted;353 and make a host of interim decisions governing the 
investigations. 
For instance, as the Supreme Court itself noted in Morrison, 
Congress specifically gave the special court power to determine 
whether the Attorney General had demonstrated "good cause" for 
extending a preliminary investigation beyond the original time limit 
pursuant to Section 592(a)(3) of the statute; deciding whether to 
refer "related" matters to the independent counsel under Section 
594( e ); deciding whether to make public the independent counsel's 
identity and his or her jurisdiction under Section 593(b)(4), as well 
350. I take this to be the underlying message of Professor Tribe, in his recent dialogue 
with Professor Amar. Tribe laments that the independent counsel statute as it has evolved 
destroys the notion of separation of powers, since the special prosecutor is "inferior" to no 
one. See Amar & Tribe, supra note 151. 
351. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(l) (1994). 
352. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(l). 
353. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(2). 
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as various documents filed with court pursuant to Section 593(h); 
deciding whether to release the independent counsel's final report 
to Congress and the public and whether any protective orders 
should be issued under Section 594(h)(2); and deciding whether to 
award attom�ys' fees to individuals investigated but not indicted 
pursuant to Section 593(f).354 It can hardly be said that Congress 
envisioned that the special court would do nothing. 
At the same time, Chief Justice Rehnquist was absolutely cor­
rect in Morrison when he suggested that this is <;langerous constitu­
tional turf. Federal judges should not be in the business of running 
prosecutions, nor do they possess expertise to do so. But the stat­
ute toes the line carefully. It assigns to the special court a combina­
tion of traditional judicial functions and quasi-executive, 
"ministerial" functions, and this is why the Supreme Court upheld 
it. Congress intentionally constructed the special court using senior 
and retired judges from the Courts of Appeals35S who would act as 
a sort of buffer zone between the independent counsel and the Jus­
tice Department, but would not decide the merits of any case in 
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine. As the Morri­
son Court noted, there is precedent for allowing members of the 
judicial branch to perform functions that intersect with those of the 
executive branch to ensure the proper functioning of the criminal 
justice machinery. For instance, federal judges supervise grand ju­
ries, assist in their "investigative functions" by compelling the testi­
mony of witnesses, participate in the issuance of search warrants, 
review applications for wiretaps, and otherwise involve themselves 
in criminal investigations in a limited fashion.356 Thus, when Con­
gress fashioned the special court under the independent counsel 
statute, it purposely built a hybrid creature. It merged traditional 
judge-like functions with quasi-executive, ministerial functions, be­
cause the Attorney General's ministerial role was necessarily lim­
ited. It built a court, in other words, like no other court. 
It is not necessary to broaden the powers of the special court to 
make it work properly. Rather, its duties must be spelled out more 
clearly so that it is empowered to carry out the functions that Con­
gress has already given it, and the Supreme Court has already af­
firmed. Otherwise, the entire statutory scheme is a terrible 
354. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680 (1988). 
355. See 28 U.S.C. § 49(c) (1994). 
356. These points are discussed in Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681 n. 20. The provision of the 
independent counsel statute that mandates that the special court shall not decide the merits 
of a case is 28 U.S.C. § 49(f). 
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constitutional hoax. A.t least three adjustments are essential to 
make the special court more effective. 
1 .  Authorize the Special Court to Consult with the Attorney 
General in Selecting an Independent Counsel 
Some observers have questioned the selection process by which 
independent counsels are appointed by the three-judge court.357 
The inherently secret nature of the appointive process, and the 
political nature of that process, are both concerns.358 The contro­
versial decision by the special court to replace Robert Fiske with 
Kenneth Starr - which took place after an alleged lunchtime meet­
ing between presiding Judge Sentelle and conservative Republican 
Senator Lauch Faircloth (R. North Carolina) - has been cited as 
proof that the ugly hand of politics controls the process.359 
Lloyd Cutler has responded with a proposal that would allow 
the President to nominate five or ten potential independent coun­
sels, to be confirmed by the Senate; from this list the special court 
would be required to select its appointee.360 But such efforts to 
squeeze every drop of political influence from the selection process 
are impractical and produce undesirable results. The prospect of 
allowing the president himself to appoint an independent counsel 
defeats the whole purpose of the statute. It heightens the public 
perception that the decks are being stacked from the start. Presi­
dent Ford's proposal in 1976 that squarely placed such an alterna­
tive in front of Congress was wisely (and definitively) rejected.361 
Moreover, Lloyd Cutler's plan is extremely impractical. Few law­
yers of the caliber sought for high-profile special prosecutor investi­
gations will commit to being considered for such a position until 
357. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 151, at Cl. 
358. See id. at C2. 
359. In part, criticism relating to the manner of Starr's appointment turned upon the fact 
that Judge Sentelle's wife worked in Senator Faircloth's office, and reportedly arranged the 
lunchtime meeting to discuss the replacement of Fiske with someone who would be more 
aggressive, in order to satisfy anti-Clinton Republicans. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 
477-78; Joan Biskupic, Choosing the Independent Counsel; Power of Three-Judge Panel 
Breeds Questions of Partisanship, WASH. Posr, Apr. 13, 1997, at Al2; Sen. Robert Torricell, 
It's Time to Reconsider Independent Counsel Statute's Effectiveness, RoLL CALL, Mar. 20, 
1997, at Guest Observer section. For a response to these criticisms involving the controver­
sial lunch, see O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 471-73. 
360. See Bell et al., supra note 148, at 477-78. 
361. See Watergate Reforms, supra note 76 at 5, and discussion supra text accompanying 
notes 76-78. For a similar proposal that the President appoint a special prosecutor at the 
beginning of each term, to be confirmed by the Senate and operate within the Justice Depart­
ment, see Victor H. Kramer & Louis P. Smith, The Special Prosecutor Act: Proposals For 
1983, 66 MINN. L. REv. 963 (1982). 
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they know the precise circumstances, the timing, and all of the nu­
ances of the case.362 The better approach is to allow the special 
judicial panel to choose the independent counsel as they see fit, but 
to amend Section 593(b) to specifically authorize the court to con­
sult with the Attorney General in making its selection. 
As drafted, Section 593(b) sets no real ground rules for the se­
lection process.363 The special panel simply gathers recommenda­
tions from a wide variety of sources, and makes its decision. As 
Judge David Sentelle explained, the judges maintain an informal 
"talent book" that is constantly updated with potential names from 
a host of contacts. They then select from this pool as the need 
arises.364 Such an informal process is perhaps inevitable. The stat­
ute, however, should build in an ounce of prevention by specifically 
authorizing the three-judge panel to obtain input from the Attorney 
General before making its ultimate selection. First, this will help to 
ensure that an individual perceived to be biased against the Presi­
dent will not become the court's appointee. Since the penultimate 
purpose of the statute is to select an independent counsel who is 
perceived to be independent by all concerned, it can only enhance 
that goal if the Attorney General is permitted to raise red flags with 
respect to potential prosecutors who may be viewed as politically 
tainted.365 Congress built the independent counsel statute so that 
the special court and the Attorney General would be able to cau­
tiously interact, and this was a healthy thing.366 Separation of pow­
ers concerns that dominated debate over the statute were resolved, 
in part, by allowing the Attorney General to retain input at appro­
priate stages. The critical appointment stage should be no excep-
362. Before Attorney General Elliot Richardson asked Archibald Cox to serve as Water­
gate Special Prosecutor, for instance, seven prominent lawyers and judges turned Richardson 
down. See GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 233-34. Given the controversial nature of such investi­
gations, few prominent attorneys will become involved rashly. 
363. Tue statute provides only that the court shall seek to appoint "an individual who has 
appropriate experience and who will conduct the investigation and any prosecution in a 
prompt, responsible, and cost-effective manner," and an individual "who will serve to the 
extent necessary to complete the investigation and any prosecution without undue delay." 28 
u.s.c. § 593(b)(2) (1994). 
364. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1537. 
365. Thus, for instance, it might have been useful if Attorney General Reno had the 
opportunity to inform the court that the White House perceived Kenneth Starr to be an 
inappropriate selection, because he purportedly had taken steps to file an amicus brief in the 
Paula Jones case taking a position against the President. See Sara Fritz, Fiske Ousted in 
Whitewater Case} Move is Surprise, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1994, at Al; Rovella, supra note 160, 
at Al; Gary Wills, Cabal and Courtiers, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 27, 1998, at A9, avail­
able in ALLNEWS, 1998 WL 3619483. Instead, this anti-Starr sentiment in the White House 
festered and led to an increasingly hostile relationship between the two camps. 
366. See Barrett, supra note 339, at 548-51. 
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tion. Ultimately, the special court must (and will) decide whom to 
appoint as independent counsel, unconstrained by political 
shackles. Yet this decision should be informed by the same relevant 
facts that the Attorney General would have at her disposal, in seek­
ing to select an unbiased appointee. Although Congress was silent 
on this subject in drafting the statute in 1978, it should make the 
special court's authority to consult with the Attorney General in 
making appointments explicit, in renewing the statute in 1999. 
2. Give the Court Express Power to Carry Out Its Duties 
A principal reason that the special court has shrunk from taking 
any role in keeping the independent counsel law on course is that 
the statute itself gives scant direction as to how the court is to carry 
out its proper functions. Fearful of stepping over the boundary line 
by interfering with the prosecutorial function, the court has instead 
elected to remain passive to the point of paralysis.367 If the court is 
going to perform its statutory duties in a responsible fashion, it is 
essential that the three-judge panel have a means by which it can 
gather information, hold limited (if necessary closed-door) proceed­
ings, and otherwise equip itself to carry out the essential role that 
Congress fashioned for it. 
A vivid example relates to the court's duty, pursuant to Section 
596(b )(2) of the amended statute, to periodically review whether an 
independent counsel should continue his or her work.368 The pres­
ent version of Section 596(b )(2), added to the statute by amend­
ment in 1994, requires the special court "on its own motion" to 
determine every two years (and after two such cycles, every year) 
whether an independent counsel's office should be terminated be­
cause his or her work is "substantially completed."369 This provi­
sion - quite distinct from the section that permits the Attorney 
General to fire the independent counsel for "good cause" (because 
of some misconduct etc. )370 - was inserted by Congress in order to 
"ensure that the special court inquires on a periodic basis"371 as to 
367. For a criticism of the special court's ill-defined role under the statute, see Martin & 
Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 539. 
368. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1994). 
369. Section 596(b)(2) also permits the Attorney General to request such termination. 
However, the special court must automatically make such a determination every two years 
(and then every year), even if the Attorney General takes no action. See U.S.C. § 596(b)(2). 
Prior to the adoption of the present language in Section 596(b)(2), the original statute per­
mitted the special court to terminate a special prosecutor if his work was "substantially com­
pleted," but did not mandate a periodic review by the court. 
370. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a). 
371. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-511, at 23 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 806. 
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the continued viability of the investigation. When Congress added 
this section, it was well aware that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Morrison v. Olson embraced a narrow view of the court's appropri­
ate role when it came to terminating an independent counsel's 
work.372 Yet Congress nonetheless adopted the amendment, wisely 
concluding that such limited review by the court was essential to 
prevent a special prosecutor from lingering beyond his or her useful 
lifetime.373 
Although the "periodic review" provision has been in place for 
four years, and a similar "termination" provision existed even 
before 1994, the special court has almost never requested a brief or 
held any kind of proceeding to determine whether the work of an 
independent counsel has been "substantially completed." In 
Kenneth Starr's recent investigation of the Whitewater affair, Mr. 
Starr's statutory deadline came and went without a whisper. 
Although there was an intense national debate over whether Starr 
should be permitted to press forward on the seemingly unrelated 
Lewinsky case, or instead wrap up his Whitewater investigation and 
pass off the Lewinsky matter to the Justice Department or a new 
independent counsel, the three-judge court entered a perfunctory 
one-sentence order continuing Starr's jurisdiction on the last day 
before his statutory deadline, without requesting written memo­
randa or holding any proceeding designed to elicit input from the 
Attorney General or the independent counsel himself.374 
This extreme judicial passivity debilitates the heart and soul of 
the statute. When Congress provided that the special court should 
periodically review the status of an independent counsel, it certainly 
did not intend that the court would do so based upon gut instincts 
or the most recent newspaper accounts. It obviously intended that 
372. See 487 U.S. 654, 682-83 (1988). 
373. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-511, at 23, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 806. 
374. See Order, In Re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Associates, Aug. 4, 1998; 
Gormley, supra note 260. The special court had done the same thing two years earlier, at the 
time of its first mandatory review. See Order, In Re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan 
Association, Aug. 5, 1996. The only reported instance in which the special court took more 
than pro forma action to determine if an investigation was "substantially completed" oc­
curred towards the end of the Iran-Contra case. There, President Ronald Reagan filed a 
document entitled "Suggestion that the Court Exercise its Power to Terminate the Office of 
Independent Counsel," requesting that the special court terminate the special prosecutor's 
office except for the "ministerial" function of completing his Fmal Report. The Court en­
tered an order directing Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh to "show cause" why his 
office should not be terminated in this fashion, and allowed the independent counsel to file a 
response thereto. Ultimately, the special court granted the President's request. See In re 
Oliver L. North, 10 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Judge Butzner dissented in part, arguing that 
the court should not use its termination power to exercise "control" over the independent 
counsel in this fashion. See In re North, 10 F.3d at 61-63. 
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the court would act as courts typically act, gathering information 
from necessary parties in order to make a reasoned decision. In the 
Whitewater example, the special court could have convened a pro­
ceeding (closed to the public if necessary) in order to solicit input 
from Attorney General Reno, Independent Counsel Starr and 
others, before determining whether Starr's work was "substantially 
complete" within the meaning of the statute.375 The absence of spe­
cific statutory authorization to do so, and the court's general "hands 
off'' approach, prevented the judiciary from carrying out its essen­
tial function. 
The duties of the special court may be relatively few in number. 
But with respect to each specifically enumerated power delegated 
to the court, from the beginning of an independent counsel investi­
gation to the end, the statute should make explicit what is implicit 
in Congress's scheme: that the court shall possess power to gather 
information, review materials in camera, request written input, con­
vene limited proceedings (where necessary), and otherwise exercise 
those auxiliary powers that courts routinely rely upon to do their 
jobs properly. Rather than violate separation of powers, this lim­
ited involvement would ensure that the court has the tools to do its 
job completely, and thus protect the institutional interests of all 
three branches of government.376 Indeed, once the court is placed 
into this hybrid role of appointing an independent counsel, estab­
lishing his or her jurisdiction, and performing certain judicial and 
quasi-executive functions (of a ministerial sort) until the investiga­
tion is ended, anything less seems to be a gross abdication of its 
responsibility. 
Finally, although the federal rules of appellate procedure and 
local rules do not apply to the special court, because it is not han-
375. This was particularly true since Starr's original charter limited him to the Whitewa­
ter matter. To the extent that the Attorney General authorized the expansion of jurisdiction 
into the Lewinsky case in the first place, based upon conversations with Starr about its poten­
tial link to Whitewater, the court would have benefitted from hearing from both the Attor­
ney General and the independent counsel in rehearsing their conversations and determining 
how far the extension of jurisdiction was meant to go. 
376. In other settings, the judicial branch has been given oversight functions to ensure 
that criminal prosecutions are being conducted fairly and even-handedly. See supra note 356 
and accompanying text. In the Third Circuit, for instance, if a grand jury subpoena is chal­
lenged, the federal courts require that government prosecutors supply them with "some pre­
liminary showing by affidavit that each item is at least relevant to an investigation being 
conducted by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and is not sought primarily 
for another purpose." See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d 
Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Schofield v. United States, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975). Such a minimal intrusion 
by the judicial branch upon the prosecutorial function, in order to responsibly monitor crimi­
nal cases, is deemed appropriate. 
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dling appeals from the district court in the usual sense,377 it is im­
perative that some sort of comprehensive rules (covering filing 
practices, service of process, hearings, etc. in the special court) be 
implemented if parties are to be treated uniformly and fairly in pro­
ceedings before that tribunal. At present, much of the interaction 
among independent counsel, the special court, and the Attorney 
General seems to be based upon ad hoc, ex parte, contacts.378 Two 
former attorneys for the target of a special prosecutor investigation 
have written: "[I]f the litigation process before the Special Division 
is to meet minimal standards of fair· practice," the creation of uni­
form rules and standards "are an essential prerequisite."379 
To correct this obvious gap in the statute, Congress should au­
thorize the Supreme Court, pursuant to its rulemaking power,380 to 
establish rules and standards for the special court such that the 
ground rules for all litigants are clear and even-handed. It should 
also carefully delineate between the functions of the special court 
and the functions of the ordinary federal district court when it 
comes to matters involving independent counsel investigations, so 
that this important line is not left to guess-work.381 
3. Give the Court Power to Replace an Independent Counsel 
Under Certain Circumstances 
Although it is a question of obvious importance, the statute 
never addresses whether the special court is empowered to replace 
one independent counsel with another, subsequent to appointment. 
The only putative precedent on this subject lies in the substitution 
of Robert Fiske with Kenneth Starr in the Whitewater investiga­
tion.382 However, Fiske was appointed by Attorney General Reno 
377. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). 
378. For one example of an ex parte motion by Starr, that raised some concern in the 
White House, see Stephen Labaton, Starr Accused of Misleading Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 1998, at A20 (discussing Starr's ex parte petition to send impeachment material to 
Congress). 
379. Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 142, at 546. The authors represented Theodore 
Olson, an Assistant Attorney General in the Reagan Administration who was alleged to have 
provided false information in congressional testimony. Olson was cleared of the charges. 
380. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994). 
381. The special court has been routinely criticized for establishing ambiguous ground 
rules for litigants who are the subject of investigations. See, e.g., Martin & Zerhusen, supra 
note 142, at 539. There is also much confusion as to whether certain decisions should be 
made by the special court, or the federal district court. For instance, it is far from clear 
whether the special court should have considered and granted Kenneth Starr's request to 
release the Starr Report to Congress, pursuant to Rule 6(e) of the Rules of Evidence, or 
whether this decision appropriately rested with the district court. 
382. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
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through her inherent powers, rather than via statute, during a lull in 
which the legislation had expired.383 Thus, when the court ap­
pointed Starr, it was exercising its power to appoint an independent 
prosecutor ab initio, rather than replacing one with another. It is 
thus wise for Congress to insert a provision into Section 596, specifi­
cally authorizing the court to relieve an independent counsel and 
substitute a different individual in his or her place, in the unusual 
event that the court concludes that the person originally appointed 
for the task is no longer capable of remaining (or appearing to re­
main) objective and neutraJ.384 
The legislative history makes clear that the hallmark of the in­
dependent counsel law was to foster public trust in the American 
system of government by replacing the Attorney General with a 
dispassionate outsider in certain high-profile cases.385 To the extent 
that this schema is frustrated by the appointment of a prosecutor 
who turns out to be biased in fact or in perception, the statute be­
comes a greater burden on the system than a benefit. Although it is 
undesirable to have an Attorney General who is biased and con­
flicted, conducting a high-level criminal investigation, it is even 
worse to have an independent counsel who is plagued with that 
same defect. The Attorney General (at least) is duly appointed by 
the chief executive and confirmed by the Senate, and thus operates 
squarely within the confines of the constitutional ballpark. The in­
dependent counsel is a hybrid creature on the fringes of the estab­
lished tripartite system of government. His or her existence can be 
justified only if he or she provides neutral expertise. 
In every politically-charged investigation, there inevitably will 
be impassioned and recurrent allegations that the independent 
counsel is "out to get the President" or other target.386 This alone 
383. See O'Sullivan, supra note 148, at 471-72. 
384. At least one state, Indiana, has statutorily required the courts to relieve a prosecutor 
from duty and appoint a replacement prosecutor where the former exhibits "bias, prejudice" 
or hostility toward the state's interest. See Hendricks v. Indiana ex rel. Northwest Ind. Crime 
Commn., Inc., 196 N.E.2d 66, 67 (Ind. 1964). A court in New York has specifically author­
ized the replacement of one special prosecutor with another, where the initial appointment 
was deemed a poor selection for the particular case. See People v. Gallagher, 143 A.D. 2d 
929, 533 N.Y.S. 2d 554 (1988). 
385. See 1973 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 101 
(remarks of Sen. Bayh). Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D. Del.), then-Chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, wrote in 1987: "There are certain extraordinary moments of crisis 
when the people's faith in the integrity and independence of their elected officials is caused 
to waiver . . . . To restore the utmost public confidence in the investigation of criminal 
wrongdoing by high-ranking government officials, the appointment of a special prosecutor 
then becomes necessary." Biden, supra note 107, at 886. 
386. In Watergate, President Nixon and his advisors vehemently asserted that Cox was a 
biased "Kennedyite" who was out to bring down the President. See GORMLEY, supra note 3, 
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should not justify a "substitution." At the same time, in extreme 
cases the court should retain the power to assess, after receiving 
input from the Attorney General, whether bias or the appearance 
thereof have crippled the particular independent counsel and ren­
dered him or her incapable of continuing in the position. In the 
Monica Lewinsky matter, for instance, evidence surfaced shortly af­
ter Kenneth Starr expanded his investigation into this subject that 
Mr. Starr had maintained ties to influential and wealthy Republi­
cans who were actively funding the Paula Jones civil case, and 
otherwise engaging in a covert battle against President Clinton.387 
Given the intense and sustained national uproar over Starr's per­
ceived anti-Clinton bias - particularly in connection with the Paula 
Jones sexual harassment suit - the prudent course would have 
been for the court to reassess whether its approval of Stai:r to head 
the separate Monica Lewinsky investigation was a sensible one. To 
the extent that Starr had become (or was perceived to be) incapable 
of undertaking a neutral investigation in the separate Monica 
Lewinsky matter,388 the simple solution would have been for the 
court to gather the facts, and intelligently render a decision whether 
to replace Starr with another (less controversial) appointee in that 
distinct case. Thus far, however, the special court has taken the 
position that the statute does not grant it that power.389 
The beauty of the independent counsel law is that it enables the 
judiciary to select from a pool of thousands of distinguished law­
yers, from across the expanse of the United States, in order to 
choose the very best person - a one hundred percent neutral indi­
vidual - suited for the sensitive contours of the particular case. 
Section 596 of the statute should be amended to facilitate that goal, 
by allowing the court to reassess and adjust its selections along the 
at 265-68. In the Iran-Contra affair, Lawrence Walsh was routinely accused of being bent on 
disrupting or destroying the Reagan and Bush Administrations. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, 
Against the Independent Counsel, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1993, at 24-25; Can't Beat 'Em?' Indict 
'Em!', DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 30, 1992, at 4. 
387. See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Starr Crosses the Line, WASH. PosT, June 26, 1997, at A19; 
Mark Hosenball & Evan Thomas, The Man Behind the Curtain, NEWSWEEK, May 18, 1998, at 
32; Gene Lyons, Kenneth Starr's Clear Partisanship, ARK. DEM.-GAZETTE, Aug. 13, 1997, at 
B9; Robert Parry, Was Hillary Right? Right-Wing Conspiracies & Hardball Politics, IN THESE 
TIMES, June 14, 1998, at 17. 
388. See, e.g., Jane Fullerton, First Lady Sees "Conspiracy:" "Nonsense," Starr Says As 
President's Secretary Testifies, ARK. DEM.-GAZETTE, Jan. 28, 1998, at Al. 
389. In 1994, Senator Carl Levin (D. Mich.) raised questions about Starr's ability to fairly 
conduct the Whitewater investigation. The special court "brushed aside" this challenge, indi­
cating that the statute did not authorize it to render opinions concerning a special prosecu­
tor's fitness to remain in that post, once appointed. See David Johnston, Three Judges Spurn 
Protest on Whitewater Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at A16; see also Statement of 
Senator Levin in the Congressional Record, supra note 245, at Sll,957. 
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way, in the unusual event that neutrality deteriorates, or the ap­
pearance of perceived bias undermines the public trust in the 
process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When Archibald Cox served as Watergate Special Prosecutor, in 
the troubled summer of 1973, there were enormous pressures upon 
him to expand his inquiry and tum his focus on a host of disparate 
allegations against President Richard M. Nixon. When charges sur­
faced, for instance, that President Nixon was using the Secret Ser­
vice to "bug" his own brother, Donald, there was a clamor -
particularly by Democrats - for the special prosecutor to investi­
gate. Cox declined.390 When information was brought to Cox's at­
tention suggesting that President Nixon may have funneled public 
funds into his homes in San Clemente, California, and Key Bis­
cayne, Florida, and failed to pay adequate taxes on the property, 
Cox elected not to investigate. He met with Attorney General 
Elliot Richardson, talked over his jurisdictional guidelines, and 
chose not to diverge from his principal Watergate assignment.391 
The special prosecutor law that was formulated between 1973 
and 1978 looked upon Cox as its model. It envisioned a special 
prosecutor of enormous self-restraint, who acted more as a neutral 
referee - dedicated to proving the truth or innocence of a high­
level official in order to quickly restore calm to the system of gov­
ernment - than a common prosecutor of street crimes. Indeed, 
the name of the statute was amended by Congress for this precise 
reason, in 1982, when Congress switched the title from "special 
prosecutor" to "independent counsel," in order to convey its vision 
of that unique office.392 As the legislative history reports: "[T]he 
name 'independent counsel' more accurately indicates that the in­
vestigation is being handled outside of normal government channels 
390. See Ken Gormley, Bring On the Impeachment Inquiry, Cm. TruB., Apr. 26, 1998, § 1 
at 21; Interview with Archibald Cox by Phillip Heymann et al., Feb. 19, 1974, Archibald Cox 
Papers, Box 24, folder 1, Harvard Law School Library, at 16. 
391. See Interview with Archibald Cox, supra note 390; see also GORMLEY, supra note 3, 
at 295-96; WATERGATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 195. Cox also declined to investigate 
charges that General Al Haig, President Nixon's Chief of Staff, might be improperly receiv­
ing two salaries, one from the military and one from the White House. See Interview with 
Archibald Cox, supra note 390, at 16. 
392. The statute was amended by Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-409, § 2{a){l)(A), (B), 96 Stat. 2039 {1983). 
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by an impartial investigator and does not suggest, as does the name 
'special prosecutor,' that an indictment has or will be brought."393 
This ennobled vision of the independent counsel has proven it­
self a naive failure. With the politicizing of independent counsel 
investigations since Watergate, by Democrats and Republicans 
alike, the temptation to use the statute as a cudgel to stun the oppo­
nent and gain swift political advantage has become irresistible,394 
With the vast expansion of independent counsel staffs, and the dele­
gation of more power to front-line advisors who are aggressive ca­
reer prosecutors by training,395 the artless vision of an independent 
counsel steeped in self-restraint has become antiqued. 
Yet our society cannot afford to scrap the independent counsel 
statute entirely. In moments of crisis when a serious institutional 
conflict arises, our system must have some failsafe device in place 
that prevents a constitutional meltdown. In Watergate, absent a 
special prosecutor, President Nixon's Department of Justice "might 
well have taken the position that the President was not subject to 
any judicial process and was not subject to the subpoena for the 
tapes."396 No mechanism in the legal system would have existed to 
challenge that position. It is true that the Watergate crisis resolved 
itself, in the end, without a statutory independent counsel position. 
But President Nixon came very close to succeeding in his effort to 
extinguish the Watergate investigation entirely, through the "Sten­
nis plan."397 And the constitutional stress created by the lack of a 
legal mechanism to deal with such crises came close to permanently 
damaging the American system of government. It is hardly worth 
risking such irreversible institutional harm in future Watergates. 
393. S. REP. No. 97-496, at 18 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3554. Profes­
sor Beth Nolan called the new name "a benign-sounding title that suggests neutrality." No­
lan, supra note 142, at 18. A later House report explained: "This change was made to 
remove any implication that the subject of an investigation under the provisions of this stat­
ute had been already determined to have committed the alleged crime." H.R. REP. No. 100-
316, at 10 n.2 (1987). 
394. See Gormley, supra note 170. 
395. For a profile of the principal prosecutors employed by Whitewater independent 
counsel Kenneth Starr, see Caldwell, supra note 289, at 129-31, 146. 
396. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference, supra note 164, at 1586 (remarks of Archibald 
Cox); see also Walsh, supra note 193, at 2389 (arguing that Act will prevent another "Satur­
day Night Massacre"). For an argument, however, that a special prosecutor law is not neces­
sary because such crises will work themselves out politically, as they did in Watergate, see 
Joseph E. DiGenova, The Independent Counsel Act: A Good Time to End a Bad Idea, 86 
GEO. L.J. 2299, 2305 (1998). 
397. For a discussion of how close President Nixon came to succeeding in his plan to 
abolish the special prosecutor and derailing the Watergate investigation, see GORMLEY, 
supra note 3, at 371-77. 
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In any event, American society has become accustomed to and 
reliant upon special prosecutors. They will not disappear, no mat­
ter what course Congress chooses. If the independent counsel stat­
ute is allowed to expire in 1999, the system of government will 
simply revert to increased ad hoc appointments of special prosecu­
tors, and increased calls for Congressional appointments of special 
investigators, when allegations of misconduct in the executive 
branch arise.398 It is far more prudent to rely upon a solid statutory 
mechanism, with an established set of ground-rules, than upon a 
hit-or-miss method that relies upon the vagaries of politics to guard 
against serious conflicts of interest within the executive branch. 
The present statutory model, which combines limited control by the 
Justice Department with ministerial oversight by a special judicial 
panel, may not be perfect, but it is still preferable to any other sys­
tem that we have invented.399 
Yet, major reforms are necessary if the statute is to resemble 
Congress's original design. The image of a special prosecutor riding 
in on a white horse, restoring public trust, and riding off quickly 
does not square with Washington life circa 1999. Not only have the 
politics of the situation become more brutal now that both parties 
have learned to manipulate the independent counsel law, following 
Watergate, but the media has become a silent partner in the corrup­
tion of the statute. Journalists have cast aside time honored stan­
dards of professionalism, in the rush to publish startling assertions 
of official misconduct (however unsubstantiated) in the impatient 
world of internet news.400 In part, the statute must be rehabilitated 
based upon a renewed commitment by the special court to search 
out appointees willing to exercise self-restraint, even where the 
temptations to become dragged into political battles and media ex­
travaganzas are enormous. In part the rehabilitation must be 
brought about by the forced leadership of Congress, in overhauling 
the law radically. Until the original vision of an independent coun­
sel as a neutral referee is specifically injected into the words of the 
398. For a discussion of ad hoc appointments, see supra discussion at notes 231-34 and 
accompanying text. 
399. For other scholars and commentators who have supported the preservation of the 
independent counsel statute, albeit with certain reforms, see Dash, supra note 248, at 2094-
95; Harriger, supra note 180, at 2116-17; Walsh, supra note 193, at 2381-82, 2389; Archibald 
Cox, Curbing Special Counsels, N.Y. TIMES Dec 12 1996, at Al. 
400. See Dash, supra note 248, at 2094-95; Norman J. Ornstein, Doing Congress's Dirty 
Work, 86 GEo. L.J. 2179, 2189-90; Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 
GEO L.J. 2267, 2269-71, 2277-79 (1998). 
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statute, it will remain one of the greatest legislative failures of the 
20th century. 
It is better for Congress to allow the statute to lapse in 1999, 
temporarily, in order to carry out this task properly, than to rush to 
a deadline and create the problems of the past anew. Without dra­
matic changes of the sort outlined above, few individuals worth at­
tracting to public office - Presidents, Vice._Presidents, cabinet 
officers, or hundreds of other public servants - will be willing to 
endure public service in the next century. 
No matter how cynical our nation may have become, in the span 
of time since Watergate, such a prospect should give us great pause. 
